

CONFIDENTIAL

NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

INTERNAL USE ONLY

This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable.

31 OCTOBER 1975

NO. 22	PAGE
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS	1
GENERAL	29
WEST EUROPE	39
NEAR EAST	41
AFRICA	42
EAST ASIA	43
LATIN AMERICA	49

25X1A

Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days.

CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

Washington Post
31 OCT 1975

The Washington Star
Thursday, October 20, 1975
Crosby S. Noyes

Kissinger CIA Group Didn't Meet

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

Nearly 40 covert Central Intelligence Agency operations were approved between 1972 and 1974 without a single meeting of the special White House group that was ostensibly in charge of them, it was disclosed yesterday.

Testifying before the House intelligence committee, a recently retired State Department intelligence expert said the National Security Council's so-called Forty Committee did not have a single formal session between April of 1972 and December of 1974.

The witness, James R. Gardner, who served for nine years as the State Department's liaison officer with the Forty Committee, said the committee's chairman, Henry A. Kissinger, apparently preferred to approve or at times reject the secret operations after "telephone votes," without face-to-face meetings at which their merits could be debated and discussed.

"Sometimes he felt he just didn't have the time for it and anyway, he knew what he wanted to be done," Gardner added later to reporters. He likened the Forty Committee under Kissinger to "Lincoln's Cabinet" — with Kissinger's vote being the only one that counts.

Covert operations, which Gardner said used to be far more numerous than their recent 20-per-year average, have ranged all the way from the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion to paying off politicians in Chile and raising a sunken Soviet submarine from the Pacific Ocean floor.

The Forty Committee, which has existed under various names since the mid-50s, has also been in charge of certain secret intelligence-gathering activities such as U-2 spy flights. Kissinger is chairman by virtue of his post as special assistant to the President for national security affairs, a job he retained after his appointment in 1973 as Secretary of State.

Other members are CIA Director William E. Colby, Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements Jr., Gen. George S. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Under Secretary of State for

These are hard times for the intelligence community. To judge from the expressions of horror and shock from our liberal legislators, we are back in the era of an intelligence-gathering which held that "gentlemen don't read other people's mail."

Of course, it's perfectly O.K. for private citizens to steal secret government documents and deliver them by the crateful to sympathetic newspapers. But let the government be accused of reading the mail or listening to the phone calls of a few people suspected of being security risks or involved in the international drug traffic, and the foundations of our fundamental civil liberties are held to be in deadly peril.

It is very fashionable these days to be against any intelligence-gathering activity. It is even fashionable to be against national security. Everything of this sort is automatically related to the excesses of the Nixon administration in the Watergate affair.

We are well on the way to a kind of reverse McCarthyism in which the most elementary activities of the various security agencies are denounced as deep-dyed plots against individual freedom.

Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco.

Gardner, an officer of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research who became liaison officer for secret CIA operations in 1966, said that the approximately 40 covert operations authorized between 1972 and 1974 were all subject to "telephone votes" by Forty Committee members, but that except for Kissinger, committee members were often not given detailed explanations of why the programs had been approved.

The official records of the Forty Committee, Gardner added, also became far less detailed under Kissinger than they had been in 1966. Also, he told the Pike committee, the number of covert operations the CIA had approved in the world has "fallen steadily, even 'radically,' since 1966.

In this I suspect there is a large element of hypocrisy and political miscalculation. Americans may deplore the need for government snooping on the activities of their fellow-citizens. But most would also recognize the legitimacy of mail interception and phone taps in cases involving national security, kidnapping or organized crime.

It is hard to contend — as some liberals do — that security of communications is a constitutional-right guaranteed to all citizens.

From its inception, the telephone has been the most insecure means of private communication. Almost everyone over the age of 30 has lived in a community of party lines where every conversation was assumed to be monitored and in which the telephone operator was always the best-informed gal in town. In every foreign country, the tapping of resident foreigners is automatically expected.

A few years ago, I remember calling Lyndon Johnson's presidential assistant McGeorge Bundy at the White House with an indiscreet question, "Surely," said Bundy, "You can't expect an answer to that — especially over the telephone."

Much the same goes for

the sanctity of the mails as an inviolable constitutional right of every American citizen. Many of those now leading the protest against the intelligence services spent plenty of disagreeable hours, as officers in the American Army in World War II, reading the letters of their own enlisted men — a duty made the more distasteful by the presumption that officers' mail was uncensored.

True, we are not in a state of war today. But the principle that the privacy of communication is subordinate to the requirements of national security — and presumably also the war against organized crime in this country — would not be seriously disputed by a great majority of American citizens.

The conflict between the rights of the individual and the rights of society, represented by a democratically elected government, is not exactly new. What is essential today is that these differing — and not always easily compatible — rights be redefined in a way which will protect honest citizens (by legal rather than political definition) without compromising the right of the state to defend itself.

It is one of the more urgent tasks of the post-Watergate period.

Christian Science Monitor
29 October 1975

Readers write

In regard to your editorial concerning the CIA's spy files I should like to agree and add my response. Due to the beatings of some of our legislators it looks like it may be no time until we have many vacant posts among the undercover operatives attempting to guard our national security. Perhaps it would be practical to ask those parties determined to fill those vacancies. After all who's more able to handle intrigue than a politician who has made it all the way to Washington?

I am appalled at the situation.

Seal Beach, Calif.

Joanne Sales

E NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1975

U.S. Intelligence System: How Well Does It Do Its Job?

By JOHN M. CREWDSON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 17—As the House Select Committee on Intelligence closes its doors to prepare the next phase of its investigation, it leaves behind what many see as a troubling answer to the question of how well American intelligence performs its principal task—predicting events of international significance in time to allow the makers of foreign policy to prepare or react.

The conclusion that seems to emerge from public hearings over the last month is that the half-dozen or so Federal agencies charged with gathering and evaluating foreign intelligence do not provide a reliable early-warning system where such things as wars, invasions and political upheavals are concerned.

Representative Otis G. Pike, the Suffolk County Democrat who heads the 13-member select committee, found the evidence so disturbing that he recently went so far as to question this country's ability to detect in advance a threat to its own shores.

Four Crises Studied

"If an attack were to be launched on America in the very near future," Mr. Pike declared, "it is my belief that America would not know that the attack were about to be launched."

The Central Intelligence Agency disputed that assertion, but so far no one has seriously challenged Mr. Pike's assessment that, in return for an intelligence budget that approaches \$7-billion, the country does not seem to be getting its money's worth.

In the public hearings, the committee chose to concentrate on four international crises in which the United States had a military or diplomatic interest, and by which it was to some extent caught off guard—the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam, the 1973 war in the Middle

East, the military coup in Portugal and the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey.

Despite delays in obtaining documentary evidence, occasioned by dispute with President Ford over the committee's handling of secret materials, the panel was able to establish that in each of the four instances warnings of what was to happen failed to reach the top.

Deliberate Effort Seen

The committee is also understood to have received documents showing failures of intelligence in advance of other events, including the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and its allies and the detonation of a nuclear device by India, but those materials are still secret.

The reasons for the intelligence failures are varied and complex. In some instances, raw intelligence collected was incomplete or simply in error. In others, good intelligence was misinterpreted by analysts.

In the case of the 1968 Tet offensive, the committee heard assertions that American leaders, in deference to preconceived policies and for fear of inflaming antiwar sentiment at home, had ignored indications that the Communists' forces might be twice as large as the official estimates.

Samuel A. Adams, a former C.I.A. analyst who specialized in studying the Vietcong, recounted his contention that this country's "astonishment" at the scope of the Tet offensive had resulted from a deliberate effort within the intelligence community "to portray the Vietcong as weaker than they actually were."

Mr. Adams quoted from previously secret cablegrams between Saigon and Washington that resulted in the unannounced dropping of two categories of Vietcong forces from the official strength estimate to keep it at its previous level of 299,000.

Mr. Adams's charges of corruption were not repeated by witnesses who testified on

Cyprus, Portugal and the Middle East. But their accounts of failure to clearly see or correctly interpret key signals were equally dismaying to most of the committee members.

One subsequent assessment obtained by the committee said "there was an intelligence failure in the weeks preceding the outbreak of war in the Middle East" in October, 1973.

Analysts Are Blamed

The fault, it said, lay not with the collectors of intelligence, who passed on "plentiful, ominous and often accurate" indications that the threat of war was serious, but rather with the analysts who were assuring officials that "neither side appears to be bent on initiating hostilities."

Some of the best intelligence, the committee was told, was picked up by the National Security Agency, which monitors the military communications of other countries.

But some of this intelligence could not be passed on to the Watch Committee, set up to keep an eye out for trouble spots, because its members were not clear to receive such sensitive material.

Ray Cline, the State Department's director of research and intelligence at the time of the 1973 war, testified that he had concluded hours before the fighting began that hostilities probably were imminent and he had asked that the message be passed to Secretary of State Kissinger. Mr. Cline said he learned later that Mr. Kissinger never got the message because his secretariat "did not want to trouble him at that late hour."

Three intelligence officials told the committee that their agencies—the C.I.A., the State Department and the Defense Intelligence Agency—had been surprised by last year's overthrow of the Portuguese Government by leftist military leaders.

According to William G. Hyland, the current State Department intelligence chief, no specific warning was provided

by intelligence agencies despite indications in the months before.

Another witness, Keith Clark, an intelligence officer for Western Europe, said the intelligence community had failed to compile information about the dissident military officers who led the coup in Portugal.

According to evidence and testimony assembled by the House committee, C.I.A. analysts studying the Cyprus situation in July, 1974, tempered their previous warnings that the Government of Archbishop Makarios, the President of Cyprus, was endangered by the military regime in Greece.

That reversal, according to a second post-mortem report made available to the committee, occurred a few days before President Makarios was unseated and was founded on a single C.I.A. report from Athens suggesting that the Government there "had now decided not to move against Makarios, at least for the time being."

Ability to Foresee

The Cyprus post-mortem report comments on an "inability to foresee critical events in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary."

"Ultimately," the report continues, "intelligence will be judged in the context of its ability to provide the consumer with premonitory assessments. The ability of the community to provide its consumers with the news after a crisis has erupted is widely recognized."

The House committee drew no conclusions about what factors might account for the intelligence failures, but the C.I.A. officers who wrote the Cyprus post-mortem report offered one possible explanation.

Among analysts, they said, there exists "the perhaps subconscious conviction and hope that ultimately reason and rationality will prevail, that apparently irrational moves will not be made by essentially rational men."

military services, the C.I.A. and the Veterans' Administration. It would also make the body permanent and add a number of officials including the director of Central Intelligence and the Secretaries of Defense and H.E.W. The revelations over recent months of the irresponsible manner in which the C.I.A. and the Army experimented on people and the tragic results of some of those experiments constitute a powerful argument for introducing accountability into the process of secret experimentation.

The legislation is imperiled by jurisdictional objections of the armed services and veterans' affairs committees on both sides of Capitol Hill. Such territorial imperatives should not be allowed to impede this legislation. The protesting committees have never bestirred themselves sufficiently to insure that these efforts to increase human knowledge are carried out with a decent regard for health and the lives of the people involved. The commission as strengthened by the new bill, would afford far greater assurance of responsibility in future experimentation than is ever likely to come from the established committees.

NEW YORK TIMES

17 October 1975

Human Experimentation

A pending Senate bill to broaden the responsibilities of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research offers a simple but promising approach to a difficult and often painful problem.

The commission was established by Congress last year to take a two-year look at the practices, ethics and values involved in using human beings as research subjects. Formed after exposure of the infamous Alabama syphilis experiments, the commission was empowered to propose regulations for such experimentation to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. Under the law, the Secretary is required, if he chooses not to promulgate the proposed regulation, to give his reasons in writing.

The new bill would enlarge the commission's jurisdiction to include experimentation conducted by the

The Washington Star

Wednesday, October 22, 1975

Foreign Service Careers and the CIA

By Norman Kempster
Washington Star Staff Writer

A close and friendly relationship with the CIA has become virtually "a prerequisite for promotion" to top posts in the State Department, a middle-level Foreign Service officer has told the House Intelligence Committee staff.

"You aren't going to have an ambassador anywhere in the world unless he has a record of working closely with the CIA," the officer said in a telephone interview after an hour-long unannounced talk with a committee lawyer.

The officer, who declined to be identified by name, said the extensive use of embassy posts to provide "official cover" for overseas CIA operatives produces a cooperative relationship between the agency and State Department management both in Washington and abroad.

STATE DEPARTMENT personnel officers must be aware of undercover CIA agents assigned to embassies, he said.

And Foreign Service officers who buck the CIA just don't get promoted, he said.

The officer said he had urged the committee to continue its efforts to question junior and middle-level State Department officials as part of its investigation of the effectiveness of the nation's intelligence efforts.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has refused to permit employees below the assistant secretary level to answer the committee's questions on matters of policy.

THE PANEL VOTED yesterday to avoid an immediate showdown with Kissinger on the issue. The secretary was summoned to appear either Oct. 30 or Oct. 31 to defend his policy in person at a public hearing.

The committee decided to call Kissinger as a witness after rejecting, 8-5, a proposal to launch contempt of Congress proceedings against him.

The middle-level officer who was interviewed by the committee staff said the lawmakers should insist on talking to working-level officers because they would be more willing than their superiors to discuss CIA "penetration and manipulation" of the State Department.

THE CIA'S PENCHANT for secrecy makes it difficult to trace the agency's influence. In many cases, he said, records do not exist.

For instance, he said, as an acting counsel in South Africa in the 1950s, he was told to show a potential informant a fake letter planted in the consulate's safe. After the informant left, he said, he was told to destroy the document.

"There are no records of much of what they do," he said. "They burn the records."

OTIS PIKE, D-N.Y., chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, and four other Democrats wanted to start action against Kissinger for refusing to comply with the committee's subpoena for a

memo that criticizes U.S. handling of last year's Cyprus crisis. But an impromptu coalition of four Democrats and four Republicans decided to make one more try at a compromise.

"It was my opinion that we should proceed against Dr. Kissinger as we would against an ordinary mortal," Pike said sardonically.

It was understood that State Department officials were working on possible compromise proposals to assuage the committee without violating Kissinger's rule barring junior and middle-level employees from discussing policy matters.

Pike objects to the order, which he said prohibits the committee from finding out the full details of the effectiveness of the CIA and other intelligence agencies. But he may be willing to compromise after he has a chance to confront Kissinger face-to-face.

THE COMMITTEE has subpoenaed a memo written by Thomas Boyatt, who was the department's top Cyprus expert at the time of the coup that ousted Archbishop Makarios from the presidency of the island nation. Boyatt has confirmed that the memo was sharply critical of U.S. policy, but he has declined to discuss

the specifics.

Kissinger has refused to give the committee the memo because it was sent through a special "dissent channel" intended to permit middle-level officials to object to policy without being publicly identified with their suggestions.

The secretary contends his objective is to protect Foreign Service officers from the sort of public condemnation they received during the era of the late Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy.

But Pike argued that Congress is so weak "compared with the executive branch" that it can cause little trouble. He said government employees have far more to fear from their own departments than from Congress.

"GOOD, HONEST MEN who state their views are punished within the bureaucracy while those that are gagged or go along, keeping silent, are promoted in the bureaucracy," Pike said. "To me, this is a far greater danger to our country than a charge of neo-McCarthyism."

Pike was the only member of the committee who would discuss the issue with reporters following the session. The committee's rules make the chairman the official spokesman.

POST-DISPATCH, St. Louis
25 Sept. 1975

A CIA Pretense

At a press briefing in St. Louis Director William E. Colby of the Central Intelligence Agency indicated that by such appearances he is trying to repair the damage to his agency done by adverse publicity stemming from congressional investigations. If success depended only on a cool and urbane manner, Mr. Colby accomplished his purpose here.

But the press has an obligation to look behind the friendly smile and the smooth answer. At one point Mr. Colby was asked to comment on testimony before the House intelligence committee by Samuel A. Adams, former principal CIA analyst of Viet Cong troop strength, to the effect that the agency, yielding to military and political pressure, had underrated the adversary's strength just before the 1968 Tet offensive. Mr. Colby replied that there had simply been a disagreement between Mr. Adams and others in the agency over categories of Viet Cong forces and that there was no deception or changing of figures.

This answer just does not square with the House testimony and in a detailed article in

the May issue of *Harper's* magazine. He reported that in 1966 he had found that the Pentagon was using an estimate of Viet Cong guerrilla strength (103,573) that had been thought up by the South Vietnamese and that had remained unchanged for two years. After studying reports from the field, Mr. Adams estimated as early as 1966 that total Viet Cong troop strength was 600,000 rather than the 270,000 figure used by the American command.

Yet despite strenuous protests by Mr. Adams, the only CIA analyst on this assignment, the agency, under orders from Director Richard Helms, accepted the American command's figure of 270,000 as late as 1968.

The deceptive figure, put out in response to pressure from Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and Gen. Creighton Abrams, was only changed after the disastrous Tet offensive, which cost heavy U.S. casualties, made clear that the military estimates had been wrong.

By pretending that the only issue here was a difference of opinion between Mr. Adams and the CIA, the agency is not helping the CIA's image.

BALTIMORE SUN
22 Oct. 1975

CIA probes linked to aide's execution

Boston (AP)—An official of an unspecified Middle Eastern country was executed for supplying information to the Central Intelligence Agency after the official's identity was determined through testimony in congressional probes of the CIA, the *Boston Globe* said yesterday.

The newspaper quoted a congressional source as saying the execution took place recently.

The *Globe* said its report was based on at least a score of interviews with intelligence sources inside and outside the CIA.

NEW YORK TIMES
22 Oct. 1975

C.I.A. 'MAIL COVER' PUT AT 2.7 MILLION

215,820 of Letters Opened
During a 20-Year Program,
Senate Panel Is Told

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 21—The Central Intelligence Agency opened more than 215,000 pieces of mail in a New York operation that many senior agency officials knew to be illegal, it was disclosed today at a Senate committee hearing.

Testimony and documents introduced before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence sketched a program of intrusion upon the United States mails far more extensive than was indicated in the Rockefeller Commission report on the intelligence community last June or in previous Congressional testimony.

Figures made available to the committee by the C.I.A. showed that it photographed the exterior of 2,705,726 pieces of mail to and from the Soviet Union in its New York program between 1953 and 1973. This, testimony established, was one in every 13 pieces of mail to and from the Soviet Union. The agency opened 215,820 individual letters.

Similar operations were conducted on the West Coast, in Hawaii and in New Orleans, but all were of shorter duration. No figures were given for these operations.

Two C.I.A. internal investigations of the New York mail project, one in 1960 and the other in 1969, found the operation of little intelligence value, the men who conducted the reviews testified.

Gordon Stewart, Inspector General of the C.I.A. in 1969, said that his office was "quite surprised to find such an endeavor going on" and that, after an internal investigation, he recommended that the project be turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which was receiving a large portion of the intelligence information.

Mr. Stewart and John Glennon, and Thomas Abernathy, former staff members in the Inspector General's Office, said they believed the project was illegal. Moreover, Mr. Glennon testified, "obviously everyone [involved in it at the C.I.A.] realized it was illegal."

As early as 1962, the C.I.A. became concerned that the mail opening might inadvertently be made public and it devised cover stories for those involved, according to agency documents.

"As an example of additional safeguards to the project," one memorandum said, "high-level police contacts with the New York City Police Department are enjoyed, which would preclude any uncontrolled inquiry in the event police action was indicated."

A committee source said there was no evidence that the New York police knew about the illegal mail opening.

The 20-year project appeared to pick up speed in the late nineteen-fifties and again in the early nineteen-seventies. During these periods, figures indicated, the C.I.A. was examining peak numbers of mail items, and between 1970 and 1972 averaged about 2 million a year.

According to C.I.A. memorandums, the project was originally proposed to postal officials as one in which the C.I.A. would only photograph the outside of envelopes—in effect, a "mail cover." New York was selected because that was where mail to the Soviet Union was funneled.

Subsequently, by the mid-nineteen-fifties, large numbers of letters were being opened, but it was unclear whether postal officials or Attorneys General were fully informed.

According to testimony, members of the C.I.A.'s Office of Security chose mail at random from the traffic between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as looking for letters of certain persons. More than 25 million letters were routed to the Soviet Union during the period.

There was no direct testimony on how the mail was opened, but intelligence sources said that the C.I.A. at first used a steam system, but later developed an oven that "baked" the letters open. After the mail was opened, the contents were photographed and the letters were resealed and sent on their way.

It was unclear whether the C.I.A. obtained approval over the years from Postmasters General or Attorneys General.

One memorandum made public today indicated that Richard M. Helms, former Director of Central Intelligence, had briefed Edward Day, Postmaster General in 1961, and that Mr. Day permitted the project to continue but "he did not want to be informed in any greater detail on the handling."

According to the Rockefeller Commission report, Mr. Helms briefed Attorney General John N. Mitchell and Postmaster General Winton Blount in 1971, and they fully "concurred."

In its report, the Rockefeller Commission said at one point that "some 8,700 items were opened and the contents analyzed"; at another point, it said the project had "expanded by 1959 to include the opening of over 13,000 letters a year." But at no point did the commission make public the total numbers of letters involved.

Testimony before other Congressional committees and the select committee had established earlier that the mail program intruded upon the mail of Senators, Representatives

NEW YORK TIMES
23 Oct. 1975

Helms Says Search Of Mail Was Illegal

By LINDA CHARLTON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 22 —

Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence from 1966 to 1973, testified today that he knew then that the agency's mail-opening program was illegal. But he said he assumed that Allen W. Dulles, the intelligence agency's director who started the operation in 1953, had "made his legal peace with it."

Mr. Helms, the only witness this afternoon before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, also conceded that a 1970 report to President Nixon that he and others had signed, and that stated that the mail-opening operation had been discontinued, was untrue.

But he added that there had been "no intention to mislead" the President. He explained that he had believed that the statement had referred to a similar operation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which had been discontinued.

It was disclosed during testimony yesterday that the agency had opened more than 215,000 pieces of mail in New York from 1953 to 1973 and had photographed the exterior of 2,705,726 pieces of mail to and

and other public officials, including Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho. Mr. Church is chairman of the Senate select committee.

Suspension of Intercepts

WASHINGTON, Oct. 21 (UPI)

— The State Department apparently asked the C.I.A. to suspend interception of mail to and from China in connection with President Nixon's visit in 1972, a Senate investigator indicated today.

Questioning C.I.A. witnesses during a hearing of the Senate intelligence committee, Senator Walter Huddleston, Democrat of Kentucky, asked whether the witnesses knew about a stop order on all interccepts involving "an Asiatic country" in connection with the visit "of an executive of this country to that country."

The witnesses said they were unaware of it, but it was clear from previous disclosures that Senator Huddleston referred to a C.I.A. operation in San Francisco that sporadically intercepted airmail to and from Communist nations in the Far East between 1969 and 1973.

Senator Huddleston, glancing at documents, said the suspension request was made by the Secretary of State—who, in 1972, was William P. Rogers.

Secretary of State Kissinger, then Presidential assistant for national security affairs, made the first secret trip to Peking in July, 1971, to arrange for Mr. Nixon's visit, which took place in February, 1972.

from the Soviet Union.

Difference in Testimony

Replying to questions about whether the agency had obtained approval of its program from Postmaster-General, Mr. Helms was occasionally at variance with two of the three witnesses this morning: all former Postmasters General.

They were J. Edward Day, Postmaster General from 1961 to 1963, and Winton M. Blount, who held that position from 1969 to 1971.

The third was John A. Gronouski, who headed the Post Office Department from 1963 to 1965; he said flatly and angrily that he knew nothing of the program and would have opposed it if he had. This was confirmed both by Mr. Helms and by an internal C.I.A. memorandum.

Mr. Day, however, said that shortly after he took office in 1961, Mr. Helms, Mr. Dulles (who died in 1969) and Kermit Roosevelt, then a C.I.A. official, visited him, saying they wanted to tell him "something very secret." Mr. Day recalled that his reply was: "Do I have to know about it?" And was told he did not. He added that he was "sure that I wasn't told anything about opening mail."

Told of Secret 'Project'

Mr. Blount said he was told about a secret "project" in which the Post Office Department was cooperating with the C.I.A., but not specifically the opening of mail. He asked if he should seek legal advice from the general counsel, he said, and was told that the matter of legality had been discussed with the then Attorney General, John W. Mitchell.

He did know, he said, that the mail of "avowed enemies of this country" was being "interrupted"—that is, taken out of the "main stream," and the front and back of the envelopes photocopied.

The committee issued a subpoena today for Mr. Mitchell's appearance Friday, but his attorney, William G. Hundley, is expected to argue tomorrow to have the subpoena withdrawn on the ground that Mr. Mitchell's appearance might prejudice a pending appeal of his conviction in the Watergate cover-up case.

Mr. Helms, in his testimony, said he believed that "we told him [Mr. Day] the truth about the project," but that he could not be sure. A C.I.A. memorandum referring to the briefing with Day says merely that the officials "withheld no relevant details."

As for Mr. Blount, Mr. Helms said that he recollected taking with him to the Blount briefing "a couple of pieces of what we got out of the program"—typewritten copies of material that would indicate that we had been reading the correspondence between certain individuals in the United States and the Soviet Union.

He appeared anxious to avoid contradicting Mr. Blount's testimony, and said that perhaps he had not been "specific enough" about the program.

Mr. Helms said that Arthur E. Summerfield, Postmaster,

The Washington Star

Wednesday, October 22, 1975

Never Knew CIA Was Opening Mail, Ex-Postal Chiefs Say

By Norman Kempster and Orr Kelly

From News Services

Three former postmasters general today told a Senate committee they never knew the CIA was opening mail. Two of them conceded they really did not want to know anyway and the third said he couldn't find out.

J. Edward Day, who headed the Post Office from the beginning of the Kennedy administration in January 1960 until Aug. 9, 1963, said he was told the CIA was engaged in a secret project involving the mails but he said he shut off the conversation because he did not want to know about it.

Winton M. Blount, head of the department during the first two years of the Nixon administration, said he was told that mail was being removed from the Post Office, given to the CIA and returned the next day.

But he said, "I don't know what was being done with it." He said he never asked if it was being opened.

In contrast, John A. Gronouski, Day's successor, said he was never told the CIA was opening mail although he tried repeatedly to find out about any cases in which mail was delayed or diverted.

"I THINK IT is incredible that a person at a top position in government could have something like this going on in his organization and not know about it," Gronouski said. "It wasn't that I didn't try to know about it."

A CIA memo dated April 23, 1965, indicated Gronouski was not told about the project because a Senate subcommittee was investigating privacy at that time and CIA officials decided that the postmaster general should not be put in a position where he could reveal the project to the committee.

The CIA has confirmed that for about 20 years, from 1953 through 1973, it opened mail between the United States and Communist countries. Of the seven postmasters general who served during that period, the CIA has said that three were informed and four were not. Day and Blount are the only two still living whom the CIA has said were briefed on the project.

FORMER CIA DIRECTOR Richard Helms has testified that he personally was involved in briefing both Day and Blount. He has said under oath that he told both of them mail was being opened.

A CIA memo placed in the committee record said Helms personally showed "a few selected examples" of the product of the mail opening operation to Blount.

The June 3, 1971 memo said: "Mr. Helms showed the Postmaster General a few selected examples of

the operation's product, including an item relating to Eldridge Cleaver which attracted the PMG's special interest."

Blount testified that, although Cleaver's name was mentioned during the meeting, he can recall no evidence to show that the mail of the black revolutionary was being opened.

Both Blount and Day told the committee that they believed the CIA was protecting the national interest and should not be impeded.

"I THOUGHT THEN and I think now that the CIA has certain powers that put them in a different class from other people... The CIA is something different and very special," Day said.

Sen. Walter F. Mondale, D-Minn., responded, "We are both lawyers. I don't recall seeing that in the Constitution."

Blount said he supported any CIA project as long as it was legal. He said he assumed the mail opening was legal because Helms told him that then Atty. Gen. John N. Mitchell had been informed.

The CIA has since conceded the operation was illegal.

"My understanding was that mail would be removed to the mail stream and given to the CIA and returned to the mail stream the next day," Blount said.

"After being read?" Mondale asked.

"I didn't know what was being done with it," Blount said.

"Didn't you ask?" Mondale said.

"I don't recall," Blount answered.

The CIA memo said Helms briefed Mitchell the day before he saw Blount and that Mitchell "fully concurred in the value of the operation and had no 'hangups' concerning it."

Helms is scheduled to testify and is sure to be asked why he had personally supported the operation — code-named HTLINGUAL — even though other officials of the CIA had long felt it was clearly illegal and of dubious value as a source of intelligence.

Between 1953 and 1973, when the operation was stopped, the committee was told, a CIA office in New York filmed the envelopes of 2,705,726 letters and opened 215,820 of them. The largest single recipient of information from the intercepted mail — 57,846 items — was the FBI.

Howard Osborn, former director of security for the agency, told the committee his office was responsible for running the New York operation, but he said he did it for another CIA division.

"It was their Cadillac. They built it, they drove it. My job was to maintain it, to change the oil," he explained, and then added, a few minutes later, "The product was worthless."

General from 1953 to 1961, has been told only that the agency wanted to photograph envelopes, and that other Postmasters General during this period were not informed at all about the operation.

'No Written Record'

He said that he could not recall if Mr. Dulles had told President Eisenhower or even Mr. Dulles's brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, about the program, nor whether President Kennedy had been informed. He said that he might have told President Johnson during a discussion of C.I.A. matters in 1967, adding: "I have no written record of what I told Johnson."

Similarly, he said he did not recall telling President Nixon. Later, talking to reporters in the corridor outside the hearing room, he explained why he had no record about what he might have told these Presidents: "You've got to protect the President from the dirty stuff." "There's got to be a break," he said. "The President can't survive [if he is tied to this sort of activity]. But somebody's got to take the heat. So let old Helms take it, and I'm taking it. You can't ask the President to sign off on illegal activity."

As for his assumption that Mr. Dulles had resolved the legal question about the mail-opening, Mr. Helms said in his testimony that the former Director of Central Intelligence was "a much respected figure" and "it would not have occurred to me to fault him on a matter of law."

He said that he could not recall "ever having discussed" the operation with any of the Congressional C.I.A. oversight committees.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 October 1975

Ex-C.I.A. Agent Loses Suit Over Raid on His Arsenal

PHILADELPHIA, Oct. 17 (AP) — Federal Judge Leon J. Higginbotham dismissed a lawsuit yesterday brought by a former agent of the Central Intelligence Agency, George E. Fassnacht, against two police officers who raided his weapons arsenal in 1971, because the two-year statute of limitations had expired.

Policemen raided Mr. Fassnacht's home in the Fox Chase section June 20, 1971, and confiscated an arsenal of guns, explosives and ammunition from his basement, the suit said. The weapons were suppressed as evidence Oct. 27, 1972, because the police had no search warrant.

Mr. Fassnacht, a 42-year-old former city ballistics expert, was acquitted in December, 1973, of charges of illegal possession of an arsenal of explosives and dangerous weapons.

The Washington Star
October 23, 1975

Mail Spies Stopped By Fear

By Norman Kempster
Washington Star Staff Writer

William Cotter, the former chief postal inspector cast by the Rockefeller Commission in the role of hero for stopping the CIA's mail opening program, says he acted only out of fear that the cover had already blown off the operation.

Cotter told the Senate Intelligence Committee he became concerned that the project had been discovered after he received a letter from the Federation of American Scientists asking if the Post Office permits other agencies of government to open first-class mail.

The question fit perfectly the 20-year operation in which postal employees turned their heads while the CIA rifled mail sacks looking for suspicious letters.

"It appeared to me that the project was known," Cotter said. He noted that the federation's membership included one former CIA official and a number of scientists with high security clearances.

THE AUTHOR of the letter that worried Cotter, Jeremy J. Stone, director of the federation, said in a telephone interview that his question was just a shot in the dark. He said he was asking a number of agencies questions about privacy.

Cotter ultimately wrote a flat denial of any mail opening in a letter to Stone. He admitted to the senators: "I knew it was false."

But motivated by the letter from Stone, Cotter said he urged CIA Director Richard Helms to terminate the project. CIA documents indicate that Helms briefed Atty. Gen. John N. Mitchell and Postmaster General Winton Blount on the project and decided to continue it when the two Nixon Cabinet members expressed no objections.

After Mitchell and Blount left the government, Cotter said he renewed his request that the project be terminated. CIA Director William E. Colby scrapped the operation shortly after he succeeded Helms in 1973.

NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1975

Mitchell Denies He Knew of Mail Opening

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24—

Former Attorney General John N. Mitchell told a Senate committee under oath today that officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation had never told him that the agencies were secretly opening mail.

His testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence appeared to conflict with a statement made Wednesday by Richard Helms, former director of the C.I.A., who

COTTER, WHO became chief postal inspector in 1969, knew about the mail opening because of an 18-year career with the CIA.

The CIA said earlier this week that 215,000 pieces of mail were opened in New York, the largest of four mail interceptions. Only mail between the United States and Communist countries was intercepted.

The committee listened to testimony for about five hours yesterday in an effort to determine who knew about the mail opening effort and who authorized it. The results were often contradictory.

Helms, making his 14th trip to Washington since he was named ambassador to Iran in 1973, testified that he briefed both Mitchell and Blount on the mail opening program, showing them samples of material obtained from reading the letters.

Blount testified earlier in the day that, although Helms had discussed a secret CIA project that involved diverting mail, he was never told the letters were being opened.

MITCHELL, whom the committee hopes to question in a public session tomorrow, has told the panel in executive session that he remembers the Helms briefing, but he thought it referred to examination of the outside of envelopes without opening them. Examining the outside of envelopes is legal; opening them is a violation of the law.

Helms said he showed Blount typewritten copies of intercepted letters. He said he can't remember if he told Blount that letters were being opened, but he said he assumed that Blount would know there was no other way to copy the contents.

"Perhaps I wasn't specific enough," Helms said.

testified that he advised Mr. Mitchell of the mail-opening project in June, 1970.

Mr. Helms said he had told the Attorney General about a "mail cover" and acknowledged that "in those times I'm not sure the Attorney General knew the difference" between "mail cover" and actual mail opening.

A mail cover, Mr. Mitchell testified, meant to him that security agencies photographed the exteriors of the envelopes to obtain the names of the addressors and addressees. Mr. Helms, however, said on Wednesday that he presumed from the context of the conversation that Mr. Mitchell knew the C.I.A. was opening mail.

The committee chairman, Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, told reporters that while there was an obvious conflict in Mr. Mitchell's and Mr. Helms's testimony, he was not prepared to accuse either man of lying.

"There is no basis on which I could make such a charge

in view of the possibility they might just have misunderstood each other," Mr. Church said.

The committee also made public today documents that indicated that Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Attorney General under President Johnson, may have known that the F.B.I. was opening mail. Committee sources said that Mr. Katzenbach would be asked to testify publicly on the matter.

In a memorandum written on March 2, 1965, J. Edgar Hoover, then director of the F.B.I., said that Mr. Katzenbach had talked to Senator Edward V. Long, Democrat of Missouri, about keeping information on mail openings out of hearings. Mr. Long was then conducting in the Senate.

The Attorney General, according to the memo, said that Bernard Fensterwald, then counsel of Mr. Long's committee, "had some possible witnesses who are former bureau agents and if they were asked if mail was opened, they would take the Fifth Amendment."

"The Attorney General stated that before they are called, he would like to know who they are and whether they were ever involved in any program touching on national security and, if not, it is their own business, but if they were, he would want to know," Mr. Hoover's memorandum said.

In a telephone interview late today, Mr. Katzenbach said he had "never heard" that either the C.I.A. or the F.B.I. was opening the mail and he suspected he had not been told because the "process is illegal." He said he had believed the intrusion upon the mail system was only to conduct a "mail cover,"

which he said was legal in both criminal and national security cases.

Mr. Katzenbach said that had he known mail was being opened he would have ordered it halted. He said that he had already told the Senate committee, under oath, in executive session that he did not know about F.B.I. mail openings.

The committee in its hearings has established that both the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. conducted illegal mail-opening projects over long periods of time. Testimony by C.I.A. officials and C.I.A. documents have indicated that agency officials throughout the years knew the process was illegal. Moreover, one C.I.A. document showed, they had serious doubt that in peacetime even the President had the power to authorize the activity.

F.B.I. officials testified today that the bureau tended over a 26-year period to ignore the question of whether the openings were illegal. The question was discussed only once, in 1951, three former officials said.

The F.B.I. conducted mail-opening projects in eight cities apparently without the approval of any Attorney General and without a warrant from a court.

No figures for the amount of mail the F.B.I. opened were given.

F.B.I. officials testified today that J. Edgar Hoover, while director of the bureau, halted the mail-opening project in 1966. W. Raymond Wannall, now chief of intelligence at the bureau, speculated that Mr. Hoover may have discontinued the top secret project because he had "a regard for the climate of the times." He implied that Mr. Hoover might have come to the conclusion that the political climate would not justify the illegal operation.

Project Lasted Till '73

The C.I.A. did not stop its mail opening until 1973. Mr. Helms testified on Wednesday that the only Attorney General he ever briefed about mail openings was Mr. Mitchell, in the session that Mr. Mitchell now disputes.

Mr. Mitchell said that in June, 1970, he did have a 22-minute meeting with Mr. Helms on a subject he declined to reveal for national security reasons. He has told the committee about it in executive session. Congressional sources indicated that Mr. Helms had been briefing Mr. Mitchell on aspects of electronic eavesdropping used by the National Security Agency in tracking antiwar radicals.

During this session, Mr. Mitchell said, Mr. Helms referred to mail cover as an aside to the main purpose of the meeting.

Mr. Helms said Wednesday that after he talked to Mr. Mitchell he had met with Winton M. Blount, then Postmaster General, and told him

that Mr. Mitchell had "no problem" with the project. He said he showed Mr. Blount some "samples" of what the C.I.A. was gleaned from opening mail.

Mr. Mitchell had sought to avoid testifying before the committee in public session because his appeal of his Watergate conviction is still pending. He was convicted of perjury, conspiracy and obstruction of justice in the Watergate cover-up.

NEW YORK TIMES

30 Oct. 1975

N.S.A. CHIEF TELLS OF BROAD SCOPE OF SURVEILLANCE

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 29—The National Security Agency secretly scanned international telephone and cable traffic to intercept the messages of 1,680 American citizens and groups and of 5,925 foreign nationals or organizations, its director testified today.

The director, Lieut. Gen. Lew Allen Jr., told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that the seven-year program in behalf of six government agencies, was halted in 1973. He said that N.S.A. had not obtained court orders to authorize the electronic surveillance and had not received the specific approval of either Presidents Johnson or Nixon or of any Attorney General.

This was the first time a director of the security agency had described one of its operations in public session. Under questioning, General Allen agreed that his public testimony might be in technical violation of laws against disclosure of communications intelligence data.

His description disclosed that the surveillance was far more vast than hinted at in press accounts or in the report of the Rockefeller commission on the C.I.A.

General Allen said the National Security Agency had supplied intelligence on Americans to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, the old Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Secret Service and two Defense Department components, Department of the Army and Defense Intelligence Agency.

Senator Frank Church, chairman of the committee, described the so-called "Watchlist" operation as one of the

aspects of N.S.A.'s activities that he regarded as "unlawful" and apparent violations of constitutional proscriptions against invasion of privacy.

The Idaho Democrat urged that the committee make public a report on the other aspect, described as "Operation Shamrock," which Congressional sources later said was N.S.A.'s arrangement with cable companies to obtain international traffic.

Senator John G. Tower, a Texas Republican and committee vice chairman, opposed disclosure of Operation Shamrock, as he had opposed the public hearings held today.

"I do believe the people's right to know should be subordinated to the people's right to be secure," he said.

Senator Tower and Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, argued strongly that such disclosure would "adversely affect our intelligence-gathering capability," as Senator Tower put it.

At a closed midafternoon meeting, the committee agreed, apparently without a vote, to submit the report on Operation Shamrock to General Allen for his comment on whether it endangered sources and methods of intelligence, before voting on whether to make it public.

Even without the details of Shamrock, the scope of General Allen's testimony was unexpected. He said that as early as the first years of the nineteen-sixties, N.S.A. had occasionally looked at communications of Americans traveling to Cuba.

N.S.A. is part of the Defense Department and is charged with coordinating electronic intelligence gathering and with developing and breaking codes.

On Oct. 21, 1967, testimony and documents disclosed, the Department of the Army formally asked N.S.A. to help in determining whether foreign governments were supporting domestic disturbances.

The following June, after Senator Robert F. Kennedy's assassination, the Secret Service submitted a list of persons and groups that its officials believed posed a threat to persons it was protecting. It also, General Allen testified, submitted the names of the persons being protected.

In the view of informed Congressional staff members, this apparently permitted the service to receive the overseas communications of candidates for President, which it protects, as well as the communications of the President himself, moreover, the N.S.A.'s computerized system, in addition to selecting threatening material, presumably would have selected innocuous overseas messages about campaign activity.

A spokesman for the Secret Service declined to comment on whether it had received political information along with

sination attempts.

In 1969, the N.S.A. formalized its surveillance on domestic security threats under an "Operation Minaret." Internal documents released today warned officials of the agency not to disclose to other agencies that it was even collecting the information. General Allen said he believed this concern was to insure that the information was not used in criminal prosecutions where its source would have to be made public to the courts.

The data accumulated — reports averaged two a day at one point, he said — were hand-carried to the agencies and marked "background use only." At the height of the various programs, he said, N.S.A. was scanning for information on some 800 Americans at any one time.

This included monitoring to discover narcotics traffickers, conducted from 1970 until 1973, as well as the programs aimed at political dissidents.

In 1971, Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, General Allen's predecessor at N.S.A., briefed John N. Mitchell, then the Attorney General, and his deputy, Richard G. Kleindienst, on the program. General Allen said that the group had agreed upon "procedures" and that this had implied some consent by the group. He said the agency, however, had found no written authorization from Attorneys General for the activity.

General Allen also said that the members of the United States Intelligence Board, made up of the intelligence agencies, knew of the intrusions because of the fact that the agencies individually submitted names for the "watchlist."

He said the National Security Agency had not conducted surveillances on domestic United States communications and that all its intrusions had involved communications in which at least one "terminal" was in a foreign country.

Benson Buffham, deputy director of N.S.A., testified that no consideration had been given to the legality of the program at any point. After a series of questions on legal aspects, Senator Walter F. Mondale, Democrat of Minnesota, said "what worries me" is that N.S.A. officials still view the

activity as legal.

Mr. Mondale said that among the messages N.S.A. had intercepted was a request from a "peaceful" antiwar activist to a foreign singer to participate in a concert to fund the antiwar movement or to make a personal contribution. The message was so innocuous, Mr. Mondale said, it "raises the very serious question about how to contain snooping."

He said the effect of the snooping "discourages political dissent in this country."

General Allen said that the security agency had rejected some names for the watchlist, mainly from the F.B.I. and Department of Justice, as inappropriate to its intelligence-gathering function mainly because they appeared to be targets of law enforcement.

General Allen testified that N.S.A.'s intelligence had helped the F.B.I. avert a major terrorist plot in one city and had contributed to halting the smuggling of several major shipments of narcotics. He declined to specify the incidents. Informed law enforcement sources said that the terrorist plot was presumably one involving Palestinian terrorists in a plan aimed at American Jews.

Concern about the legality of the operations emerged in 1973, at the height of criticism of Watergate matters, and shortly after General Allen became head of N.S.A. First he testified, the C.I.A. pulled out of the narcotics surveillance project on the ground that it appeared to violate the C.I.A.'s charter forbidding a domestic police role. Though N.S.A. has no such charter, General Gaylor said, it followed suit.

On Oct. 1, 1973, he said, then Attorney General Elliot L. Richardson ordered N.S.A. to supply the F.B.I. and the Secret Service with material.

"Until I am able more carefully to assess the effect of Supreme Court decisions concerning electronic surveillance upon your current practice of disseminating to the F.B.I. and Secret Service information acquired by you through electronic devices pursuant to requests from the F.B.I. and Secret Service," Mr. Richardson wrote, "it is requested that you immediately curtail the further dissemination of such information to these agencies."

LOS ANGELES TIMES

19 OCTOBER 1975

CIA Activities

While the CIA needs a tighter rein on its activities and budget, those seeking to cripple its activities abroad should remember that Russia's equivalent of our CIA is working full-time through numerous agents in our country and elsewhere. Furthermore, the present action of some members of Congress is to give our adversaries whatever of our secrets they cannot otherwise learn.

ARTHUR N. YOUNG

Chmont

NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1975

White House Pushes Effort to Keep Intelligence

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 28—The Ford Administration is increasing pressure to keep the hearings of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence behind closed doors, the committee's chairman said today.

The chairman, Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, said "pressures are mounting on a broadening front" that indicated the intelligence community and the Ford Administration were "more and more opposed to public hearings on anything." The senator made his comments after a two-hour closed briefing on covert activity by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Intelligence community officials have said on several occasions that they are against disclosure of details of present and past covert operations.

"Just how do you have a public hearing on a covert operation without endangering individuals?" one official asked.

The dispute now centers on the issue of whether the committee can hold a public session on the C.I.A.'s operations in Chile. Mr. Church and other members of his committee have said they believe a portion of the discussions can be held in public without compromising national security. Moreover, they point out, much of the activity has already been reported in the press.

Leaks Are Charged

Senator Gary Hart, Democrat of Colorado, charged in a speech today that the Ford Administration and the intelligence community "were deliberately leaking secret information about abuses under investigation by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence."

He cited a dozen news articles that had the effect, he said, of pre-empting the committee hearings and putting Administration explanations in a favorable light. He said the committee had made a major effort to remain "leak proof."

There is no record that the

Administration has publicly charged the Senate committee with leaks, but William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, has said that disclosures concomitant with the entire Congressional investigation the intelligence community had undermined the agencies' effectiveness.

Senator Church said that after today's meeting Mr. Colby would seek guidance from the White House on whether he would be permitted to testify before a public session. Mr. Church also made public a letter from Philip W. Buchen, counsel to President Ford, it was the "general view of the executive branch" that if the committee issued an "Official" report on plots to assassinate foreign leaders, it might damage United States foreign relations.

Senator John G. Tower, Republican of Texas, who is vice chairman of the committee, said he was also opposed to public hearings on covert activities.

Inquiry Secret

Meanwhile, antiwar and religious organizations filed a \$500,000 suit against the C.I.A., the National Security Agency and four major cable communication companies. The suit, filed in Washington's District Court, charged that the Government agencies had deprived some 8,200 persons of their constitutional rights.

The plaintiffs sought \$50,000 in damages for each of the 8,200 persons as well as \$100 for each hour they were subjected to illegal electronic eavesdropping. The suit is based on disclosures in a Rockefeller commission report of a domestic surveillance operation in which files were prepared on antiwar and radical leaders and in which the N.S.A. conducted cable and overseas telephone monitoring on some 1,000 persons.

The suit was filed by the American Civil Liberties Union as a class action in behalf of those affected by the program.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Wednesday, Oct. 29, 1975

CIA Prober Hits Pressure To Go Easy

By George Lardner Jr.

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate intelligence committee has been running into mounting pressures from the administration to suppress the results of its investigations, Chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho) charged yesterday.

Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby urged the committee at a closed meeting yesterday morning not to hold any public hearings on covert CIA operations in Chile.

Church also told reporters at a mid-day briefing that the administration still opposes open hearings on improper activities of the National Security Agency and that the White House recently objected to release of even a printed report on the CIA's involvement in foreign assassination plots.

"The pressures are mounting on a broadening front," Church said.

But in spite of the complaints, he added, the committee will go ahead today with a public hearing on the supersecret NSA. Church said the Senate panel also has no intention of abandoning its

plans to publish a comprehensive report on its months-long assassination inquiry.

The Idaho Democrat said he saw no reason to keep the Chile inquiry secret either, but the committee will first attempt to find out "how strongly the administration is prepared to resist" a public airing.

Colby and William Nelson, the CIA's deputy director of covert operations, testified in closed session yesterday about the spy agency's work in Chile from 1964, when it spent some \$3 million to oppose the presidential candidacy of Marxist Salvador Allende, until 1973 when Allende was overthrown in a military coup.

Two former ambassadors to Chile, Ralph Dungan, who served from 1964 to 1967, and Nathaniel Davis, from 1971 to 1973, appeared before the committee yesterday afternoon. George Kennan, former ambassador to Moscow and author of the so-called "containment policy," also testified about the value of covert operations generally.

Church said he felt disclosure "of the whole story (on Chile) is in the best interests of everyone" since it would give the CIA a chance to explain itself publicly. He said the episodes were all past history and would "not entail any threat to national security."

But he said no decision was reached because "it was not clear if Mr. Colby and others would be prohibited from testifying" in public.

Turning to the committee's nearly complete assassination report, Church recalled how President Ford himself had encouraged a congressional investigation of CIA-sponsored plots after the Rockefeller commission had been unable to complete its own inquiry.

"I can't imagine how now it could even be suggested that this report not be made public," Church said.

He said the objection had been voiced in a letter to the committee from White House counsel Philip Buchen.

The Oct. 9 note, made public later in the day, appeared to be largely a complaint for the record. In it, Buchen said the "general view of the executive branch is that any report on political assassination allegations issued by the select committee as an official government document may seriously prejudice our national security through damage to the foreign relations of the U.S. and to the position of the U.S. in the world community."

8

PUBLISHERS WEEKLY

SEPTEMBER 29, 1975

THE HOUR OF THE BLUE

FOX. Hugh C. McDonald. Pyramid, \$1.75

This long, wallowing good espionage thriller has many ports of call, an expertly devised plot and enough energetic spies to keep readers happily settled in for the run—that is, if they ignore the author's obvious and overbearing political biases. The CIA, opposing détente, has lied to the president and aligned itself with an international organization of reactionaries called the Blue Fox to infiltrate a Russian experimental germ warfare facility in the Aral Sea. At stake is the antidote to a virile microbe the Russians have successfully tested in three U.S. reservoirs. With super-security safeguards easily penetrated on all sides, the action races around Hungary, Austria, Russia, San Francisco, Washington and New York.

[November]

Buchen added, however, that the White House realized the committee "intends to exercise its own judgment" and therefore would assign three officials, from the State Department, CIA and Pentagon, to read over the draft report for any language that might cause "specific security problems."

NEW YORK TIMES
22 Oct. 1975

INQUIRY IS VOTED FOR HARRINGTON

By RICHARD L. MADDEN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON Oct. 21—The House Ethics Committee voted 7 to 2 today to investigate formally charges that Representative Michael J. Harrington violated House rules by discussing with unauthorized persons secret testimony on the Central Intelligence Agency's political activities in Chile.

If no inquiry is made, it would be the first time that the eight-year-old panel, which is officially known as the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, has formally investigated a complaint against a member of the House.

Approving an inquiry, which will begin with a public hearing Nov. 3, the committee's vote appeared to assure that whatever action it recommends will reach the full House for final action.

Committee members said the panel could recommend that no disciplinary action be taken against Mr. Harrington, a Massachusetts Democrat, or that he be censured or even expelled from the House.

The last disciplinary action by the House against one of its members was the exclusion of the late Representative Adam Clayton Powell Jr., Democrat of Manhattan, in 1967 for alleged misuse of funds and for being in contempt of court in New York.

Could Stir Fight

The Harrington case could provoke a divisive fight within the intelligence operations already being investigated by House and Senate committees.

Mr. Harrington has acknowledged that he discussed with other members of Congress and a reporter for The Washington Post the substance of secret testimony on the C.I.A.'s efforts in 1973 to undermine the government of Salvador Allende Gossens, Chile's late President.

The testimony had been given by William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, to the House Armed Services Committee, and an account of it appeared in The New York Times in September, 1974.

Representative Harrington, summoned before an Armed Services subcommittee two weeks later, denied having been the source for The Times article but conceded he had sought to bring the C.I.A. involvement to light.

Representative Robin L. Beard Jr., Republican of Tennessee who is a member of the Armed Services Committee, filed a complaint with the Ethics Committee charging that Mr. Harrington had violated House rules.

Mr. Harrington countered by filing complaints against 17 members of the Armed Services Committee charging that they

Washington Post
29 Oct. 1975

\$500 Million Is Sought in U.S. Spying

By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer

A lawsuit was filed in federal court here yesterday charging the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency with conducting a massive, illegal spying campaign on antiwar activists in the late 1960s and early 1970s and seeking \$500 million in damages.

The suit was filed by the American Civil Liberties Union on behalf of 8,200 individuals and groups on whom the CIA and NSA reportedly maintained files, opened mail and intercepted messages and telephone calls.

The suit is based largely on information growing out of the Rockefeller commission's report in June on the U.S. domestic surveillance ac-

tivities. The report confirmed the existence of a program known as "Operation Chaos." The groups and individuals listed as plaintiffs in yesterday's suit reportedly were watched as a part of that program.

Named as defendants are past directors and other top-ranking officials of both government spying agencies, as well as four international communications networks which supposedly aided in the illegal interception of messages being sent overseas by the plaintiffs.

The suit claims the plaintiffs became the topics of "watch files" or "subject files" in the CIA because of their opposition to the war in Indochina in the late 1960s. The CIA then supplied a "watch list" to the NSA so the NSA could intercept international messages and telephone calls placed by persons on the list, the suit continued.

According to the Rockefeller commission report, the CIA began "Operation Chaos" to gather

information on the "foreign contacts" of American citizens here who were protesting the Vietnam war. As a part of that program, more than 40 undercover agents reportedly infiltrated domestic antiwar organizations.

The program also included illegal opening of first-class mail with the contents copied and placed in Chaos files, the suit alleged. Reportedly aiding NSA in the interception of overseas messages were Western Union, Telegraph Co., RCA Global Communications, Inc., American Cable and Radio Corp., and ITT World Communications, Inc., according to the suit. The four companies were named as defendants.

NSA turned over to the CIA more than 1,100 pages of summarized conversations that had been illegally overheard, the suit claimed.

The suit seeks \$50,000 in punitive damages for each plaintiff, as well as \$100 a day for the duration of any illegal interceptions of wire or oral communications.

Wednesday, October 22, 1975

The Washington Star

Oliphant's seen aiding the KGB



I am dismayed by the vileness of recent Oliphant cartoons, especially, but not limited to, those concerning the CIA. Is he incapable of a humorous or positive or constructive portrayal of people, organizations and events?

Years past, I had extensive experience and involvement in propaganda activities. The most effective media instrument was the cartoon, since most people indulge visually and absorb the message, but rarely read written propaganda. The KGB could never approach Oliphant's destructive cartoons, and they receive it for free; that is, the cartoons serve the KGB's objectives.

Ed McGettigan

3 on Other Panel

He also noted that three of the seven votes in the Ethics committee to investigate Mr. Beard's complaint had been cast by Representatives who were also members of the Armed Services Committee—Melvin Price, Democrat of Illinois, F. Edward Hebert, Democrat of Louisiana, and Floyd Srence, Republican of South Carolina.

The other four votes for the inquiry were cast by Representatives John J. Flynt Jr., Democrat of Georgia who is chairman of the committee; Olin E. Teagut, Democrat of Texas; James H. Quillen, Republican of Tennessee; and John Hutchinson, Republican of Michigan.

The Mail Cover Story

By Tom Wicker

When Richard Helms became director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in 1966, he knew that the agency's mail cover program was illegal—or would be unless, as Mr. Helms now says he assumed to be the case, some form of legality had been arranged by Allen Dulles, the C.I.A. director when the program was started in 1953.

That may have been a logical assumption, but the trouble was that Mr. Helms did not bother to check its validity with Mr. Dulles—"it would not have occurred to me to fault him on a matter of law." Nor, apparently, did Mr. Helms check his assumption with anyone else who might have known; he just let the mail cover program go forward.

That testimony and the rest of what the Senate Intelligence Committee has been hearing about C.I.A. mail covers provide a sort of catalogue of the evils that allowed the agency to go its own way for so long, to violate the law and its own charter with impunity, to become a sort of government within the Government.

Mr. Helms' "assumption," for example, not only emphasizes the fact that the C.I.A. was scarcely accountable to anyone, and that its power to operate in secrecy was, in fact, the power to do virtually anything it wanted to do. It also suggests the arrogant, expansive and dangerous habits of mind officials can develop when they can act in secret and without accounting for such acts.

Mr. Helms further testified that when he signed a statement in 1970 informing Richard Nixon that the mail cover program had been ended, he had no intent to mislead Mr. Nixon—although the C.I.A. mail cover program was continued until 1973. The 1970 report, he said, had referred to an F.B.I. mail cover program.

Of all the devices of high-handed government, none is more insidious than this—the statement that is bound to mislead although it was "not intended" to mislead, that does not tell the truth although it does not tech-

nically tell a lie, that distorts or conceals or obscures facts while appearing to be a straightforward response. The C.I.A. may not have originated the technique, but its officials became master practitioners.

The Helms testimony left the impression that at whatever political level—if any—the mail cover program might have been authorized in 1953 or afterward, it was not by a President. He thought he recalled mentioning the program to President Johnson, more than a decade after its inception, although he could not be sure. But he could not remember if Presi-

IN THE NATION

'No President has a right to be insulated from the knowledge that his own subordinates are deliberately breaking the law.'

dents Eisenhower or Kennedy had been told about it by his predecessors, and he did not remember telling Mr. Nixon himself.

"You've got to protect the President from the dirty stuff," Mr. Helms told reporters after testifying. It could as easily be said that a man in his position, or Allen Dulles before him, had to keep the President from finding out what was going on, so that the illegal "dirty stuff" could proceed.

And even if the motive was to "pro-

tect" Presidents, why should they be protected? The highest duty of any President is to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and no President has a right to be insulated from the knowledge that his own subordinates are deliberately breaking the law. To whom should they justify doing so, if they can, except to the President?

Mr. Helms said he never discussed the mail cover program with any of the Congressional oversight committees to whom he supposedly reported. That can only mean that they didn't ask him anything, and he volunteered nothing, about such important invasions of the privacy and constitutional rights of Americans, and such violations of the laws of the very Government the C.I.A. theoretically protects. So much for the supposed efficacy of Congressional oversight, and the willingness of the agency to cooperate with the overseers.

Arthur Summerfield, Postmaster-General in the early years of the program was misled as to its extent, according to the Helms testimony, and his immediate successors were not informed of it at all—an early example of C.I.A. deception of its own Government and subversion of official institutions and processes.

That neither Mr. Helms nor a later Postmaster-General, Winton M. Blount, could agree on exactly what the latter was told about mail covers suggests how ad hoc and inadequate were the sketchy procedures later followed to inform the postal department of the perversions of law being practiced in its own house.

And when Mr. Helms and other C.I.A. officials tried to tell Postmaster-General J. Edward Day "something very secret" (about the mail covers) in 1961, Mr. Day protested that he did not want to know, so that he could not be blamed for any possible leaks. Thus, he exemplified that abdication of personal responsibility by Government officials that did so much to permit the vast growth of secret, unlawful and imperial power in America.

NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1975

American Intelligence: 'A Page of Shame'

To the Editor:

Samuel A. Adams' effort to throw some light on corruption in the intelligence process before and after the 1968 Tet offensive reflects a personal integrity which, unfortunately, has been increasingly under fire within the C.I.A. and other precincts of the intelligence community in recent years. As a C.I.A. analyst working on the Vietcong in Saigon and in the Pentagon from 1965 to 1970, I can confirm the entire thrust of Sam's charges. My only regret is that I did not have Sam's courage and foresight in saving relevant documents to prove the case.

Some of Sam's critics attempt to represent him as an egomaniac on a crusade. Others portray the questions he raises as "arcane side issues" (R. W. Komer's Sept. 29 letter). These positions reflect either an appalling

ignorance of the nature of a people's war or a self-serving but transparent effort at self-defense by the time-worn tactic of "plausible denial."

The truth is that working-level analysts in the C.I.A. continually were diverted from following out leads on Vietcong strength; that they were assigned to other areas of work when they attempted to do so; that they were ignored or suppressed, as Sam was, when they persisted, and that these efforts at distortion and suppression of the facts were common knowledge and were openly discussed at the working level. There was room for only one convenient "truth" in official estimates, as Sam has proved beyond any dispute. The choice was to compromise one's integrity or to resign, and too many chose the former.

If the issues were fully studied, if special task forces were appointed to study them and if the results were circulated in the intelligence com-

munity as they became available, let the C.I.A.'s offices of Current Intelligence and National Estimates produce the published results for Congress. Let the Director of Central Intelligence release to Congress the detailed records and documents of the National Security Council's Watch Committee to prove that the matter was pursued vigorously and professionally. The facts will speak for themselves.

The record is clear. It speaks of misfeasance, nonfeasance and malfeasance, of outright dishonesty and professional cowardice. It reflects an intelligence community captured by an aging bureaucracy which too often placed institutional self-interest or personal advancement before the national interest.

It is a page of shame in the history of American intelligence, and it deserves to be aired as fully as possible before the public.

JOHN T. MOORE
Selinsgrove, Pa., Oct. 10, 1975

BOSTON GLOBE
22 OCTOBER 1975

CIA loses foreign contacts in wake of probes, exposes

William Beecher, *The Globe's* diplomatic correspondent, interviewed more than a score of present and former intelligence officials to examine the implications of recent exposes. In a three-part series he discusses the impact on foreign intelligence-gathering, adjustments made to ride out the storm and future prospects for US intelligence capability.

By William Beecher
Globe Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Within recent months, British and West German intelligence services, which long had freely exchanged the most sensitive information with their American counterparts, have become chary of providing such data.

During the same period, a number of major US corporations, which have provided cover abroad for Central Intelligence Agency operatives or insights on little-known economic and political trends overseas, also have become reluctant to cooperate as before.

And large numbers of foreign agents and contacts, always worried that an indiscretion could jeopardize their jobs or their lives, have become increasingly nervous about passing on documents or even rumors.

Well-placed sources in or otherwise familiar with the American intelligence community report that such developments are a direct result of congressional hearings and newspaper exposes of certain questionable activities on the part of the CIA and other intelligence agencies.

Comments one top CIA official: "It would be overstating the situation to say our sources abroad have dried up. But there's no doubt we're hurting. People who used to give us whole reports now are giving us only summaries. People who used to give us summaries are only giving us one or two facts. Others who used to pass along an occasional nugget at a diplomatic party, are now not willing to shake hands or even smile."

The reasons for this sudden skittishness: fear that information turned over to CIA could conceivably be provided to Capitol Hill and thence either released wholesale or leaked — with damaging

in some cases deadly, consequences.

Indeed, a Congressional source says certain committees have been advised that following a recent Congressional revelation a Middle East country put two and two together and executed one of its officials believed to have been supplying information to CIA. The source declined to be more specific.

But while conceding at least temporary damage to foreign intelligence gathering, several intelligence experts interviewed by *The Globe* over recent weeks stressed that exposure of excesses and illegalities by American intelligence was direly needed in order to force reforms of the system.

Clark Clifford is one such person. Having helped draft the 1947 legislation which created the CIA and having served for seven years, first as a member and later as chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, he is particularly well qualified to assess the situation. He says:

"In the main, our intelligence operation has served this country well, through very troubled times, for nearly 30 years. Now the time has come to profit from lessons learned and to overhaul this sometimes free-wheeling machine."

"Some of those engaged in intelligence deplore the investigation that's been going on. They take the position that there's something unpatriotic and naive and unsophisticated about the whole thing. I disagree. If we find that under our democratic system we have created an operation which has grossly offended important tenets we adhere to, then it ought to be changed. The most important job government has is to correct

Both critics and defenders of the CIA and its sister agencies agree, however, that never before has the nation had greater need for clear, insightful intelligence on military, political and economic developments in the Soviet Union and throughout much of the world.

If detente with Russia is to continue, for example, it is vital that both sides have confidence they know to what extent agreements between them are being honored. And if detente should collapse, with a reversion to cold war attitudes, detailed knowledge of Soviet capabilities and probable intentions would obviously be of very great importance.

The spotlight of recent revelations has focused on three broad categories of activity.

On covert programs in places such as Chile and Laos, many observers feel it is unfair to pillory the CIA for operations authorized and minutely directed from the White House.

On domestic operation, which are precluded by CIA's charter, such as penetrating and spying on antiwar movements, even insiders concede the agency should have strenuously resisted such assignments.

On small scale covert and clandestine operations, informed sources claim there has been a proclivity in some cases for exceeding authorized actions. Very little has surfaced publicly on this. There was, however, the case of a middle level CIA official who took it upon himself to disobey an order to destroy some deadly toxins developed for use in possible assassinations.

But of more than a score of specialists interviewed, none felt the "rogue elephant" concept of the CIA running amok and out of control was an overstatement.

Ray S. Cline, who spent about 20 years in top analytical and operational assignments with CIA and four years as director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, believes that while the intelligence structure requires re-vamping, an overdrawn picture of abuse of power has seriously damaged the ability of CIA to perform necessary work.

One of the major impacts of the bad publicity has been on the morale of intelligence personnel, primarily in CIA, but also in other agencies.

Notes one senior official: "People in the overt side of CIA and I&R (State Department intelligence) are beginning to feel a little ashamed to have been a professional in intelligence over the years. When you tell someone you're in intelligence, there's a definite danger that you'll become an outcast, both inside and outside government."

Wives of CIA men report suddenly scornful treatment in social functions and even by long-time neighbors.

About 2500 reportedly have resigned from the CIA over the last three years and many are encountering difficulty in getting good jobs. "In the past, firms have been anxious to snap up our experienced men," says one official. "Now they don't want to touch them with a 10-foot pole."

William E. Colby, director of Central Intelligence, has said publicly there is no difficulty getting recruits for the CIA. But others report the quality of the new men generally is not up to the level of the halcyon days of the agency.

Sources report that the National Security Agency

(NSA) is worried that its worldwide electronic eavesdropping could be crippled for fear that it will unwittingly pick up and transcribe foreign telephone conversations that include US citizens, a matter that the Congress is very much upset about.

Sen. Frank Church, Democrat from Idaho who is chairman of the Senate committee investigating the intelligence community, has warned that the technology of exotic eavesdropping has become so pervasive and awesome that Americans may soon be left with "no place to hide."

But a senior intelligence official frets that while it would be important to learn what plans a European firm has to build petroleum pipelines in Russia and China over the next several years, the NSA is nervous about going after telephone intercepts of that company for fear some American may suddenly be heard in one of the conversations.

Attorney General Edward H. Levi reportedly is

trying to work out a system to safeguard Americans from unwarranted intrusions of their privacy while permitting NSA to conduct electronic surveillance that is regarded as being in the national interest.

Congressional sources say that after the Russians installed several facilities in the United States to intercept telephone conversations beamed by microwave, they learned how valuable an intelligence instrument that was and proceeded to bury many of their key telephone lines in Moscow.

Officials report that some foreign governments that used to pass secrets eagerly to the CIA, on the premise that a two-way exchange would be mutually beneficial, now are giving information instead to US military attaches abroad. Apparently they feel the military system is less likely to leak. But these officials say this switch is on a small scale and is not making up for a lot of material the United States used to get routinely.

However temporary this development may turn out to be, for the time being there appears to be a significant net reduction in so-called "humint," or human intelligence. "The finest spy satellites in the world are great at counting missiles, but not too good at providing clues as to intentions; internal political shifts, economic plans," says one expert. "For that we must depend on people."

The negative climate within the United States has cooled the cooperativeness of American firms to the point where many are not willing to cooperate as before overseas. Also, in a recent CIA solicitation of bids on a spooky piece of equipment, there were no takers. The CIA says this is the first time in its history this has happened. The official who disclosed this was not willing to say what the equipment was.

Perhaps as damaging as anything else of disclosures from the Pentagon Papers to those more recently in the view of several officials, has been the

insight Soviet analysts have gotten into the inner workings both of American intelligence and of the decision-making process itself.

"Take the Pentagon Papers," said one Defense official. "What the Soviets learned was not so much a few detailed recommendations about Vietnam, but rather that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the President a series of steps they felt he must take to win the war."

It was an interdependent package deal — with time being of the essence.

"Other memos showed the President agonizing endlessly over seven months and then picking out a few actions to try. This gave the Soviets an important insight into the non-decision-making in a democracy. It could tempt them to act quickly in a crisis, confident that before a reaction is decided upon in Washington they'll have achieved their aim."

BOSTON GLOBE
23 OCTOBER 1975

US takes British files 'on loan'

William Beecher, The Globe's diplomatic correspondent, interviewed more than a score of present and former intelligence officials to examine the implications of recent exposes. In a three-part series he discusses the impact on foreign intelligence-gathering, adjustments made to ride out the storm and future prospects for US intelligence capability.

(Second of a three-part series)

B. William Beecher
Globe Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — In order to convince British intelligence it can hand over top-secret documents without fear of their becoming public, the United States now treats such material as "on loan."

By that semantic sleight of hand, such files would not be considered the "property" of the United States and therefore would not be subject to

THE TROUBLED CIA-2

subpoena by Congress or the courts.

Also, while the Ford Administration wanted very much to mount a major covert effort in support of political moderates in Portugal, because of widespread criticism over a similar effort in Chile no action was taken until very late in the game.

What finally was done was not only very late, but very little. Contrary to published reports speculating about tens of millions of dollars of covert aid, the total effort to date, according to unimpeachable sources, has been just over \$1 million.

These two incidents are in one sense closely related. For they represent ways the United States is trying to adjust, in the aftermath of months of revelations about the CIA on Capitol Hill and in the press, to the new reality of nervous allies and a criti-

cal Congress.

For, whatever reforms may eventually be decided upon to restore confidence in American intelligence, the United States cannot call "time" to minister to a key injured player.

The US-British intelligence connection has been very close since the days of World War II when the OSS (Office of Strategic Services), the predecessor of CIA, was established in part because of Britain's desire to have a single agency with which it could share information and coordinate clandestine operations to mutual advantage.

The relationship flowered as CIA grew from a band of a few hundred ex-OSS hands in 1947 to a 15,000-man establishment, with access to information from the most sophisticated spy satellites and other intelligence-gather-

ing equipment in the world.

But the British, of late, have become quite alarmed at the trend in the United States to shine a public spotlight into some of the more shadowy cupboards of American intelligence. In Britain that could not occur because of the Official Secrets Act.

They were particularly concerned that their secret reports and analyses might be pried out of the files of the CIA by subpoena from a congressional committee or by court suit under the newly strengthened Freedom of Information Act. Highly sensitive sources and methods might be compromised. And so they held back a lot, and passed certain information with so many restrictions as to make the information difficult to disseminate to analysts, according to qualified US sources.

Thus American officials came up with their imagina-

tive legalism of treating British intelligence as property, not owned but merely on loan to the United States.

But officials concede this has not totally overcome British apprehension and the earlier, close relationship has not been fully restored.

In the case of Portugal, officials say that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger was particularly worried that unless Lisbon's drift toward including Communists in top government posts could be reversed, it might well give an aura of respectability to coalition governments with Communist members that might be repeated in Italy and elections in Western Europe.

If such a trend developed, he felt, the very existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be jeopardized. For NATO, an alliance designed to stand against Soviet political and military pressure, could not function without exchanging great quantities of classified facts and plans. And with Communists sitting in its inner councils, such information could not be kept from Moscow, in his view.

Knowledgeable sources say William E. Colby, CIA director, in spring and early summer stoutly resisted pressures to mount a covert political-action program in Portugal, arguing that word would get out and Congress and the press would have a fit over interference in the internal affairs of another nation, similar to the reaction to revelations of CIA activities in Chile.

As late as July, a number of other officials were backing Colby in the argument that American hands were tied in Portugal by the hostile atmosphere in Congress. Instead, they insisted the United States would have to sit back and depend on a number of West European Socialist parties, led by those in West Germany and Sweden, to help their counterparts in Portugal.

Meanwhile, while no one knew the hard numbers, reports were circulating through the bureau-

cracy that the Soviet Union was spending about \$50 million in Portugal.

In early August, President Ford complained in an interview with U.S. News & World Report of the virtual impossibility of CIA involvement in Portugal because of the negative climate on Capitol Hill. But a month later, in an interview with the Chicago Sun-Times, the President hinted of some involvement when he declared: "I don't think the situation (in Portugal) required us to have a major CIA involvement, which we have not had."

Sources say that between those two statements by Ford, the Administration discussed the danger of trends in Portugal with some key congressional committees and a small-scale CIA effort was approved and launched.

Observers in and out of the intelligence community believe the CIA has been given a bum rap over covert action in places like Chile and Laos. As in the case of Portugal, they point out, the decision to go in and the nature and scope of the effort, were decided upon by the President and supervised by his advisers.

Ray S. Cline, who capped a 20-year career with CIA by serving from 1962 to 1966, as its deputy director for intelligence and subsequently headed the State Department's intelligence branch from 1969 to 1973, said in an interview that the Laos operation started as a standard clandestine intelligence mission to gather information on North Vietnamese military movements along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

But a series of White House decisions, starting in the Kennedy Administration, turned the effort from that of a small number of Neo tribesmen collecting tactical intelligence into a covert, undeclared war, run in the field by a succession of American ambassadors in Vientiane.

A senior congressional source agrees. Both North Vietnam and the United States, he said, in which neither admitted

its participation in military activity in Laos. In the case of the United States, he says, it might have been forced by the Laotian government to pull out if it admitted its role publicly, thereby increasing the jeopardy to American and Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam.

"It grew to a \$20 million to \$30 million a year operation, funded out of the Defense Department's budget," the congressional source said. "But it was not an assignment the CIA particularly relished, and it certainly cannot be blamed in that instance for running amok."

In the case of Chile, Cline says, "Kissinger pushed the CIA in, presumably on behalf of Nixon." The operation, he said, was run from the White House.

But he and others do blame the CIA for knuckling under to pressures from Presidents Johnson and Nixon to infiltrate and report on the activities of antiwar groups in the United States.

Cline makes this distinction: if CIA had penetrated domestic groups in order to provide a cover to send agents abroad on clandestine missions, that would have been permissible, in his view. But CIA provided extensive reports to the White House and the FBI on the plans and activities of such domestic groups, and that clearly was improper.

"I can only blame Helms for not digging in his heels harder," Cline says, referring to Richard Helms, who at the time ambassador to Iran. Many voters voiced the same sentiment, saying that Helms found it difficult to headed CIA and now is others voiced the same say no to the White House, but suggesting that he saw that the agency "dragged its heels" and did the least possible in questionable operations.

A number of specialists believe recent revelations may be useful in opening the way to needed reform of the intelligence community, but they argue that the focus on covert operations, which represent only about two percent of

intelligence activity, is missing the forest for the trees.

In their view, the two most important problems are: 1) a paucity of consistently well thought-out, well articulated and timely intelligence analysis, and 2) a penchant for oversecrecy over the last six years which withholds from top intelligence analysts information, for instance, on negotiations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Such information would enable the analysts to better know what to look for in studying the reams of data culled from reconnaissance satellites, agent reports and translations of Soviet and Chinese broadcasts and newspapers.

Says one official of the poor quality, overall, of analysis from CIA and DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency): "They know the single stones of the mosaic. They know the color and shape and size of many of them. But they can't put the mosaic together consistently."

To improve the quality of analysis requires the recruitment of better analysts, provision of well thought-out programs of specialized advanced education and training, and incentives to get out on a limb and warn of impending crises when facts and intuition warrant, the experts agree.

But they feel the present climate makes it especially difficult to recruit many of the kind of young people necessary for an upgrading effort.

On the matter of oversecrecy, Cline recently told the Pike Committee on intelligence: "In all my years in the State Department as chief of intelligence, I never saw any record of any of the many conversations between White House officials and senior Soviet officials. If these had been available for systematic study by Soviet experts, some of the rather naive steps taken in Presidential-level negotiations with the Soviet Union might have been avoided."

And Pentagon sources

say the decision to invade Cambodia in 1970 was so closely held by the Nixon Administration that even the then DIA director, Lt. Gen. Donald Bennett, was in the dark. According to this account, on the morn-

ing of the invasion Bennett was asked how the Russians and Chinese were reacting?

"If you'd have told me a few days ago, I would have gotten some special assets into place to be able

to give you a decent answer," he is reported to have snapped.

The point, of course, is that if a handful of top officials are so worried about the possibility of

leaks that they don't even confide in the heads of State and Defense Department intelligence, this severely constrains the ability of the intelligence community to serve the policy making process effectively.

THE BOSTON GLOBE
24 October 1975

Officials fear reform, admit it's needed

William Beecher interviewed more than a score of present and former intelligence officials to examine the implications of recent exposes. In a three-part series he discusses the impact on foreign intelligence-gathering, adjustments made to ride out the storm and future prospects for US intelligence capability.

By William Beecher
Globe Diplomatic Correspondent

WASHINGTON — The senior intelligence official was trying to sum up his frustration and concern over sensation-packed Congressional hearings and newspaper exposes on the excesses of the intelligence community.

"The whole thing reminds me of the last scene of Oedipus Rex," he said. "The king, having seen some wickedness and learned some bitter truths, walked to center stage and tore his own eyes out."

"If the current process continues, we're in danger of ending up with a blind government, trying to cope with foreign affairs and military policy in a very cruel, tough world."

This sort of apprehension, though not so dramatically overstated, was voiced in a series of interviews by a number of men, particularly those who currently lead the intelligence establishment.

But they and others generally agreed that out of the present trauma should come a thoroughgoing analysis of what America wants and needs in the way of an intelligence system, and reforms aimed at achieving a better balance between ends and means.

While experts in and out of government have a variety of views on what is needed, there are some common strands in many of their proposed solutions.

The common elements include:

1) A new look at intelligence priorities, with greater emphasis on developing sophisticated economic intelligence and somewhat less on military intelligence, especially if funds are cut back, as expected.

2) A fundamental change in the present ar-

THE TROUBLED CIA — 3

range in which the director of the intelligence community also heads one of its components, the CIA. Most would separate the two functions and upgrade the former.

3) Creation of a new joint Congressional oversight committee, patterned on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, to scrutinize operations and consult with the Executive Department on long range policies and on proposed covert activities.

4) Some would take covert missions away from the CIA and establish a separate small agency, more closely supervised, for such activity. Others would leave the function at the CIA, but cut way back on such operations, permitting political interference in other countries only when a compelling case of American national interest could be made.

Clark Clifford, Washington lawyer, adviser to a succession of presidents, and former Secretary of Defense, has been involved in shaping American intelligence since he helped draft the 1947 law which established the CIA. He was White House Counsel at the time.

President Truman, he recalls, wanted such an organization because of his conviction that the bureaucracy failed to forecast Pearl Harbor not because there weren't solid signs and reports pointing in that direction, but because no one central office was collating and evaluating them.

Following the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961, Clifford says, he was asked by President Kennedy to become a member of a new group, the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, to

improve US performance in this field.

"I made a tragic mistake," Kennedy told him at the time. "The reason I did was because my advice was wrong. My advice was wrong because it was based on erroneous facts. And the erroneous facts were due to faulty intelligence. If we improve substantially our intelligence, then my advice will be better and I will, hopefully, not make another mistake of this magnitude."

Clifford served for seven years on the board, first as a member and later as chairman. From this background, he has a number of suggestions to improve the current intelligence set up.

He urges a new law which would take from the National Security Council the primary responsibility for making policy for the intelligence community and vest it, instead, in a specialist at the White House. Any proposed covert actions, for example, would have to be cleared by him.

He would consult, regularly and closely, with a new special oversight committee with a small number of senior members from both houses of Congress.

"This man would keep the President fully informed of all important developments in intelligence; if he needed a Presidential decision, he would get it, quickly," Clifford says.

He feels true oversight has not been performed in Congress for years. And he believes that the secretaries of State and Defense are much too busy running their departments to give more than cursory attention to overseeing the intelligence community.

Clifford says that at the present time the director of Central Intelligence will come before the National Security Council, sketch out a problem and make a recommendation for perhaps a covert action program.

"The pushed, harried men at that meeting will say: 'It sounds O.K., go ahead.' CIA will thus have a charter to go from point A to point B. But in the field it will appear to the operators the events are pushing them to Point C, then to D and E. And then the roof falls in. In point of fact, they were only authorized a limited operation from A to B."

Clifford feels that with a small, new agency set up to handle only covert programs, it would have to clear each and every step directly with the new intelligence czar. And he, in turn, would consult, as necessary, with the President and the special Congressional group.

He feels that very few covert programs would be authorized under this approach, and that the effort in Chile would not have passed the test as being vital to US national interests.

This raises a philosophical question as to what sorts of activities the United States should in fact get involved in.

A senior intelligence official complains that under present circumstances the Soviet KGB could move into Bangladesh, build up the local Communist party, buy off some key people in the military, the government and the press, launch a black propaganda campaign to mislead the populace on the true activities of the United States and others — all without fear of any counter-effort by the United States.

"We would say:

shouldn't we counter it? Buy back some people? We need funds. But it wouldn't be authorized for fear of the activity leaking out. So we'd drift along until the situation became so desperate that we'd have no choice but to act. By then it would be too late to do anything effective."

This reflects a concern among a number of active officials, but Clifford, among others, would argue the United States should steer clear of such marginal situations. That is the kind of question that doubtless would be debated thoroughly if a new intelligence law and structure is proposed either by the White House or Congress.

A top Congressional source says he would be apprehensive about creating a new intelligence czar on the President's staff because such advisers at present may not be called before Congressional committees. He would prefer having a Director of Central Intelligence, confirmed by Congress, with overall responsibility for guiding all the intelligence agencies, and a different man running the CIA. Currently both jobs are handled by one man, William E. Colby.

The Congressional source favors a new select committee of the Congress,

but would limit it to overall review of policy, with the Armed Services and Military Appropriations committees of both Houses continuing to pass on the funding requests of different intelligence agencies, mostly hidden in the Defense budget. The new committee, however, would also be available for consultation on special, sensitive projects, such as proposed covert actions.

An official with extensive experience both in CIA and military intelligence points out that 80 percent of all intelligence resources are under the control of the Defense Department. One result, he says, has been that the vast bulk of resources are targeted on learning how many SS-19 missiles the Russians have deployed and how many mechanized divisions the Chinese have, but precious little on developing economic intelligence about plans of oil producing nations, for example.

Other experienced intelligence officials, civilian and military, agree. One of them says: "Economic information is booming increasingly important to the viability of this country. We should be gearing up to a major capability here. There ought to be some way we could obtain information from some of our major corporations,

without creating conflicts of interest or raising stories about infiltration of US business by the CIA.

"For example," he continues, "Occidental Petroleum knows more about what's going on in Libya than anyone in the US government. We ought to be able to go to them and solicit information, promising it won't go to competitors or anyone else. But Occidental doesn't want to be associated with CIA. Everyone is afraid to get involved in internal collection of information. But we should be gearing up more to understanding what's going to happen to oil, copper and other commodities. We know so much about strategic missiles, but very little about economic intelligence. It's a question of priorities."

When will the priorities be addressed, the issues brought to a head?

A savvy Capitol Hill source says he thinks the issue will be kept alive through the election year. "There are some members who would rather have the issue than the solution."

But the Church committee in the Senate and the Pike committee in the House should wrap up their investigations and render reports and recommendations within the next few months.

President Ford is known to be unwilling to let the matter rest with the report by the intelligence commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller. A team of White House officials is beginning to actively dig into the situation, questioning officials at each of the intelligence agencies with an eye to a major Presidential initiative.

Clifford, for one, thinks it would be a mistake to think the community can be brought into line merely by increasing the clout of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as recommended by the Rockefeller Commission. The members of that board are much too busy in their own professions to provide proper continuous overview, he feels.

One of the key officials in the community would welcome the issue being aired in the Presidential campaign, so long as it is done conscientiously and constructively. "When the campaign is over, the new

President will have a mandate to reform the system. The dust can settle, and we can stop testifying and get back to our work of gathering and interpreting the facts so necessary to effective policy-making."

NEW YORK TIMES
25 Oct. 1975

'Former Intelligence Officer
Sues for C.I.A. Files on Him

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (UPI)—A former intelligence officer, John Marks, has filed a freedom of information suit against the Central Intelligence Agency seeking all files or other documents the agency has compiled on him, the Center for National Security Studies announced.

The suit, filed this week for Mr. Marks by the American Civil Liberties Union, seeks "all files, dossiers, communications, computer printouts or other documents" the agency holds on the former State Department liaison official with the intelligence agency.

Mr. Marks is co-author with Victor Marchetti of the controversial book "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence," which, with court approval the agency partially censored. He is now an associate at the center.

Christian Science Monitor
22 October 1975

'Leave our spies alone'

Commentary by Howard K. Smith on
ABC News.

Chairman Pike [recently] praised our spies who gather information, but he said the CIA goes wrong among those who receive and interpret the information, and act on it.

I don't know if he knew it, but scholars of the subject say he was stating the tradition of the dark game the world over.

Espionage is eminently successful in all nations. There aren't many secrets that can't be found. But intelligence — interpreting and acting on them — are flawed most everywhere.

Because all the books on it are now open, World War II is an encyclopedia of cases. Hitler's planned attacks on the Netherlands and on Russia were known to the date in the

victims' capitals, but they wouldn't believe it. Hitler had our detailed plans for D-Day, but we were smart enough to get a lot of phony plans to him too, so he never believed the real ones.

Books on cases since are not open. But we know that from Russia putting missiles in Cuba to the Yom Kippur war in the Sinai, we had all the facts we needed, but misinterpreted them.

Since CIA reform is now in order, the distinction is important: Leave our spies alone. I am inclined to think the President right in denying Congress information that would hint at their identities, locations, or methods.

Go to work on the superstructure of intelligence and dirty tricks. That's where the trouble lies and changes are needed.

Julian Barnes

Under the CIA Cloak

According to Walter Mondale, the Democratic Senator from Minnesota, the present proceedings of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities are 'more important than the Watergate hearings - possibly the most important hearings in the history of our country'. There have certainly been enough sensational revelations about illegal techniques and vicious hardware (dart-guns and shellfish poison) to disturb the glazed approval with which the American public traditionally regards the CIA and the FBI. The Committee itself is aiming somewhat deeper: at how the intelligence agencies are and can be made accountable to the President and to Congress. Such a scrutiny is certainly overdue, since congressional supervision has long been weakly complaisant, and presidents have been more interested in hearing about results than methods. In addition, presidential attitudes to the FBI were long conditioned by the secret files which J. Edgar Hoover built up on important public figures. Kennedy, asked why he re-appointed Hoover, replied: 'You don't fire God'; while Johnson, a rich source of coarse wit, commented: 'It's better to have him inside the tent pissing out than outside the tent pissing in.'

The Senate Committee is not a very wieldy institution, either for intensive cross-examination (each of the ten Senators has ten minutes with a witness), or for a serious exchange of ideas (three of the ten minutes are usually taken up with a harangue, sometimes patriotic, sometimes moral, sometimes folksy, sometimes, hideously, all three). Moreover, there are side-issues which often take over from the investigation. With election year coming up, and gavel-to-gavel television coverage available, the Senators are on good form: the younger Democrats are in feisty mood, throw moral fits towards the camera, and call for Nixon to be subpoenaed; the Republicans soft-pedal the past, and take it out on the bureaucrat served up as the day's victim. The chairman, Frank Church, neat and broad-jawed in the Kennedy mould, with a matching electric-guitar voice, is bucking discreetly for the Democratic nomination; and his recitation of the Presidential Oath (without notes), ostensibly to emphasise Richard Nixon's dereliction of duty, has an added resonance to it. Despite all this calculated theatricality, however, the plot-line remains vividly clear.

The present hearings, part of the continuing backwash from Watergate, developed from the discovery of what was known as the 'Huston plan'. Named after a Nixon White House aide, this was a strategy designed in 1970 to counteract campus violence and the anti-war protest movement; it involved black-bag jobs (as break-ins are called in the sanitised vocabulary of intelligence work), mail-opening programmes, and the vigorous harassment of political activists. It also proposed domestic spying by the CIA, in direct violation of the agency's charter. President Nixon gave official approval to the Huston plan on 23 July 1970; but five days later, after pressure from Hoover and Attorney-General John Mitchell, he revoked his approval. Both decisions were completely hollow: the

first, since most of the illegal techniques suggested in the Huston plan had already been in use by the FBI and CIA for decades; the second, since both agencies went ahead and behaved as if the plan had been approved.

It was a classic example of executive impotence. The CIA, for example, immediately began to expand the mail-opening programme which it had run on suspected dissidents since 1952 (its varied victims had included Senator Edward Kennedy, John Steinbeck, Martin Luther King, Richard Nixon himself, and, ironically, Frank Church). Meanwhile the FBI, which had had great difficulty in infiltrating student movements, had sought, and been refused, permission to recruit agents under the age of 21; it nevertheless went straight ahead with the proposal, and its teenaged informants enabled thousands of extra files to be opened on suspected dissidents. These files, illegally compiled, are presumably still held. Truly, as Frank Church put it, the intelligence agencies had begun to operate as 'independent fiefdoms', keeping the President ignorant of everything which, in their judgment, he did not need to know.

The reasons for acting unconstitutionally and illegally are easily explained: such methods are less trouble, they bring results, and anyway the other side is already using them. One of the few witnesses to approach candour on the subject was James Angleton, the former chief of CIA counter-intelligence. A gaunt, rather stylised patrician who cultivates orchids in his spare time, Angleton was reputedly the man who put the finger on Philby, and was forced into retirement last year because of his opposition to détente. In an unguarded piece of testimony which he subsequently described as 'imprudent' but did not withdraw, he pronounced it 'inconceivable that a secret intelligence arm of the government has to comply with all the overt orders of the government'. It was a belief which followed ill on the assurance voiced earlier by ex-CIA Director Richard Helms: 'The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we, too, are honourable men devoted to her service.'

When Angleton was asked to evaluate the usefulness of the CIA's illegal activities, he cited the case of Kathy Boudin, a member of a group of Weathermen who blew up the Manhattan house in which they were making bombs in 1970. The FBI's investigations produced virtually nothing on her; but the CIA's mail coverage programme turned up some 50 letters which related to her activities.

Almost by arrangement it seemed, the next witness, Charles Brennan, a former assistant director of the FBI, emphasised the frustrations and failures of sticking to the law. A chubby, nervous apparatchik, suspiciously eager to please, Brennan outlined an FBI plan devised when information on foreign spies working in the United States was at a low ebb. This was a scheme of 'trash coverage', and involved the bureau systematically sifting through the dustbins of suspected communist agents. The revela-

tion that communist garbage invariably contained nothing but garbage drew the loudest laughter of the hearings; but even this seemed to underline the stance which the intelligence services were taking before the committee. Either we stick to the letter of the law, they appeared to imply, in which case we remain empty-handed and ridiculous; or we use dubious methods, and get results.

It is, of course, an illusory dilemma, since there are two more possibilities: legal competence, and illegal incompetence. Indeed, the latter may well turn out to characterise the recent activities of the CIA, since a concurrent House investigation under Congressman Otis Pike into the agency's actual efficiency has already revealed startling failures over the Têt offensive and the Yom Kippur war. Even with an efficient intelligence service, however, the Executive must be able to control it. The Senate Committee returns restlessly to this question, with little enough help, not surprisingly, from its witnesses. Asked how he thought the agencies could be made to act within the law, Angleton brazenly suggested that the law should be adapted to the needs of the agencies; indeed, he even claimed (and in this was supported by Brennan) that if the agencies had gone astray it was partly through lack of guidelines from Congress.

Disingenuous as this argument is, it contains some truth. Tougher congressional supervision is part of the answer (at the moment, for example, oversight of the CIA is split between four congressional units); choosing a president (and, through him, an attorney-general) of firm moral character is clearly another part. As far as the agencies themselves are concerned, it does appear that they are now less eager to engage in illegal activities: the FBI's black-bag jobs (of which, for example, there were 238 against 14 specific 'domestic subversive targets' between 1942 and 1968) were discontinued on Hoover's orders in 1968; and the CIA ended its mail coverage in 1973. Of course this still leaves activities like the tapping of international phone calls (about which Senator Church has promised revelations), and the use of the Revenue Service to harass dissidents.

But however much the structure of accountability is tightened up, and however much agency operatives appear to change their spots, it remains extremely difficult, if not impossible, to ensure the accountability of intelligence agencies whose patterns of thought and modes of operating demand stealth, concealment and deceit. Perhaps the most bizarre and disturbing discovery made by the Church committee so far, and the one which is most indicative of the thought processes of those under investigation, has been that of the existence of the FBI's 'Do Not File' file. This was a system whereby the black-bag jobs which were done were recorded separately, and kept out of the regular bureau files. FBI officials were thus able to submit affidavits, and to swear in court, that their files contained no reference whatever to the break-in that was being investigated. 'It's really the perfect cover-up,' declared Senator Richard Schweiker. 'It would be technically telling the truth, yet it would be a total deception.' Or, as Senator Howard H. Baker from Mississippi, in his folksier way, put it: 'Pure frightening.'

Washington

The U.S. News-Letter

WASHINGTON

A PRIVATE WEEKLY REPORT AND FORECAST FROM U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT

2300 N Street, N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20037
Tel: (202) 333-7400 • Cable Address: WORLDREPORT

October 10, 1975

EXCERPT:

Quiet steps are being taken to reshape the Central Intelligence Agency.One objective: To free the agency from "excessive" Pentagon pressures.Another, to lessen the influence the State Department wields over the CIA.And, at the same time, a drive is on to find more spies who are willing to do the tedious undercover work that a successful intelligence operation requires.Little of this story has been told. Here is a backgrounder for you:The Pentagon comes in for some severe criticism by CIA's civilian brass.In particular, scare-tactic lobbying by the military to boost CIA's budget -- the old routine of whispering to Congress that "Soviet subs are off the coast" at times when Congress just happens to be considering appropriations requests from the Defense Department and the CIA. The growing view: No need for that.Moreover, some CIA professionals resent what they regard as interference by the State Department -- "tailoring" CIA information to foreign-policy goals. (The charge that CIA figures on Viet Cong troop strength in the Tet offensive were doctored to match an Administration line is offered as an illustration.)To correct the alleged abuses, the agency is doing some intense lobbying, asking Congress to amend the 1947 law which set up the CIA in the first place.Specifically, CIA seeks exclusion of military men from its two top posts. It's also asking Congress to block any Secretary of State from serving as head of the National Security Council, a position that Henry Kissinger holds today.CIA morale? Low. Investigations and adverse publicity haven't helped. Nor has this: The agency has become infected with Washington bureaucracy-itis. Too many empire-builders, some offices overstaffed, some methods cry for change. Vietnam proved, for example, that the British Government could gather as many facts with 12 undercover agents as we could with 700 people in the same area.Then there's the problem of spies who don't want to stay out in the cold. The CIA can hire plenty of people who like to work in the open, but we're told there's a shortage of men and women willing to go overseas and underground -- to pose as merchants, taxicab drivers and such while serving as CIA operatives. These missions can mean danger, hardship, facelessness -- sometimes for years.If you know anyone interested in working for CIA, suggest that they write CIA Personnel Director, Washington, D.C. 20505. Or telephone 703/351-2028.

NEW YORK

27 OCTOBER 1975

NEW YORK INTELLIGENCER

The Company Minds Its Manners

The CIA is quietly launching a public-relations campaign to convince the establishment that its existence is worth preserving. So, the Harvard Business Club of Washington was recently invited over to CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, for cocktails and a little hard sell from Director William Colby. Equipped with charts and slides, Colby detailed the structure of the organization, discoursed on the necessity for some secret operations, and discussed the CIA's involvement in the six-day Arab-Israeli war. One of the agency's Middle East problems, said Colby, was that intelligence agents in the area had not anticipated an Arab attack. A more fundamental flaw in their operations, Colby explained, was that the agency had not "programed enough irrationality" into the Arab-Israeli situation. He promised that every effort would be made to "program more irrationality" in the future.

Meanwhile, over on Capitol Hill, the word is that Colby's courtship of the establishment may be a little "irrational" itself. A number of congressmen are saying that both the Church and Pike committees investigating U.S. intelligence activities have mishandled their hearings, and as a result, the CIA may get off the hook entirely. One embittered liberal congressman explained it this way: "Frank Church's Senate committee went off into the clouds, playing to the press gallery with sensational stuff about poison dart guns and shellfish toxin. It lost sight of the real purpose of the inquiry—not only *what* the CIA does, but *why* it does it. . . . Over in the House, Otis Pike is on an ego trip fighting the White House on a side issue of subpoena power, and it's caused a lot of dissension within the committee." The expected outcome: as the investigations drag on and on, Congress will lose interest in the whole subject and will

CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1 CIA

FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL
October 1975

The nation must, to a degree, take it on faith that we, too, are honorable men devoted to her service.—Richard M. Helms

The CIA Investigation

Asking the Unthinkable?

THOMAS A. DONOVAN

IT SEEMS likely, when the Senate's investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency is finally behind us, that new and stronger barriers to Agency involvement in domestic affairs will have been erected. It is much less likely that any substantial changes will have been imposed on the Agency's activities overseas. Too many Senators have explained that the investigation is not a threat to the Agency's continuing ability to carry out its "basic mission" for us to expect from the Congress any real change in CIA's mandate for clandestine intelligence collection beyond our borders.

This is a pity, for there is need for a careful look at this "basic mission." We should ask: Should we not, while retaining within the agency's sphere of operations all of its present open intelligence-collection activities, put an end to its present excessive preoccupation with the collection of information by the traditional methods of espionage?

We would still have our observation satellites overhead. We would still listen to (and if we are clever enough, even read) other people's radio traffic. We would continue, as in the past, to learn what we could from knowledgeable defectors and other walk-in document deliverers, such as Oleg Penkovsky. We would still take normal counter-intelligence precautions. Moreover, we would still have in an above-board way, our batteries of intelligence analysts making their customarily careful analyses. We have been told by CIA spokesmen that the overwhelming bulk of the information worked over by agency analysts emanates from more or less open sources, and only a tiny percentage comes from the products of traditional spy

work.

As for agency officers at CIA stations in embassies and consulates through the world, we could keep them on the job, going to cocktail parties and circulating as conventional diplomats do. The unconventional but sophisticated political reporting talents of agency personnel abroad already largely focused on and concerned with open available information, are an asset that would not be diminished by depriving them of their authorization to act, for a few hours each week, like characters in a spy novel. All in all, then, an abrupt end to the shabby expedients now indulged in by our collectors of (or rather, lookers for) clandestine political intelligence would be a long way indeed from total intelligence disarmament.

Certainly the record does not suggest that Russia's immense investment of men and money in clandestine intelligence collection has been all that useful. The Soviets have been taken by surprise quite as often as, perhaps oftener than their Western rivals. They did not expect that Nkrumah would be overthrown in Ghana or that Sukarno would fall in Indonesia. They did not foresee that the United States would take pictures of the missiles in Cuba, or react to them as it did. They have been as often surprised by startling developments in East Europe as the rest of us. Yet in all of these countries the Soviets have long possessed large clandestine intelligence-collection programs, and in some of them they have even controlled the local intelligence apparatuses.

Is it, then, worthwhile for us as a nation to have on the payroll at Langley a set of specialized civil servants to collect information for us by burglary, bribery and blackmail? For this is what we are really talking about in our sanitized language about the Agency's "basic mission" to collect clandestine intelligence.

My own experience, as an information collector and intelligence processor of sorts in the Foreign Service and the State Department,

is that we could get along nicely without blackmail, bribery and burglary. No one who has not gone abroad on a diplomatic assignment can appreciate how much our representatives overseas are handicapped by the reasonable suspicion that they have been sent to bribe or blackmail their way into possession of the classified internal trivia of another country's bureaucratic machinery of government. Certainly, in my own tours of duty in Eastern Europe I have appreciated the legitimate anxiety of casual foreign acquaintances as to whether I was other than I seemed to be. Was I, under diplomatic cover, someone whose organizational imperatives made it routine for him to be ready to ruin the lives of his foreign contacts—in the presumed "national interest" of the United States, but in practice mostly to win points for himself in his home organization?

I have firsthand knowledge of one such Agency effort. The victim was a young member of the Czechoslovak Mission in West Berlin who had the misfortune to meet, and subsequently to be propositioned by, a free-lance American journalist whose acquaintance he made at a dinner in my home in West Berlin.

My role in the matter seemed harmless. I inferred correctly enough that the journalist whom I was asked (by an agency employee in the US Mission) to invite to my house was not, in fact, a legitimate American correspondent. I had never heard of the news agency listed on his calling card. Though I knew, therefore, that I was being used by the Agency to help bring these two men together (this is why I took up the agency man on his offer to pick up the tab on the cost of the dinner)—I rather simply-mindedly supposed that this was an inconsequential favor on my part. The Czech would be too wily to bite, I assumed, and if I didn't make the meeting possible someone else would.

Several years later in Washington, a professor friend from MIT just back from a trip to Prague, told

Thomas A. Donovan, FSO-retired, served at Prague, The Hague, Frankfurt, Warsaw, Berlin, Khorramshahr and in the Department before his retirement in the late '60s. Reprinted with permission from Commonwealth Publishing Co., Inc., 232 Madison Ave., New York, New York 10016.

me he had met somebody I knew. My young Czech diplomat had been assigned to escort him about Prague. Why was he no longer in the diplomatic service?, the professor had asked. The young Czech had candidly replied that he had accepted an invitation to dinner at an American diplomat's house in West Berlin and there he met an American correspondent who made him an offer to work for the American intelligence service. He turned down the offer and informed his superiors. But they, in the way of intelligence organizations—and maybe this was what the agency had had in mind all along—called him home and cashiered him. After all, if the Americans could have had reason to suppose he might be a weak link in Czechoslovak security, then better to play it safe and put him on the shelf in Prague.

An unimportant enough affair in the end, no doubt. Diplomats have to live with such hazards. But now it is no longer just the diplomats who come under a cloud from this sort of thing. Whole professions have been tainted by reasonable doubts as to their bona fides. Can one wonder, from the above instance, that suspicious security services in even the backwaters of the world now feel they cannot af-

ford to be indifferent to the comings and goings of US newsmen?

The Senate investigators should ask, at long last, whether the national interest is really served by having this unworthy and ultimately useless activity continue to be carried on by career civil servants of the United States government. The Senators must go beyond a limited effort to satisfy themselves that the clandestine arm of the agency henceforth operates more clearly within the agency's charter. They must redraw the agency's "basic mission" to exclude the kind of reliance on blackmail, bribery and burglary that has become such a characteristic feature of clandestine intelligence collection. No amount of fussing with the agency's operating instructions—no new ordinances specifying, say, what kinds of newspapermen may or may not be used in what kind of operations—nothing of this kind will set things right.

The Senators have, anyway, a unique opportunity to seek an answer to the question of whether our own record over the last 25 years shows clearly and decisively that slavish imitation of the Soviet KGB has promoted our real national interests in any significant way.

They might try to balance the Agency's inflated and thus far undocumented claims to occasional modest successes against its all too painful failures. The committee should satisfy itself, for example, as to whether the Agency has needed its license to practice blackmail, bribery and burglary beyond our borders in its much vaunted performance in gaining possession of the text of Khrushchev's secret speech of 1956 on the crimes of Stalin. In fact, several copies of the speech were simply passed to US officials abroad by foreign Communists who were anxious to get it into general circulation quickly and who were indifferent to the fact that a decision would be taken in Washington to treat the windfall as a coup of CIA's clandestine intelligence collectors.

At any rate, my own exposure—in a Foreign Service career of 25 years—to a representative cross-section of the Top Secret output of the collectors of clandestine political intelligence convinced me that the game of authorized blackmail, bribery, and burglary has been worth as little abroad as at home. The Senators will conclude as much, I suspect, if they try to see for themselves.

ARGUS, St. Louis
2 October 1975

From The Publisher's Desk

Image Making

Eugene N. Mitchell, M.D.



It would seem that in what is commonly considered the post Watergate era that Americans are in for an onslaught of redefinitions and new image making.

Currently the media in most cities are about investigating government and its agencies. In a way, this is good in that many have needed a close perusal for sometime now.

Abuses by physicians and other professionals are also popular topics, and most agree that certain types of exposes, while necessary, if not watched carefully can cause more harm than good. Witness the ever increasing malpractice costs which many feel will seriously damage the practice of medicine in this country.

Right now, alleged CIA and FBI abuses are the popular fodder for many a newspaper's powerful cannon, and sensational headlines concerning these co-called threats to our democracy are as common as raindrops.

That mistakes have been made is all too obvious, but if we're not careful the effectiveness of these badly

needed agencies will also be seriously hampered.

This is not to say that the CIA, FBI, doctors, lawyers and politicians should not have checks and balances, but to totally tarnish their images or ignore their individual and collective good would be a horrendous mistake.

All nations have a spy service and as CIA Director Colby pointed out recently in a St. Louis visit, this very delicate balance of power must be maintained to preserve peace. It would be nice if nations did not have to spy on other nations but it's naive to suspect this will ever be.

Certain types of abuses simply can't be accepted especially if they infringe upon our individual rights.

Would we, however prefer to allow groups like the SLA, the Weathermen, or Ku Klux Klan run rampant and unchecked?

Remember the violence prior to J. Edgar Hoover's getting tough on the Klan. And don't forget that groups that advocate overthrowing our form of government are also a threat.

It's obvious when all facts are considered, that the difference between totalitarianism and the effective safeguarding of American freedom is a thin line.

The one area of concern that is intolerable is the allowing of politics to influence our powerful national agencies thrust. This, obviously, is difficult to control, and in the end, after all the investigations are over, the main control will probably still be the integrity of the people involved.

Laws, can be legislated, but honesty and integrity can't.

POST, New York
17 Oct. 1975



Max Lerner

WILL INTELLIGENCE SURVIVE?

WASHINGTON.

It was part of the new "openness" of the CIA that a professor-columnist was invited to give a talk in an afternoon lecture series in the new dome-shaped auditorium. His theme being "Where Is America Going?" he talked (among other things) about open and covert societies, and about using social intelligence in intelligence operations.

The policy of inviting some ideas from the outside into the sacred precincts of the CIA predates the big public flap about the agency. It was started when James Schlesinger was briefly director and has been continued under William Colby.

Some might scorn such auspices for an arena of open discussion, but others have seen it as a change to infiltrate the hitherto rigid domain with oppositional ideas. In any event the CIA leadership publicly aired its conviction that its sinners are not beyond salvation.

My own view of the recent revelations about the CIA and its related agencies is that it is never pleasant to watch a can of worms being opened, but that it is better to have the worst revealed than to continue the concealment.

When director Colby ordered a set of internal investigations into the agency's past several years ago, he must have had a strong hunch about what would be discovered. Understandably he wishes that the cleansing process had stopped there. But no one could have stopped it. Once the self-assessment had begun it was bound to spread.

Colby's regret—if he has any—is that he briefed only the chairmen of the two Congressional oversight committees on the results of the inner digging. He should have briefed the whole of the leadership of both houses, and arranged for an early and orderly Congressional investigation. By not doing so, he let the whole investigation game become a free-for-all. Seymour Hersh of the New York Times got hold of a good part of the story, and then hell inevitably broke loose.

The Rockefeller commission worked hard, but from its beginning it was bound to be tagged as an establishment inquiry. It did an honest, earnest job but the conclusions would have lacked credibility if they were not confirmed by the independent work of the two Congressional committees.

Where the Rockefeller group made its mistake was in deciding to separate the assassination material from the rest of its report. The whole thing was all of a piece in its methods and in its moral roots, and should have been treated as a piece.

The story one gets in Washington is that President Ford was responsible for lopping off the assassination material. He felt it was bad enough for foreign nations to learn that their heads of government had been assassination targets, but if they had to know everything it was better for them to learn it from Congressional hearings and leakages than from a presidential commission which had been given the President's brief and whose report would get the President's approval. One can understand Ford's feeling, but

it was still a blunder.

Have the Congressional committees become sensation-mongers, as is often charged? My answer is that the political theater was inevitable. The strength of Congressional investigations, as witness the Ervin committee on Watergate, is that they are free of executive inhibitions.

Their weaknesses are that Congressmen have to play to the gallery of their constituencies, or else they wouldn't be what they are. Curiously, none of the Ervin committee members who were touted for the presidency at the time have come through as real candidates.

How about the question of legislation? The best bet would be to strengthen the internal investigative controls within the CIA by giving the inspector general stronger powers to roam through the agency. As for the National Security Agency, its scanning of global communications should get specific assent from the Attorney General.

The Congressional controls of the whole intelligence setup should be in the hands of a joint Congressional committee of both houses, as is true of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. But its members should be taken from the highest levels, and include the Congressional leaders of both parties. In that way there will be a maximum of intelligent control of intelligence.

There remains the question of whether the Congressional investigations have hurt the intelligence operation. Temporarily they have, by putting the agency in a bad light, but the intelligence community will survive. The valid functions of the operation will have to be separated from the abuses that have distorted them.

What the world will in time see, as it did with Watergate, is that a democracy can clean its house without destroying the vital things that have to go on within it.

The Virginia Gazette

Williamsburg, Va.
October 17, 1975
Page 4

CIA Headlines

It was unfortunate that Vice President Rockefeller took the occasion of the launching of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower last Saturday to make some gratuitous and misleading remarks about news coverage of the CIA.

Warning that U.S. security is threatened by a build-up of Soviet naval forces and their existing intelligence system, Rockefeller said, "The Soviets have developed the most comprehensive intelligence complex the world has ever known—while we run the risk of destroying our own intelligence system with headlines."

This is analogous to the remarks of former President Nixon and his aides that "wallowing in Watergate" would destroy the presidency. Watergate destroyed Nixon but revitalized our trust in the presidency.

Vice President Rockefeller did not tell the Newport News crowd that he was a member of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board during the same time that many alleged CIA wrongdoings were permitted to occur,

during 1969-1974. This board theoretically held supervisory authority over the CIA and other intelligence groups.

Rockefeller also seemed to forget that it was his own Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States that just last June confirmed the accuracy of many news stories about CIA misdeeds. In fact, the Rockefeller Commission went beyond the news media in several instances such as the discovery of Operation CHAOS, the domestic intelligence project.

We have previously maintained that an official investigation is warranted into possible connections between alleged CIA assassination plots and the agency's sprawling training base here at Camp Peary. While it would be diplomatically damaging to expose the identities of any targets, it would be helpful to know the sordid history of how these plots developed. Only in this way can we learn from our mistakes and hopefully punish any perpetrators. This country has benefited far more from such exposure to the public eye than it has from comparable cover-ups, as we so painfully learned during Watergate.

NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1975

Administration Said to Map 'Battle Plan' on Intelligence

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 18—The Ford Administration will staunchly resist a Congressional effort to bar the United States Government from undertaking covert intelligence operations or to intrude upon the President's prerogative to order such operations, interviews with high Administration sources disclosed.

This decision is one of several reached recently as the Ford Administration and the leaders of the intelligence agencies drew up what one key official called the "order of battle" for an expected confrontation with Congress on control of the intelligence community.

Administration sources said they fully expected, and many approved of, stronger Congressional oversight of intelligence gathering activities. But these sources agreed that President Ford would resist an attempt to bar the Government from engaging in covert foreign operations or an effort to require him to get prior approval from Congress before such an operation might be started.

Indeed, one top official was even chary of proposals that the President should "consult" with Congress on covert operations before they are launched.

"The problem with that is consultation implies approval which is a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers and we've been fighting this on separate fronts all along," he said.

The move within the Administration to solidify its positions on intelligence matters seemed to coincide with a sense of growing fatigue and irritation with the Congressional committees and media disclosures on intelligence. "People are tired and tempers are flaring," one key source said.

A senior official said that he and the President believed that the two Congressional committees did not need to "disclose everything in order to get legislation" and suggested that the Congressional investigators may have passed from gathering evidence to prepare legislation to "mere curiosity."

"I think they ought to get on with it," said another official. "Get the legislative proposals together and stop all the dramatics." He criticized particularly the upcoming hearings of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which will examine mail openings this week. "We've been over and over and over that," he said.

The Senate has already received testimony on how the Central Intelligence Agency opened mail and the subject has been examined by several other Congressional committees.

The pressure of Congressional

in the preparation of Mr. Ford's program for halting intelligence agency abuses. He and his advisers, senior sources said, want to avoid legislation passed in what one called the "emotional present atmosphere" that would permanently crimp the Government's ability to maintain national security.

The Ford program, still far from finished, includes efforts to "civilianize" intelligence and arrange ways the agencies can "police themselves," sources said.

The keystone will be a reinforced President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which would have the power to "look at" proposals for covert activity. It would also, another source said, be a place where complaints of abuse within the intelligence community could be carried.

The board was created to be a place Presidents could obtain independent advice on intelligence matters. But, in fact, over the years its role has been minimal in the President's decision-making on covert activities.

The plan now under study by Mr. Ford, drawn partly from a recommendation of the commission on the C.I.A. headed by Vice President Rockefeller, would require that a proposal for covert activity be sent to the board and the board would give the President its recommendation on the plan. He would still have the final decision and his power is unmarred, most sources agreed.

The board would be given an increased staff to permit it to examine the justification for agency proposals more fully. New appointments would also be made to give the board what one official called, "more Ford character." All current members of the board were appointed before Mr. Ford took office and seven of the 10 members were appointed by President Nixon.

"It's Mr. Kissinger's board," said one source, explaining that the appointments since 1969 had been recommended or approved by Secretary of State Kissinger.

The White House, sources said, has rejected an early plan that would have placed the board's chairman over the intelligence agencies in what one called a "czarlike" role. The post was offered to former Secretary of the Treasury George P. Shultz, who is a member of the board, but he declined it. Mr. Shultz is employed by the Bechtel Corporation and is serving the Administration in several special capacities.

There is also no immediate plan to replace William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence or Clarence E. Kelley, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. At one point, a source said, a list of potential directors for

NEW YORK TIMES
20 October 1975

U.S. REFUGEE AIDE FACES NEW DELAY

By GEORGE VOLSKY

Special to The New York Times

MIAMI, Oct. 19—The confirmation of a Cuban-American appointed last August as director of the Cuban Refugee Program faces a new delay following lengthy background investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies.

A spokesman for F. David Mathews, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, who is responsible for the Cuban program, said Friday that an F.B.I. report on the appointee—Ricardo Nunez, would be sent to the Civil Service Commission this week.

"It's out of our hands," the spokesman said, adding that a decision might not be made until December. Other Federal officials said they could not recall a "super-grade" appointment for which confirmation by the commission had taken so long.

Mr. Nunez, a wealthy Miami builder, was a top executive of Gramco, a bankrupt investment fund based in the Bahamas that was owned by Robert L. Vesco, the financier who fled to the Caribbean after he was indicted on Federal charges of fraud and conspiracy.

Between 1959 and 1968, when he joined Gramco, Mr. Nunez was an employee of the Voice of America. During most of that time, he has said, he was also an undercover operative of the Central Intelligence Agency.

His new \$36,000 job, although subject to the confirmation by the Civil Service Commission, is a political appointment. It also requires a top security clearance.

The refugee program he has

the C.I.A., but found no one with the qualities he felt the job called for who would accept the post.

Mr. Colby has already increased the size of the C.I.A.'s inspector general's office and the inspector general is to be given new lines of command that will make it possible for him to report to the advisory board, they said.

Several officials were anxious about the concept that a director of the C.I.A. could complain to Congress about Presidential orders or that Congress would be "ombudsman" over the agencies.

"I'm a little worried that oversight should not impair good working management," said one senior official. He implied that making Congress a "court of appeals" for the bureaucracy weakened discipline.

Administration sources appeared to believe that how the Senate select committee handled the hearings on the National Security Agency might be a "test" of the responsibility of Congress in general national security matters.

been named to head spends about \$90-million a year. Its former director—like his predecessors, an expert social worker—died in March, and Casper W. Weinberger, then the H.E.W. Secretary, named Mr. Nunez to the post five months later.

Before the appointment was made known, some experts advocated that the position be abolished for the sake of economy. They argued that since virtually no new Cuban refugees were coming to the United States, the program should be phased out and its functions absorbed by other agencies.

The appointment of Mr. Nunez provoked strong criticism, particularly among Cubans who are Republicans and Americans who have had business dealings with him here.

In Washington, Lillian Ciberaga, a Cuban Adviser to the Republican National Committee, called Mr. Nunez, himself a Republican, "totally unqualified." She said that she had written to resident Ford urging that Mr. Nunez be asked to resign to "spare the Administration an embarrassment."

In Miami, Rafael Villaverde, a Republican who heads a social agency for the aged, termed the process through which Mr. Nunez was appointed "our new Atergate."

Supporters of Mr. Nunez have insisted, however, that his wide-ranging business and civic activities have qualified him for the job.

In late August, after The New York Times learned that Mr. Nunez was a defendant in a dozen of civil lawsuits here, the F.B.I. reopened its inquiry into his background.

According to court records in Dade and Broward Counties, about 30 companies and individuals and several law firms are suing Mr. Nunez and N. B. S. Development Company, his land and contracting concern, alleging nonpayment of more than \$300,000 in bills. Two other cases, the builder and his company have been ordered to pay a number of plaintiffs.

While not legally bankrupt, N. B. S. has no known assets.

Mr. Nunez, who lives in Coral Gables, in a lavish home reported to be worth \$500,000, was a modest wage earner in 1968, when he left Miami to live in Nassau. Four years later, following the bankruptcy of Gramco, he returned here a multimillionaire, according to former associates.

One associate said that part of Mr. Nunez's job at Gramco had been to coordinate sales in Latin America. He added: "We all knew that it was illegal in every Latin country to sell Gramco bonds. At one time, our entire team of 10 salesmen in Peru was arrested, and it cost us a huge bribe to get them out of jail. After that our Latin operation went completely underground, with fictitious names, coded messages and all that C.I.A. stuff."

When Gramco collapsed, thousands of Latin investors were reported to have lost more than \$50-million. Some of them are said to have expressed dismay over Mr. Nunez's appointment.

Leave the CIA agents alone

By WILLIAM A. RUSHER

Recently, the liberal reporters who kicked off the CIA controversy late last year are now ready to settle for the prosecution and jailing of one or two CIA agents—the higher-ranking the better—for violations of law uncovered in the course of their hot-eyed investigations. I hope profoundly that no such thing happens.

The whole flap over the alleged misdeeds of the CIA has been a phony from the start—a painfully obvious attempt on the part of the Washington press corps to maintain the momentum generated by Watergate and roll over yet another pet liberal target before the juggernaut slowed down.

From Seymour Hersh's original story in the New York Times on Dec. 22, 1974, to Sen. Frank Church's most recent pirouettes on the Sunday TV talk show, the entire affair has had the unmistakable flavor of a "happening": one of those pseudo-events staged to amaze and edify the groundlings in the tedious gaps between real events.

The test of the phoniness of the whole thing is the disproportion between the efforts exerted between the cooperating media and politicians and the amount of authentic concern generated in the public at large.

Heaven knows the effort has been

monumental: acres of newsprint, oceans of ink, hundreds of hours of prime time, a revelation a day for 300 days, a Presidential commission and three separate congressional investigations.

Yet just how concerned are the American people over the alleged misconduct of the CIA? Have you heard a single really tense argument on the subject? Watergate caused plenty of them—and Vietnam too; and so did the campus riots and various aspects of the civil rights controversy.

But if anybody outside the original claque has ever raised his voice in anger, one way or the other, on the subject of the CIA, it has eluded me.

The reason for the public's indifference is not far to seek. Most Americans know very well that this is a dirty world, and are entirely in accord with the idea that it is necessary to have some tough types on our side.

And if Senator Church, poking around in the files, comes unexpectedly upon evidence that the Kennedy brothers spent a lot of time trying to kill Castro, I daresay that the dominant emotion of a good many Americans on the subject is a keen regret that they didn't succeed.

To be sure, it is the unwritten law in such situations that the old principle of "respondeat superior" doesn't apply. We all remember that dry voice on the self-destructing tape in

"Mission: Impossible" warning Jim that, if his actions unluckily came to light, "the Secretary will of course deny all knowledge of them."

Fair enough; but it certainly didn't follow that if Jim's illegal acts were exposed by some nose reporter, it would be the bounden duty of our own Department of Justice to prosecute Jim and send him up the river.

There is such a thing as "prosecutorial discretion": the right of the prosecutor to decide, in the light of all the circumstances of the case, whether or not to seek an indictment.

Just at the moment that discretion is being exercised generously in favor of thousands of draft-dodgers and deserters, many of whom have recently compounded their original crime by failing to keep the promises (of alternative service) they made to avoid prosecution in the first place.

How much more deserving are the men in the CIA who may have violated lesser laws in the interests of this country, with the full knowledge and at the private behest of the Presidents they served!

To prosecute such men now, for no better reason than to reassure Seymour Hersh that he hasn't been wasting our time and his own, would be a deadlier blow at the CIA than any he and his cronies have managed to land—and a far greater crime than any yet laid at the door of the CIA.

WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, October 21, 1975

CIA Saturated Embassies in '60s

By George Lardner Jr.

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency built up such an undercover bureaucracy overseas that for a time it had almost as many employees abroad as the State Department's Foreign Service, according to informed sources.

Shortly after the advent of the Kennedy administration, sources said, the CIA had 3,700 employees operating under diplomatic or other official U.S. titles overseas while the State Department had 3,900 bona fide employees working abroad.

The CIA officials were known in U.S. government circles as "CAS"—Controlled American Sources. Their proportions in U.S. embassies abroad were sometimes startling.

Some 15 years ago, one source said, for example, 16 out of 20 people in the political section of the embassy in Vienna really belonged to the CIA.

In recent years, another source said, the CIA contingent abroad has been drastically reduced, partly because of the 1961 Bay of Pigs

fiasco, but also because of the growing clout of the multi-billion-dollar National Security Agency, whose technological eyes and ears are considered more reliable.

"You'd be surprised at how few people the CIA has overseas these days," this source said. Although the figure can sometimes jump dramatically with the inception of new covert operations, this source said the current total was "less than half" of the 3,700 officials reported on the CIA's secret roster in mid-1961.

Shortly after the CIA was established in 1947, a special study group headed by then deputy CIA director Allen Dulles warned in a still secret report against using State Department cover as an answer to all its problems.

The report, sources said, indicated that the CIA even then had been making what the State Department considered excessive demands for official slots. The study group reportedly recommended that the CIA develop more "outside cover" for its personnel overseas, such as that which could be provided by private business.

The CIA, however, steadily increased its requisitioning of official government positions, sources said, because it was easier, quicker, provided more security and offered more perquisites for its personnel.

By 1961 as a consequence, according to sources, the spy agency had some 1,500 people abroad under State Department cover and another 2,200 under other official U.S. covers, such as Defense Department civilian personnel.

In some U.S. missions so-called "CAS" personnel outnumbered the regular State Department complements. At the embassy in Chile, for instance, 11 of 13 officials in the political section in 1961 were from the CIA. Almost half of the political officers in American embassies throughout the world were under cover for the CIA.

The result, sources said, was often a serious encroachment on State Department policymaking. In some countries, CIA station chiefs were able to command more influence than the ambassadors and at times

pursued different policies. At the Paris embassy, where the CIA occupied the top floor and in 1961 had more than 125 people, the spy agency even took over much of the overt political reporting on French politics normally done by the State Department.

Although there are reportedly far fewer CIA officials operating abroad today, there are indications that the agency still relies heavily on official U.S. cover for the overseas personnel that it does have.

At the CIA's inception 28 years ago, according to one knowledgeable source, the use of State Department cover was supposed to be "strictly limited and temporary."

But in an affidavit this month that was prompted by a freedom-of-information lawsuit in U.S. District Court here, officials of the National Security Council claimed that disclosure of initial 1948 plans for coordinating secret operations with other U.S. agencies could, even today, "prompt attacks on our diplomatic personnel overseas as being spies and covert operators."

BALTIMORE SUN
19 OCTOBER 1975

Revamping the spy game: Can the old mold be broken?

By THOMAS PEPPER

Washington.

As the leaves change color on the trees, and time begins to run out on the two congressional committees investigating United States intelligence activities, it is becoming increasingly apparent that normal standards of government performance are not going to bring great and meaningful change to the intelligence community.

If past precedent is any guide, it will take an extraordinary and concerted effort—on the part of the White House, Congress, and the intelligence agencies themselves—to do anything more than repeat the usual Washington cycle of disclosure, alarm, and inertia.

Indeed, without such an effort—of a sort more systematic, for example, than the current attempts to change regulatory policy—one could hazard a guess that the various intelligence agencies would ride out their current troubles, and be back in business, roughly as before, by mid-1977.

Between now and then, a certain amount of day-to-day difficulty is inevitable. Senate and House investigating committees will continue to demand answers to a host of questions, although the committees will soon have to halt their inquiries and put together their reports; both face deadlines of early next year. President Ford has indicated that he will be instituting reorganization procedures—presumably to check past abuses, but also to head off too much Congressional intervention later next year, when legislative changes arising out of the two investigative reports will be ready for passage. Meanwhile, the intelligence agencies themselves can be expected to do a certain amount of internal house-cleaning.

Thus, by spring various reorganization plans are likely to be in the works. And with an election campaign underway, the country can expect—and deserves—more debate than normal about the power and quality of its intelligence services.

There will be charges and countercharges, and bitter disagreements over who is protecting the nation more effectively: defenders of a relatively unfettered intelligence agencies, or critics of allegedly too powerful intelligence services. Then, no matter who wins the presidency—but particularly if a Democrat wins, and brings with him a wholesale change in executive branch appointments—some further reorganization is likely in early 1977.

But what happens after that? Will the dust settle once again? What form will reorganization take?

The answers to these questions would seem to depend, in the end, on the intelligence agencies themselves. A strengthened system of oversight, though it is now the most obvious and most likely result of the current congressional investigations, is not enough.

The intelligence gathering process, if it is to work, must operate under conditions of greater secrecy than any other part of a democratic government. Unlike grand juries, or regulatory agencies and other quasi-judicial bodies that operate with a certain amount of secrecy, intelligence agencies collect much of their information without the knowledge of the people who first produce that information.

Any sharing of how this is done, even within an agency, is considered a risk perhaps greater than the original risk of seeking the information. The risk is even greater when an intelligence agency engages in so-called "covert action," meaning an attempt not simply to collect information, but to change the course of events in a way that masks the cause of the change.

Any oversight process, particularly one that might involve public disclosure, increases the risk to intelligence operations. Correspondingly, any requirement for a secret oversight process weakens the independence of the oversight body. In extreme situations, something has to give—either the effectiveness of the intelligence operations, or the effectiveness of oversight. With mutual trust, there would be room for give-and-take; the agencies could give up some of their secrecy, and the monitoring bodies could give up some of their need to know, taking the rest on faith.

But that very trust is the missing ingredient at the moment. The succession of super-discreet congressional subcommittees that took care of intelligence oversight up till now tilted heavily in the direction of intelligence activities. In practice, there was less oversight than this year's revelations would seem to have warranted.

Now the atmosphere is different. Beginning with the Watergate revelations of 1973, and continuing into this year with the two congressional investigations and one by an executive branch commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller, public perceptions of the intelligence agencies have changed considerably. As a group, they stand accused of two severe failings.

First, in their efforts to collect information, the agencies admittedly broke various laws and violated constitutional rights of privacy. The primary examples

Agency aimed at letters to and from Communist nations, and an electronic eavesdropping program run by the National Security Agency on all international telephone, telegraph, and telex traffic. Also, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has admitted that it conducted illegal burglaries against U.S. citizens.

In addition, the agencies often failed—again, by their own admission—to meet standards of quality they themselves had set for gathering accurate information; standards they had told the rest of us to expect. Key examples here are the estimates by both the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency of the likelihood (or unlikelihood) of a Middle East war in the fall of 1967. As late as one hour after the Egyptian-Syrian attack had begun, these estimates were still telling the President that no general offensive was in the works.

Thus, judging by revelations so far, the major tasks ahead are:

1. On the input side, to curb abuses of the law.

2. On the output side, to force the system to produce higher quality intelligence.

Some would go still further and say that U.S. intelligence agencies should not engage in "covert action."

Any new congressional oversight body that might emerge from this year's investigations is bound to have these matters very much in mind, and to shift away somewhat from the old system of giving the intelligence agencies the benefit of the doubt.

Just how far the balance will shift remains to be seen, however. A Democratic administration could probably count on greater latitude from a congressional committee dominated by Democrats than the present Republican administration could.

Furthermore, any new Congressional panel—say one patterned after the relatively successful Joint Committee on Atomic Energy—Would eventually encounter the same obstacles that haunted its subcommittee predecessors. This conflict between secrecy and oversight would also apply to any new White House monitoring group that Mr. Ford might establish.

The burden of change, then, is likely to fall mainly on the agencies themselves. Each has a separate history, and a separate set of problems. But they alone possess the necessary information to accomplish the two key tasks.

Within the CIA, for example, there is a definite feeling of satisfaction about changes the agency introduced on its own in the period just before the congressional investigations began. These changes deal both with the problem of abuses and the problem of faulty intel-

ligence estimates of the sort published just before the Middle East war.

But again, if past precedent is any guide, further improvement will be needed. The next major phase in CIA history—following an inevitable period of caution during the current investigations—will depend on how its next generation of executives is selected.

The group that entered intelligence work in World War II—when such work was an honor and a privilege—is now serving out its last few years. Because the CIA was founded in large measure by these same people (and their like-minded, already-retired elders), the agency has never really had a transfer of power from one generation to another.

This is why the nature of any reorganization that takes place over the next 18 months is so important. If all the disclosures of the past two years lead only to a purge of a few top officials, and to the institution of a new but still politicized White House monitoring group and new but customary congressional oversight, the intelligence agencies could easily revert to their old habits—and understandably so.

Mr. Pepper reports on congressional activities from The Sun's Washington Bureau.

THE NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
 14 October 1975

Survey: 33 Agencies Spent 2.63 for Cops

Washington, Oct. 13 (UPI) — The first inventory ever conducted of federal government police activities showed today that the government spent \$2.6 billion last year to employ 169,625 persons for police, investigative and intelligence-gathering activities in 33 agencies.

The figures covered the fiscal year that ended June 30 and amounted to more than 0.8% of federal spending.

The survey was conducted by the General Accounting Office, an arm of Congress, and did not cover the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, or the Defense Department's intelligence-gathering branches. Nor did the survey show how much is spent separately to contract for guards.

The survey showed that the Capitol employed 1,028 guards — more than two for every member of Congress — at a cost of \$12.2 million.

The survey raises questions about "the sheer number of government units having some form of law-enforcement responsibility" as well as raising the possibility of duplication of efforts, according to Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.) who requested the data.

Percy said, for example, that 23 departments and agencies have 35 separate guard forces, with four alone in the Treasury Department. Percy questioned why the Capitol, the Library of Congress and the Supreme Court each requires separate police forces totaling 1,214 officers to protect a four-block area that also is patrolled by the District of Columbia police.



CIA recruiting: a keyhole view

By Benjamin Welles

Washington — For the last 10 months the CIA has been battered by more bad publicity than in all 28 previous years since its creation in 1947. Has this hurt recruiting?

No, say agency officials — though they concede that the school year has only just begun and that recruiting trends may not be clear until January.

The CIA says it hires "less than 500" young men and women officers a year (apart from clerical staff) of the 4,000 or so who apply. Its size and budget are officially secret, but a good guess would be 15,000 people and \$600 million.

Who, then, are the college and graduate students and the young men and women already in jobs who want to join the CIA?

"There's been a marked change down the years," explained a senior official. "In the '50s they came mostly from the Eastern Seaboard and they were products of prep schools and Ivy League colleges. Now they come from all over the country."

In the '50s — when the cold war reduced U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations to black and white — many recruits came from military backgrounds. Duty came before self-questioning; patriotism before doubt. Now, since Vietnam and the Watergate scandal, the CIA's recruits are more "intellectually challenging," says one agency official.

"They ask tough questions: 'What do we do, why do we do it?' They probe, they challenge us. We realize they face stiff peer pressures. So when they do decide to join — they've weighed it and thought it out. They're committed."

Each year top CIA officials at headquarters near Washington list the special skills — engineers, chemists, economic geographers, area specialists, linguists among others — that they will need over the coming year and in what numbers. The lists go out in autumn and spring to regional recruiting offices: Los Angeles; Portland, Oregon; Austin, Texas; Denver; Chicago; New York; and Philadelphia. Headquarters here handles recruiting for the South.

CIA recruiters from the regional offices contact area university-placement offices

— and even advertise in leading newspapers, including the New York Times whose revelations of "massive, illegal" activities last December led to investigations both by Vice-President Nelson A. Rockefeller's commission and by Senate and House committees.

Applicants were once interviewed on campus, but anti-Vietnam war feeling ran so high in student circles in the late '60s and early '70s that the bulk of the interviewing process was quietly shifted to nearby federal office buildings.

Applicants now must fill out a 17-page, personal-history form and if accepted must wait up to six months for the intense screening process. Most of those accepted then undergo a year's training (with certain exceptions such as engineers, scientists, etc.).

Not all the CIA's work is "spying." Of the agency's four component directorates, one — Operations (formerly Plans) — trains and directs agents who collect clandestine intelligence overseas. Traditionally the so-called clandestine services have had the lion's share of personnel (33 percent) and of funds (50 percent). But since Vietnam and the post-Watergate outcry about assassination plots and "destabilizing" hostile foreign governments much of its activities have been cut back.

Of the other three directorates, Intelligence analyzes the huge bulk of incoming information ranging from published manuals on Soviet bee culture to secret-agent reports. The work of the Science and Technology directorate and of the Support (administrative) directorate are self-evident.

Virtually all new recruits have a PhD or at least an MA degree; only 5 percent hold only BA degrees, say the recruiters. As an equal-opportunity employer the CIA also has been seeking qualified women, blacks, plus Americans of Oriental and Hispanic origins. According to one official, "We've been delighted to find that we can hire from minorities without lowering our strict standards." Starting salaries — depending on skills — range from \$10,000 to \$20,000.

WALL STREET JOURNAL
 17 OCTOBER 1975

Washington Wire

CIA CLEANUP promises to fall short of fundamental change.

Ford will order limited revisions soon. He will make the CIA inspector general more autonomous, supposedly with power to halt dirty deeds. The White House plans to give more authority to the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, install a new chairman. Its legislative proposals may seek to bar assassinations. Skeptics claim the

changes would be largely cosmetic.

Congress will probably create a joint committee to oversee the agency. It will likely tighten legal language governing CIA operations, without banning all covert action. Some Capitol aides wonder if Senate investigating chairman Church is more interested in running for President than in reforming the CIA. The House inquiry is far from reaching any conclusions.

Morale says, meantime, among CIA hands. They make reports increasingly bland in efforts to avoid trouble. Some employees count the days till retirement.

NEW YORK TIMES
25 Oct. 1975

DRIVE FOR BLACKS PRESSED BY P.I.A.

College Placement Officers
Impressed by Parley on
Minority Employment

By JOSEPH LELYVELD
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 25—There were cocktails and an ample buffet, featuring Southern fried chicken, in the executive dining room of the Central Intelligence Agency last night for a group of college placement officers. As it happened, most of the guests were blacks.

They had been invited into the sanctum on the seventh floor of the agency's McClean, Va., headquarters at the end of a two-day conference on "minority employment" designed to drive home the idea that the C.I.A. is an equal opportunity employer.

William E. Colby, the agency's director, whose offices open on to the dining room through doors that have one-way locks, was on hand with other top officials for this rare display of C.I.A. hospitality. The guests were clearly impressed.

Dr. Joseph M. Wright, director of student affairs at the University of Michigan in Dearborn, said the very idea of coming to the conference had made him uneasy. Before this week the only C.I.A. man he had ever met was James W. McCord Jr., the convicted Watergate burglar, who had spoken on his campus.

He would have been unlikely to mention the C.I.A. to a student job seeker, Dr. Wright said, because of his own doubts about its activities and anxiety about "how he might react to my suggestion." Now, he said, he is not only convinced that the agency is a "necessary evil" but that it ought to have more blacks.

Drive on for Two Years

Long stereotyped as a bastion of the WASP Eastern establishment, the C.I.A. has been actively recruiting black professionals for two years now. It obviously did not have many blacks when the effort began, for only 1.5 per cent of its professional staff is now black. (Of its total staff, including clerical workers, 6.4 per cent is black.)

The agency divulges only percentages, not absolute numbers. According to the book by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence," a 1967 survey turned up fewer than 20 blacks on a nonclerical staff of 12,000. That works out to .0016 per cent.

Yesterday, in one of the con-

ference's final sessions, the placement officers pressed F.W.M. Janney, the agency's personnel director, to say how many blacks were interviewed in recent years and how many were employed. When Mr. Janney would not give the numbers, suspicions were voiced by the guests that the agency was more interested in image-building than black recruitment.

These were answered by Mr. Colby, who followed Mr. Janney to the rostrum. But, at the last session of the afternoon, Helen Kimball of the University of Kansas wanted to know "how much awareness" the C.I.A. had of the economic and social barriers the average black had to cross to become a college graduate. Her question raised the question of preferential hiring.

It was answered by Dr. Edward Proctor, deputy director of for intelligence, who said the agency would consider the obstacles an individual had to overcome but would not establish special standards for blacks as a group. "I'm looking for performance," he said.

Oreing Not Essential

The one exception the C.I.A. would make, he said, was that it would hire a black who was "really first-rate in virtually any academic field that is pertinent to our work" even if it had no immediate opening for him.

Moments later, Merritt Norvell, an assistant dean at the University of Wisconsin, said that blacks were not looking for preference. "The Russians don't care if I'm blue, yellow, or red," he said to a burst of applause.

According to C.I.A. personnel officials, the agency recruits about 1,100 new employees a year. Of these, only 2 to 3 per cent are taken into the elite career trainee program that prepares future intelligence operatives. In all, there are about 400 professional openings a year, mostly for economists, linguists, scientists and others with special skills.

The recruiting is done from 10 regional offices across the country, which are said to be in contact with 400 campuses. Until the antiwar protests of the late nineteen-sixties, the recruiters went on to the campuses to conduct their interviews, the way corporate talent scouts do.

Later they retreated to well-secured Federal buildings, but now, gradually, it is said, the climate is easing and the C.I.A. is cautiously starting to send its recruiters back to the campuses.

In the last year, officials say, the recruitment prospects for the agency have improved markedly, despite the revelations of the C.I.A.'s illegal domestic spying activities and the well-publicized investigations these engendered. In fact, it is said, the publicity has helped, not hurt.

BALTIMORE SUN
30 Oct. 1975

Garry Wills

FBI Motto Is to Save Its Face

The revelation that the FBI destroyed a letter from Lee Harvey Oswald does not tell us anything new about the FBI—its highest imperative has always been "Don't embarrass the bureau."

What is more important, the letter tells us nothing new about Oswald's assassination of President John F. Kennedy. We are often told that new revelations make it desirable to reopen the Kennedy investigation. Most of these new revelations are repetitions of old stuff, like the fact that Jack Ruby was a mob groupie.

But the letter of Oswald was a new bit of information, and it just tends to confirm the Warren report. Oswald wrote the letter because he was mad at an FBI agent for checking up on his wife, Marina, a routine the bureau follows with immigrants from the Soviet Union.

If Oswald had been working for the FBI, as many conspiratorialists have argued, he would not write the agent a letter telling him to stay away—he would have talked to his "contact." In fact, he would probably have expected, and not resented, the agent's call on Marina.

Then why did the FBI destroy the letter? Because it regularly tells lies to make itself look like its TV image.

Even without knowledge of the letter, some people find that the FBI had been remiss in not watching Oswald more closely. With the letter, things might have looked worse. So the FBI denied such prior knowledge of Oswald in his threatening mood.

The letter gives us a glimpse of the reality that exists behind conspiratorial theorizing. The theorists believe that all people in power make up a clique of bad guys, whose interests are similar when not the same. They do not recognize that the bad guys spend a lot of their time fighting each other.

The FBI swept much of the evidence in the Kennedy and

Oswald killings off to its vaulted laboratories in Washington. When the state prosecutors needed some of that evidence for the Ruby trial, they almost had to blackmail the FBI to get it.

The conspiratorial scenarios depend very largely on meet-meshings between local police, the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Justice Department. But local police often resent the FBI—especially Texas police, who still think of themselves as Rangers. The CIA and FBI have a long history of mutual distrust and bureaucratic non-cooperation. That is one reason J. Edgar Hoover shot down the Huston plan—he did not like to work with others, and especially with the CIA.

In World War II, Hoover quickly expanded his anti-crime work to the hunt for domestic spies and saboteurs, and then expanded that hunt to foreign cities where he had FBI offices. So thoroughly did he take over the busy anti-espionage activities throughout South America that William Donovan, when he founded the Office of Strategic Services, could not move in on Hoover's territory.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur kept Donovan's boys out of the South Pacific, too; so the OSS had to settle for Europe and Africa.

After the war, Hoover tried to supplant the OSS in Europe while retaining his sovereignty over South America. But with the founding of the CIA, he had to relinquish even South America to the President's new army of spies. He did this with a notable lack of grace, and the bitterness engendered then was kept alive, like most of Hoover's resentments, through the rest of his career. As recently as 1971 he was again expanding overseas FBI offices, against the active resistance of the CIA.

So those people who imagined Hoover's one-man band co-operating in a conspiracy to kill the President are misjudging the actors in the plot. The FBI has always tended to be timorous with any people but the very helpless—frightened of embarrassing the bureau, and better at destroying letters than at pulling off co-operative ventures of high risk.

Jack Anderson

'An Attack on American Liberties'

The Central Intelligence Agency's harassed director, William Colby, has written us a letter that deserves attention.

"The successful conduct of both intelligence and journalism," he contends, "depends upon the ability to protect sources. We are deprived of intelligence today, which we might have had but for sensational exposures of our activities, not our abuses."

"The solution to the dilemma of how to conduct intelligence activities in our free society is to give our intelligence organizations clear guidelines and effective supervision — but through representatives of our people, not through the powerful spotlight of total exposure."

We agree that total exposure, like total secrecy, could be hazardous to our national health. But the greater danger, we believe, is too much secrecy.

For too long, the CIA has operated in a subterranean world of half light, a world of grotesque shadows and shapes. In this murky environment, the CIA plotted murders, conducted burglaries and buggings, blackmailed diplomats, tailed newsmen, spied on dissidents and engaged in dirty trickery. Often, the victims were not enemy agents but loyal Americans.

We believe the press let the sunshine into this shadowy world just in time. Otherwise, a subterranean creature might have developed, which would have become a menace to the freedoms it was created to protect.

The language of the Constitution — justice, tranquility, welfare, liberty — was intended to protect the people from the government. The language of the CIA — secrecy, surveillance, covert operation — would protect the government from the people.

Colby acknowledges "that the CIA must allow more light on its activities to regain the trust of the people. I believe we have been doing exactly that," he contends, "over the past two years."

Certainly, Colby has been more open and candid than any of his predecessors. But he has also sought to create a cozy

relationship between the CIA structure and the press apparatus. What he really wants are reporters who will act as explainers and apologists for the CIA. They would become lap dogs rather than watchdogs.

The need for the press to occupy an adversary role was clear to America's founding fathers. That is why they made freedom of the press the first guarantee of the Bill of Rights. Without press freedom, they knew, the other freedoms would fall.

Colby claims we misrepresented his views on Senate Bill No. 1, a 750-page monstrosity disguised as a codification of existing law, which would strangle in the crib the system of free inquiry we have today.

"You say that I want to make it a crime for newsmen to publish classified information." This is not so. The legislation I have recommended," Colby claims, "would apply only to those who gain authorized access to classified intelligence information."

He also states that his proposal "would require that any prosecution for unauthorized disclosure be subject to prior judicial review to ensure that classification of the information is not arbitrary or capricious."

Behind almost every important revelation of government wrongdoing in our time has been three ingredients: (1) the honest public employee who reveals the hidden truth; (2) the newsman who verifies the story, fits it together with other information and publishes it; and (3) the official investigation that is thereby forced into being.

As we understand Senate One, it would nullify or impair each step in this process. First, it makes it a crime for public employees to reveal classified information.

Second, the bill in its present form would make it a crime for a reporter to receive or publish "national defense information." The government would have the power, with some limitation, to define national defense information. Thus, the government could attach this classification to

almost anything it didn't want the people to know.

Third, the bill provides a loophole for officials who break the law in line of duty if they believe they were acting lawfully, thereby weakening the incentives for official probes.

Our professional estimate is that this package would shut down the investigative press quite effectively. Remember how President Nixon tried to invoke the CIA and "national security" to cover up the Watergate scandal? Under Senate One, he would have gotten away with it.

There are legitimate defense secrets, as Colby suggests, which the government ought to be able to protect. Codes, nuclear secrets, plans for military operations, the identity of undercover agents, crucial data on weapons systems — all have a just claim to secrecy if they are not already known to the enemy.

But instead of defining narrowly the types of information that must not be revealed, instead of writing into Senate One the standards set by the Supreme Court for justifying news suppression — that the disclosure must pose "direct, immediate and irreparable harm to the security of the United States" — the bill relies on a long-discredited classification system.

The decision as to which parts of the people's business could not be divulged would be left to the caprice of innumerable bureaucrats, such as a gentleman of our acquaintance who used to spend his days clipping articles out of newspapers and pasting them on stiff paper which he would then stamp with a secret classification.

Millions of documents have been classified, some legitimately, some willy nilly, some under criteria designed more for hiding mistakes than for protecting valid secrets.

Senate One does not discriminate sufficiently between the yellowed newspaper clippings and the latest weapons designs. And so, instead of being a safeguard for national defense, it is an assault on American liberties.

(c), 1975 by United Feature Syndicate

OMAHA WORLD HERALD
 5 OCTOBER 1975

Retired General: CIA Is Nearly Paralyzed

By Michael Holmes

Congressional investigations of the American intelligence community "have practically paralyzed the CIA," a former deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said Saturday.

Retired Lt. Gen. Alva R. Fitch said: "Virtually no one in intelligence does anything now because they don't know that tomorrow they might be questioned about it," he said.

Acknowledging that "the intelligence community, like other institutions, has some internal problems and occasional policy errors," Fitch said the present investigations "are raising a moralistic fuss about things that were approved (by

the government) at the time they occurred."

Partly because of the Watergate scandals, he said, "there's a different morality now. But the investigations have passed the point where they're doing good for the country. I think they're doing us a great disservice."

Fitch said that certain practices which have come under fire, such as monitoring phone calls, opening mail and keeping dossiers on U.S. citizens, are important.

Fitch, who for 2½ years directed Army intelligence activities, said that when intelligence agencies are denied the controversial methods, "if a man wants to sell out to a foreign government, he feels

much more secure."

He also lashed out at critics who have accused the intelligence agencies of formulating "assassination plots."

"I know the people and I know why they did things," he said. "I know of no single case where there was an assassination plot. There's a great difference between a plot and a contingency plan."

"When you plan how to get students out of a high school in case of fire," he said, "that is a contingency plan — it's not a plot to set the school on fire."

Fitch, in Kearney, Neb., for a 50-year high school reunion, told The World-Herald in a phone interview that the need for a strong intelligence oper-

ation is "just as great as it ever was."

Fitch, a native of Amherst, Neb., was held prisoner by the Japanese in World War II. He began his career in Army intelligence in 1947, retiring from the service in 1966.

FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL
October 1975

FSJ BOOKSHELF

Inside the
Intelligence System

THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE, by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. Dell (Knopf). \$1.75 (\$8.95).

INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA DIARY, by Philip Agee. Stonehill, \$9.95.

IF THE CIA had been able to impose its will on, and enforce its employment contract with, Marchetti and Agee, these books would not have been published. The Agency obviously believes that parts of these books are injurious to intelligence and covert political operations.

After a complex Federal Court battle, the CIA was able to enforce some censorship, and so "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" contains some 168 blank spaces representing material suppressed by the CIA. Other material has been printed in boldface type emphasizing material that a Federal judge, over CIA objections, would not permit to be censored. Marchetti worked for the CIA for 14 years, serving in positions near the executive leadership. This gave him an overview of CIA activities which few have had. Marks was a Foreign Service officer and former assistant to the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department and later a Senatorial aide on Capitol Hill. Their joint efforts expose a substantial amount of new information about the US intelligence system. Their book is strongest in muckraking details about the organization, procedures and attitudes of intelligence professionals. It is weaker as an analytic work; indeed rather thin when it comes to the tough problems of policy, organization and control of secret services in a democracy. Much of the book is currently being upstaged by the various official investigations of the CIA problem.

Agee's "Inside the Company" is a more radical and revealing book, if taken at face value. Its substance seems authentic, but who on the outside can say? Agee confesses that as a covert operator "you get so used to lying that after a while it's hard to remember what the truth is" (p. 9). Given Agee's current motives to further a world revolutionary, socialist cause, the reader is bound to be curious about how he was able to reconstruct from memory hundreds of pages of a "diary." And what, exactly, does Agee mean when he acknowledges

STAR, Indianapolis
25 Sept. 1975

TRANSATLANTIC

CIA Probe Boggles British Minds

By Anthony Lejuene

Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, the leader of Britain's conservative opposition, and her predecessor, Edward Heath, have both been visiting the United States during the past few days. (Separately, not together — there's an icy coolness between them.) Despite the European Common Market, despite the resurgence of isolationist sentiment in America, there has perhaps never been a time when the two nations had more to learn from one another.

Much of what needs to be learned falls into the Awful Warning category.



Lejuene

NO ONE RETURNING to the United States after an absence of several years could fail to notice the strong current which has set in towards Federal, collective or, in plain English, Socialist solutions to social and economic problems.

The sheer growth of Washington, which means the growth of central government and its attendant bureaucracy, of politicians and their parasites, proclaims what has been happening. And one has only to read the newspapers or watch television to meet a continual stream of demands for government intervention; demands based on political assumptions which not long ago would have been considered, at the very least, highly controversial.

Everything from medical care to car seatbelts, from housing to consumer protection, is treated as a proper subject for the passing of laws and the spending of taxpayers' money. Government and business are becoming more and more intertwined, and a lot of businessmen no longer really want to be left alone, whatever they may say.

The labor unions too seek to gain what they want through government action, and are clamoring for new welfare schemes and for more public expenditure in order to create jobs. The school system has become flagrantly a political battleground.

that the Communist Party of Cuba "gave me important encouragement at a time when I doubted that I would be able to find the additional information I needed" (p. 639)?

Agee's tedious book is unique in that it describes CIA covert operations in Ecuador, Uruguay and Mexico in which the author was involved. Pointlessly, he cites the names of numerous agents, foreign and American; lists secret organizations and code names; and in general "blows the cover" from a

THE COROLLARY of this process — high taxation, refuse inflation, a jungle of controls and a habit of mind which looks always to the government for help — renders people less able and less willing to look after themselves, and therefore makes the welfarists' predictions self-fulfilling. So the current flowing towards Socialism becomes cumulatively stronger.

All this will have seemed very familiar to Mrs. Thatcher. It is exactly the road down which Britain has travelled since World War II — with consequences which are only now becoming unmistakably clear.

On the other hand, any British visitor is likely to be startled by certain attitudes toward government which are quite unfamiliar. It is taken for granted in Europe that governments do not, and cannot, act only in ways which would satisfy the moral code of a Sunday School teacher.

THE INVESTIGATIONS into the activities of the CIA are, from a British or European point of view, truly mind-boggling — not because of what they reveal but because the politicians involved, and indeed the press, seem to have no qualms about revealing it. Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, on which to a considerable extent, the CIA was originally modelled, has endured several major scandals since the war: but they were not scandals of this kind.

On the contrary, the whole sting of them was that secrets had been penetrated or endangered, and that the efficiency of operations was therefore lessened and agents' lives put in peril.

Nobody in Britain doubts that a Secret Intelligence Service ought to be secret. Only quite extreme left-wingers doubt the necessity or propriety of covert operations overseas — scruples which seem not to worry them unduly with regard to the activities of the Soviet Union.

Each day's news from Washington must set the walls of the Kremlin rocking with merry laughter. America's allies find it less enjoyable and not at all reassuring.

(North American Newspaper Alliance)

theme is that the CIA provides a secret police for American capitalism. His book is substantially revealing; his theme is appallingly overstated and simplistic. Unintentionally, parts of the book suggest a script for a Marx brothers movie, which is to say that many US covert operations abroad were amateurish, outrageous and foolish. Smaller wonder that the CIA would have suppressed this book, first published in Great Britain, had it been able to do so.

—HARRY HOWE RANSOM
University

"TIMES OF ZAMBIA" Lusaka 26 September 1975

Kapelwa Musonda

OVER the past couple of months, we have written considerably on the chronic shortages of essential commodities. We hope we are not boring our regular readers if we make some fresh revelations on this same topic.

While these shortages have not brought a great deal of joy in this country and have been a cause of severe inconveniences to the sort of life we were trying to get used to, they have brought a great deal of happiness to many parts of the world, particularly those near our borders where photos of our women queuing for essentials and fighting over them, have become a regular feature on the front pages of their national newspapers.

Armchair economists are writing haughtily about what we should have done and where we went wrong. Zambia has suddenly become a household word in most parts of the world not because of our commendable efforts to sort out the mess in southern Africa, but because of our failure to provide the basic essentials to the common man.

A couple of nights ago, I was having a few quick ones with my mentor and good friend Comrade Bonzo. I think it was during our second refills when Bonzo caught sight of the collars of my shirt and expressed grave indignation. He wondered loudly if I had problems in my household.

I assured him that all was well and that the lady of the house was given ample housekeeping allowance but there was just no soap powder to be had for love or money. I then complained to Bonzo and wondered if this country was seriously tackling the supply and distribution problem of essential commodities.

In desperation and full of emotion, I charged and blamed our shortages on congestion at ports and expressed the hope that if they operated more efficiently, we would get most of the essential raw materials in good time.

"Nonsense," said Bonzo. "You have been reading too much of the 'Daily Noise' which is deluding the people about what is actually happening to the economy of this country."

"But it's a fact, comrade," I exclaimed, "that most of the essential raw materials have been stuck at the ports for years."

"But it's a fact, comrade," Bonzo, "that any importer

and manufacturer who has essential commodities stuck at the port of entry can get these moved in no time at all by approaching the right authority. What do you think is the reason for the establishment of the Directorate of Contingency Planning?"

"Then would you blame it on low productivity of the Zambian workers?"

"That's another rubbish propagated by the 'Daily Noise'," retorted Bonzo. "The Zambian worker works just as hard as any other worker anywhere where they have no shortages. In fact we have had these shortages with us for the past three years only. You can't convince me that the Zambian worker has suddenly become lazy and less productive. That's nonsense, if anything, he has become a better and efficient worker."

"Would you blame the Ministry of Commerce then for not granting import licences for essentials or that there is an absence of an effective supply and distribution policy of essential commodities?"

"That again is not true. The Ministry of Commerce is very generous in its issue of import licences for essential commodities and there is in this country institutionalised machinery for the importation, supply and distribution of all essentials."

Failed

"Then, tell me comrade, what is the cause, where have we failed, where have we gone wrong?"

"I will tell you," said Bonzo as he reached for his large glass of the fluid that is never in short supply and drained it in one breath, "it's the CIA".

"You don't mean the Central Intelligence Agency?"

"It's the one, comrade, at the root of all our current problems. I see a CIA touch on what is happening in

this country. They are very good at this sort of thing and no one else in the world could have convinced and effected it. Don't you ever under-estimate the CIA?"

"Comrade you are not serious," I said in disbelief.

"Of course I am. Think, don't imagine for any moment that because the CIA is under investigation and is having problems with the American Senate and Congress it has been deterred from exporting confusion, unrest, assassinations, anarchy, and coups to the Third World. The problems we are going through over supplies of essential commodities are not of our own making, that is why we are unable to bring it under control."

"But how do they do it?"

"That we shall never know. That's why they're an Intelligence organisation. I imagine they have infiltrated the entire manufacture, supply and distribution sector."

"I certainly would like to know what they have done to these men involved in this sector."

"What other explanation could there be for failure to supply to the common man the basic essentials like salt, soap powder, cooking oil, beans etc unless he was being paid by someone like the CIA not to do his job properly otherwise you expect him to discharge his duties well, after all he gets paid for it."

"But why should they employ this crude method of bringing frustration and unrest to this country?"

"Probably they realise that the people in this country are so politically united that we have to be tackled from a different angle."

"What do they stand to gain out of all this?" I asked.

"Maybe for the fun of it. There is usually no apparent reasons for most things the

CIA gets involved in."

"But surely they should have better things to do," I said.

"I don't know. Probably they don't like the Chinese."

"What has their dislike of the Chinese got to do with us?"

"They may think we are getting too much under the Chinese influence. They see a lot of Chinese goods in our shops, a Chinese built railway and we owe the Chinese a great deal of money. So I suspect they say to themselves that if they can't have us under their sphere of influence, they damn well won't let the Chinese have us either."

"What do you think is the cause of all this?" I demanded to know.

"It's simple really," said Bonzo, "a great deal of American money was used to lay the economic foundation of this country."

"I thought it was the British money," I reminded him.

Unhappy

"No, but American money using British personnel. The British have no money. Naturally, the Americans are not at all happy that their money will be used to finance the Chinese. Neither are they pleased that they are losing a potentially profitable market to the Chinese."

"There may be something in what you have said comrade, but I don't think you will find many people accepting your explanation."

"But the people have no choice but to believe the CIA theory. So far, every reason has been given as the cause of the shortages and nothing has been done about it and nobody believes anything anymore on the supply situation. It is time, I think, we blamed it on the CIA, it's the only thing left..."

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

23 October 1975

CIA efficiency

CHICAGO—The CIA should not be criticized for hiring gangsters as assassins. It should be complimented for trying to do a job in a more efficient manner.

Forty years ago, for possibly less than a million dollars, we could have hired the Mafia to bump off Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, and a few other key Nazis. Instead, we permitted those dangerous men to strut around while we, shouting about our ideals of morality, assassinated

ed hundreds of thousands of innocent men, women, and children. In doing so we spent billions of dollars, killed and crippled vast armies of our own men, and devastated hundreds of cities.

Before we get involved in another international conflict we should take a long hard look at our system of morality. We might find that the most virtuous way of waging a war would be to take the contract from our star-spangled generals and give it to the Mafia.

Otto Boutin

GENERAL

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1975

Andrei Amalrik, on Détente

The writer of the following article, a 37-year-old historian and dissident, is best known in the West for his book "Will the U.S.S.R. Survive Until 1984?" in which he postulates that hostility among various ethnic groups and an eventual war with China could tear the Soviet Union apart. Last May, he returned to Moscow after five years' imprisonment and internal exile on charges arising from his writings. Barred from residence in Moscow last month, he now lives in a nearby town and is permitted to visit the city two and three days at a time. This was translated from the Russian by The New York Times.

MOSCOW—Assessing the advantages of détente over the cold war, we don't have the right, it seems, to say that détente is the alternative to war. The cold war, being a form of sublimation of hot war, was not less effective than "détente" in averting a real war, because peace depended, and still depends, on the balance of nuclear power. Therefore, even a mutual reduction of weapons, should it ever be achieved, would not reduce and would not increase the risks of war.

The rise in armaments is a consequence of confrontation, not its cause, and to a certain degree is a consequence of scientific-technical progress. Inasmuch as an accord about reductions in these or those areas will not end either confrontation or progress, the arms race if suppressed in one area will merely emerge in another. A reduction in arms may be a result of détente but it is not its sole nor basic content. Therefore, it is better to look upon détente as an instrument not for the safeguarding of peace but rather for the improvement of the world. Otherwise, there would be no sense in détente.

An impression is growing, however, that the objective of the U.S. in détente is precisely the safeguarding of the existing situation. It seems to be striving to entangle the U.S.S.R. in a web of treaties and mutual commitments, and thereby deprive it of the ability to disrupt world stability without concern that these ties might be severed.

Soviet Union's Aims

For the U.S.S.R., the side still on the offensive, the objectives of détente are much broader. The U.S.S.R. is striving to emerge from isolation for at least three reasons: first, to use détente with the West to manipulate the Western countries one by one rather than in a group, and this is already happening to a certain extent; second, to assure itself of a secure rear in view of the hostile relations with China; third, to overcome the economic backwardness deriving from the isolation.

Despite important military-industrial achievements, the economy of the U.S.S.R. remains bogged down and

needs technological and organizational modernization, and this is impossible without assistance from the West. In addition, the backward state of agriculture compels the U.S.S.R. to buy grain regularly in the West. Two bad harvests in succession without such purchases could shake the Soviet economy and even provoke mass upheavals.

Further, détente is explained, as I see it, by two not fully clear but real circumstances: first, by the fact that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. regard each other as the only equal partners; second, that they along with other developed countries are beginning to consider themselves not only rivals but also to a certain degree as allies—somewhat like a group of well-fed in a crowd of hungry.

I speak of these tendencies recognizing that opposing tendencies are at work and that the U.S.S.R. remains in the eyes of the U.S., as before, a destructive force. Whether or not the American leaders recognize it, a fundamental change in the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. is impossible without a change in its internal situation.

It is difficult to imagine a state combining constant suppression and violence internally with peaceful behavior and accommodation externally. Such "peaceful behavior" could only be the consequence of military weakness or of deceptive camouflage. Therefore, any relaxation in the internal policies of the U.S.S.R. should be desirable to the Americans not only out of humanitarian considerations. It is also vitally important to them for reasons of their own security, and therefore can be regarded as one of the objectives of U.S. policy.

Since the U.S., in working out its political strategy, chose cooperation with the U.S.S.R. rather than its isolation, two tactical variations were possible:

1. To move toward rapprochement expecting that the cooperation of the U.S. and the West in general would gradually "soften" the U.S.S.R.

2. To tie every step toward the U.S.S.R. to a demand for a particular change in both internal and external policies, understanding their interdependency.

An impression has been created that Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger chose the first path as the one seemingly requiring less effort and giving visible results promptly. Mr. Kissinger sought to resolve in barely two years the challenge of rapprochement with the U.S.S.R., a task requiring, let us say, two decades. Such haste possibly reflects not only the mentality of Mr. Kissinger himself but also the features of American mentality in general—the mentality of businessmen who want to see at once the tangible results of their efforts.

to the hasty signing of a series of agreements only for the purpose of presenting them to the citizens on television and saying: "Look! We have done this and this and this!" But the U.S. is dealing with a partner with which it is dangerous to make haste. Even if the Soviet leaders do not possess the many brilliant qualities of Mr. Kissinger, they are able to a superlative degree to set themselves distant goals and also to wait patiently.

American policy differs from Soviet policy in two other features. Foreign policy in a way is a pupil of internal policy. The mentality of government officials rising to foreign policy leadership has been shaped for years by dealing with internal political problems, and all the methods they have mastered inside the country are applied abroad.

American domestic policies are based on a play of free forces, settled by compromise, while Soviet domestic policies are based on a no-compromise implementation of instructions. And while the U.S. may sit down at the negotiating table consciously or subconsciously thinking of compromise, the U.S.S.R. sits down with the intention of achieving its objectives in full, agreeing only to fictitious concessions.

The other strange feature of American policy, as with the policy of the West in general, is the treatment of the U.S.S.R. like a small child who must be allowed everything and not be irritated because he might start screaming—all because, they say, when it grows up it will understand everything.

'Dr. Spock' Methods

This prolonged "upbringing" of the U.S.S.R. by the methods of Dr. Spock is reflected not only in an endless number of minor concessions by the U.S. but also in actions that are simply humiliating for its prestige as a big power. This was most clearly illustrated by the reluctance of President Ford to invite Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn to the White House because Mr. Kissinger feared this would infuriate Leonid I. Brezhnev.

Such behavior in general is very typical for representatives of the American Government. Thus, an American diplomat with whom I have been acquainted for more than 10 years and who recently returned to Moscow declined for the same reasons to meet with me, although he did send expressions of his sympathy via an intermediary.

Knowing the character of those whom the Americans are trying to play up to by such behavior, I believe that even though it wins approval from their side it also arouses a degree of contempt.

As I get older, it becomes ever clearer to me that the best in the

world finds its expression in simple human relationships: the love of a husband for his wife and parents for their children, the comradeship of men, compassion, patience and simple decency; while any ideology and doctrine, if not used with care as a working hypothesis, may lead to the chopping off of heads or, in the best of cases, to the stuffing of money bags.

The fact that two persons who were able to meet more than 10 years ago without any interference and now, in the period of "détente," are unable to meet does not speak in favor of détente's humanitarian aspects.

It does not seem to me correct, in light of the long-range problems of the U.S. rather than the immediate ones, that there is a desire "not to overload" détente, as Mr. Kissinger has said, with humanitarian problems, and to yield on humanitarian issues as politically unimportant and annoying to the U.S.S.R., all in order to promote the sale of Pepsi-Cola.

The Basis of Stability

If the U.S. sets itself the objective of establishing truly friendly relations with the U.S.S.R. and wants to be assured of their durability, then it must strive for the transformation of the closed Soviet system to an open one. The awakening of the Soviet people to human rights is a force working in this direction.

Inasmuch as the movement for human rights has no troops, the politician-policemen and the politician-businessmen are inclined to slight it. But it seems to me that it is precisely the world movement for human rights that will become a world-transforming force that will overcome both inhumanity based on violence and inhumanity based on indifference.

Genuine stability comes only in a process of movement, only in the expansion of influence. The U.S. must strive for a transformation of the world if it wants it to be more stable. A system that does not set expansionist goals for itself contracts and dies away. The world has experienced many forms of expansion—military, economic and cultural. If the U.S. can become the center of a new expansion, a humanitarian expansion based on human rights throughout the world, its future would be assured for a long time.

It is interesting that this idealistic element has already, to a lesser or greater degree, been felt in American politics during the entire history of the U.S. The old-fashioned European political mentality—without an understanding of historical perspective and without interest in higher goals—is not likely to long dominate the foreign policy of the U.S. No matter how much more Mr. Kissinger wants to cast aside humanitarian problems, they come to the surface by one means or another. This is particularly evident in the differences between the Administration and the Congress over the question of trade and of emigration from the U.S.S.R.

These differences, although restricting the Administration, also do give it certain benefits. The triangle of Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Brezhnev and Henry M. Jackson reminds me somewhat of the situation when a criminal is being induced to confess by two interrogators, one of whom—Senator Jackson—shouts and beats his fist on the table, and the other—Secretary of State Kissinger—who smiles and gently promises leniency. So the heart of the criminal, faced with such contrasts, opens up to the kind smile.

The U.S. Government evidently is feeling the pressure of business circles, headed by makers of soft drinks, interested in cooperation with the U.S.S.R. because they consider it a gigantic potential market for their products and a source of raw materials and cheap labor. One can only welcome economic cooperation, if it is one of the elements of the policy of détente, but not a force shaping this policy.

Without doubt, businessmen have made an enormous contribution to the creation of modern America, but when they became the leading political force they led the U.S. to the brink of disaster—to the Great Depression of the 1930's.

Americans are a people easily carried away. When they were carried away by the cold war, I don't know whether there were sober voices proposing some kind of alternative. Now the Americans are carried away by "détente," and it is good that warning voices are being heard. The warning is that détente requires restraint and determination—not merely a willingness to compromise—and that meek concessions will only lead to demands for more concessions. Perhaps the voices will be heeded.

The alternative to détente, which its supporters have demanded to hear from its critics, is détente carried out differently, détente in which long-range goals are not sacrificed to short-term goals; and one must learn to wait for what is desired.

Foreign policy does not exist by itself. It is an integral part of a country's internal condition, which in turn depends upon external conditions. If one accepts the premise that without *rapprochement* with the U.S.S.R. the U.S. cannot exert influence on it, then one must say that if this influence is not in a constructive direction the *rapprochement* will be even dangerous for the U.S. When the U.S.S.R. must pay for every bushel of grain and for every technological secret not so much with gold as with a step toward democratization of its society, only then will its foreign policy cease to present a threat to the West.

However, this exchange, this "gentle pressure" should not have the character of wounding the self-respect of the U.S.S.R. Let it proceed under the banner of demanding fulfillment from the U.S.S.R. of the international declarations it has signed. And every concession should be looked upon not as a "victory for the West" but rather

as a step toward common good.

In the emerging triangle of powers, the relationship of the U.S. toward the U.S.S.R. and China, amid some similarities, is very different. China has not developed yet to the level of true partnership with the U.S. economically, socially or politically; and militarily it presents much less of a danger to the U.S. than does the U.S.S.R. Further, the mainspring of revolution still has not unwound in China. Any attempt to put pressure on China for the purpose of internal change most probably will yield no results. China is still so far from the West that everything that happens there is regarded almost like something on the moon. China is still too "alien" for public opinion in the West to reach out a hand to those who are subjected to persecution.

Pressure From the West

It is a different matter with the U.S.S.R. From the circumstances of its tragic Eurasian geographic situation, Russia has always been both more sensitive to the West and more dangerous to the West than has China. The mainspring of the Russian Revolution has completely unwound. And moving now only by the force of inertia, the U.S.S.R. will be highly responsive to pressure from the West, all the more so because of a hostile China at its back. And it is fully clear that the more the relations of the U.S.S.R. with the West expand, the more it becomes "familiar" to the West, the more public opinion in the West will keep an alert watch on events in the U.S.S.R.

If the rivalry of the U.S.S.R. and China becomes ever sharper, and I believe that it will, then the ties of the U.S. to the U.S.S.R. and China will become like two sets of reins in the hands of the American leaders, which they can use to guide the course of world history.

But the question is, will they?

Let us assume that a state or a group of states, working out long-range policies, should define the goals, strategy and tactics. As viewed from here in Russia, one might say that the political strategy of the U.S. is correct, but that its tactics in effect are undermining that strategy. But what is more important, the policies of the U.S.—and even more so of the West in general—reveal very dim objectives or even the absence of objectives; the preservation of the status quo and economic growth are not really objectives.

Perhaps the dissent and lack of confidence that have seized the West and have found partial reflection in "détente" will open the way to a perception of the significant objectives—the objectives of reshaping the world, at the basis of which will be the human personality, a personality in its broad human, not egoistic, essence. Then the West, sure of itself, will begin to speak in a different voice.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Wednesday, October 22, 1975

Schlesinger's risky 'empty strategy'

By Herbert Scoville Jr.

When his "counterforce" strategic policy came under fire in the Congress, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger claimed the Russians had nothing to fear since they had "a capability to launch their strategic force on warning of an impending attack."

This tactic, known as "launch on warning," would place ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) on a hair-trigger alert so that they could be launched in the interval between the firing of a hostile counterforce attack (an attack of one country's ICBMs against those of the other) and the arrival of the warhead at the targeted silo. It takes 30 to 40 minutes for an ICBM to travel between Russian and American sites, and radars or satellite infrared systems can provide at least 20 minutes' warning that an attack is under way. With modern technology, defending missiles could easily be launched during that 20-minute period so that the attacking warheads would only be destroying empty silos. A counterforce strike thus becomes an empty strategy. "Launch on warning" would appear an ideal tactic were it not for other fatal flaws.

Strategic missiles, unlike bombers, cannot be recalled or destroyed once they have been launched. Yet each packs the punch of many Hiroshima bombs—the Minuteman III ICBM carrying three warheads aimed at separate preordained targets and the Poseidon missile carrying ten warheads. Thus, a single missile is capable of destroying three to ten cities and of killing millions of people.

Furthermore, the military are strongly opposed to placing any mechanism in the missile so that it can be destroyed or aborted in flight. They fear that this would make it vulnerable to countermeasures and provide the enemy a self-installed ABM (anti-ballistic missile) system.

Therefore to reduce the chance of calamitous accident, extraordinary measures are taken to ensure that no missile will be inadvertently fired without authorization. The United States has adopted tight command and control procedures, which require authorization from the President, and positive action by at least three independent persons to launch any ICBM. Our deterrent forces are designed to survive an attack so as not to have to be fired hastily. Fail-safe mechanisms are installed on all launch systems to ensure against an accident which could unleash such catastrophic destruction.

We have no specific knowledge of Russian procedures to prevent accidental launches, but there are strong indications of their understanding of the hazards involved and their interest in avoiding such an occurrence. They have exercised even greater control than we over people with access to nuclear weapons; in 1971 they negotiated several agreements with the United States to provide safeguards against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, all their land-based ICBMs have been deployed in costly, hardened silos to increase their proba-

bility of survival in the event of an attack and avoid the need of rapid launch on warning.

Apparently, Mr. Schlesinger feels that improving U.S. ability to knock out Soviet ICBM silos overrides the substantially increased chance that millions of Americans will be incinerated in an accidental nuclear strike. Actually, the Secretary was providing telling support for what critics of his counterforce policy have long been warning — that we cannot risk the acquisition of a more effective anti-silo capability, which could push the Soviet Union toward a "launch on warning" posture. Putting the Soviet ICBMs on hair-trigger alert is even more risky for us than for them.

To make matters worse, Mr. Schlesinger has threatened to launch strategic nuclear weapons in a "selective" strike at military targets in the Soviet Union in response to aggression with conventional weapons in Europe. If the Russians follow Schlesinger's advice and "launch on warning," the selective strike will hit only empty silos while Soviet warheads may be killing millions of Americans. It is time for the Secretary to contemplate the implications of his own programs, and recognize that they are seriously increasing the risk of a nuclear catastrophe.

Mr. Scoville is former Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Deputy Director of the CIA.

Tuesday, October 28, 1975 THE WASHINGTON POST

Helsinki Rule Seen Aiding

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

BONN, Oct. 24 — The Soviet Union appears to have outsmarted the Western allies on a key provision of the 35-nation agreement on European security signed last summer in Helsinki.

The provision requires advance notice of "major military maneuvers" by participating countries when the maneuvers are within a certain distance of another country's border.

Before the new agreement was signed, the question of what size maneuvers would require advance notice and how far away from borders they could be held without the notice was a major stumbling block and the last issue to be resolved before the wide-ranging pact would be concluded.

As matters turned out, the numbers arrived at match the recent pattern of Soviet military maneuvers, in effect allowing the Soviets to continue doing what they have been doing for the past few years without giving prior notice.

The provision for prior

notification of major military maneuvers is included in a section of the 60-page agreement devoted to "confidence-building measures."

The idea was to ease fears that a country could launch a massive surprise attack against another country and use the pretext of a big military exercise to disguise the massing of troops in border areas.

Thus, the agreement, in rather vague language, requires that countries give notice three weeks in advance of military maneuvers in Europe involving more than 25,000 troops.

However, a key provision is that "in the case of a participating state whose territory extends beyond Europe, prior notification need be given only of maneuvers which take place in an area within 250 kilometers (153 miles) from its frontier facing or shared with any other European participating state."

Since the Soviet Union's territory extends well beyond Europe, this means the Soviets do not have to an-

nounce large-scale maneuvers that are more than 153 miles inland from its European borders.

The agreement does limit the size of Soviet and Warsaw Pact exercises close to Western European borders to the 25,000-troop level, but informed American and West German military officials say that for the past few years at least the Soviets have been holding down their maneuvers in border areas to that size anyway.

Since the signing of the Helsinki accord Aug. 1, there have been a number of Western news reports that NATO governments had evidence of the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies "circumventing a clause" in the Helsinki agreement by holding down the size of their maneuvers to escape the requirement to announce them in advance.

In fact, Western intelligence officials say the Soviets apparently knew that they could stay under the 25,000-man ceiling when they agreed to it in Helsinki.

State Dept. spokesmen are considerably smaller than NATO divisions. Sources say,

Soviets

that while the Soviet general staff conceives of its military maneuvers on a very large scale, they generally have been carried out in the last year or two in concentrated form near border areas, using perhaps two or three 8,000-to-10,000-man divisions.

The larger-scale exercises, in which perhaps 60,000 Soviet troops are airlifted aboard planes of the Soviet airline Aeroflot, take place further inland, where no announcement is required.

The Western alliance generally does not have this luxury since the high-density urban part of central Europe is not the best for military maneuvers.

Similarly, Western exercises in border areas generally use bigger divisions and several thousand extra troops who serve as "referees and umpires." Virtually all NATO exercises exceed the 25,000-man limit and thus must be announced in advance.

One West German official likened the Soviet tactics at Helsinki to the techniques used by the Soviets in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the United States. Moscow's representatives, in this view, are not overt cheaters but skillful

negotiators who ignore vague unilateral statements by other countries that are not precisely spelled out in treaty form.

Failure of the United States to insist on specific limits to size increases in atomic-warhead missiles in the first

SALT accord, for example, is now producing problems in trying to get a second one.

In the long bargaining at Helsinki over the maneuver limits, the United States wanted originally to require notification of exercises exceeding 8,000 troops. The

Soviets proposed a 50,000-troop limit. The 25,000 would appear to be a compromise, but West German and American sources point out that the Soviets undoubtedly knew all along that they were able to do what they wanted to with 25,000 men or fewer.

WASHINGTON POST Monday, October 27, 1975

Soviet Buildup Disputed

Colby Sees No Massive Arms Increase

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

Newly disclosed testimony by top intelligence officials contradicts claims by Pentagon spokesmen that steady increases in Soviet military spending threaten to subordinate power status.

In the current "Battle of the Pentagon Budget" there have been warnings from Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger and other officials of massive Soviet military buildups and "gaps" adverse to the United States.

Contra Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby, in testimony made

public yesterday by Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.), said Soviet spending was increasing at a steady 3 per cent annual rate it has maintained over the past decade.

Colby also said that a substantial portion of Soviet defense costs was absorbed by defensive missions for which there was no comparable U.S. outlay—such as the 10,000 surface-to-air missiles deployed around Soviet borders as well as the positioning of forces along the Chinese-Soviet frontier.

Summarizing the testimony by Colby and Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Proxmire said, "The U.S. leads the Soviet Union in virtually every area of advanced military technology." He acknowledged, however, that the dollar costs of Soviet military programs exceed those of the United States on the basis of estimating techniques used by the CIA.

Colby and Graham testified June 18 and July 21 before the Joint Economic Committee's Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of which Proxmire is chairman. The sanitized transcript was issued yesterday.

A strong element in Soviet military planning and expenditures, said Colby, was

defense against the possibility of attack from aircraft deployed throughout the NATO countries.

"They are very concerned about their vulnerability to aircraft. The Soviets, of course, have a national historical fixation on the problem of invasion..." the CIA director observed. Aside from the deterrent capability arrayed against NATO forces the Soviet Union is deploying 40 divisions along its border with China together with some 1,000 tactical aircraft, half of them nuclear-armed, Colby said.

Colby and Graham agreed that the dollar basis of estimating Soviet military costs tended to inflate Russian expenditures because of noncomparable factors in the U.S. and Soviet economies. Nonetheless the estimated dollar costs of Soviet defense programs have exceeded U.S. expenditures every year since 1971, according to Colby. During 1964-1974 Soviet military costs, in dollar terms, were estimated to be 90 per cent of the U.S. level.

In the course of the hearing Proxmire complained to Gen. Graham that threats of a new Soviet capability seem to blossom "just like the flowers

bloom in the spring" whenever the defense budget reaches the Appropriations Committee action stage. "During a debate over a U.S. ABM we begin hearing about a Soviet MIRV or a Chinese ICBM," the senator observed.

Proxmire asked Graham whether he agreed that the United States "leads the Russians in almost every high technology base in terms of

bombers, submarines, computers, missiles and other categories."

Graham answered: "I think that in almost all military technologies we lead them." He added, without elaboration, "I am worried about several that are rather important, such as (deleted) the application of lasers."

Proxmire concluded that it would improve public understanding of defense spending controversies if reports on Soviet military outlays were made at regular intervals by the "civilian side" of the intelligence community.

"It would also help avoid confusion if Pentagon officials would refrain from using the estimates of the intelligence agencies prematurely, selectively, or out of context," he said.

NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1975

Personal Diplomacy

By James Reston

WASHINGTON, Oct. 23—Personal diplomacy is very fashionable these days. We have pictures of Henry Kissinger shaking hands with Chairman Mao Tse-tung in Peking, of the Emperor of Japan and President Ford on the White House lawn, and next week it will be President Sadat of Egypt and his "dear friend" Henry dominating the social and diplomatic news.

Sometimes these personal contacts are vital to the relations between nations, and they have always fascinated Mr. Kissinger, who spent years at Harvard studying and writing about the personal diplomacy of nineteenth-century Europe. But his own years in Washington illustrate the fragility of human life and power.

He established a remarkable degree of respect with Chou En-lai, which helped to end the long break in Sino-American relations, but when he got

to Peking this time, Chou En-lai was too ill to see him and it is doubtful that they will ever meet again.

Likewise, it was thought here that negotiations with Spain for the use of military and naval facilities in that country ought to keep in mind the pride, and prejudices, of Generalissimo Francisco Franco; but before negotiations could be completed, Franco was stricken and the judgment here is that his long domination of Spain is over.

Mr. Kissinger counted on the philosophic and economic influence of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia to help moderate the demands of the Middle Eastern oil states, but Faisal was murdered in March of this year. The Secretary had hoped to get help in the Cyprus crisis from Bulent Ecevit, who had once been a Kissinger student at Harvard, but Mr. Ecevit was thrown out of office on Nov. 17, 1974.

This is not to say that personal diplomacy does not have its uses or that Mr. Kissinger's own personality,

character and wide-ranging mind have not made great contributions to some of the more positive events of recent world history. It is doubtful, for example, that Egypt would have taken even its limited step toward an accommodation with Israel unless Mr. Kissinger had won the confidence of Mr. Sadat.

In contrast, Mr. Kissinger also felt that he had established mutual trust with Le Duc Tho, the principal Hanoi negotiator at the Vietnamese peace talks, but the agreements arranged between them fell apart when they no longer supported the interests of the parties concerned.

Aside from the accidents of politics, the accidents and mortality of life make personal diplomacy a risky business. Since Mr. Kissinger came to Washington as the principal security adviser in the White House in January of 1969, President Nixon and Vice President Agnew have been forced out of office, and his principal ally in

Congress, Chairman William Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was defeated at the polls.

Meanwhile, in these six and three-quarter years, the obituaries of world leaders have dotted the front pages. They include: Charles de Gaulle and President Pompidou of France; Chiang Kai-shek of Nationalist China; Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt; Antonio Oliveira Salazar of Portugal; Juan Perón of Argentina; Prime Minister Norman Kirk of New Zealand and Premier Carro Blanco of Spain.

And this does not take into account key political figures like Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany, who left office at the height of his influence in world politics.

One does not dwell on the past to be morbid but to question the domina-

WASHINGTON

tion of personality in political affairs and to point to the instability of almost all the major political leaders at the present time.

Mao Tse-tung is 81, Chou En-lai is 77, both in poor health, as is Leonid Brezhnev, the Communist party chief in Moscow. Also, President Ford's term of office is assured only until the end of next year, and Mr. Kissinger will be leaving then, in any event, so that enduring agreements between nations must rest on national interests and not on personalities—a rule almost all world leaders accept in principle but defy in practice.

Harold Nicolson, still perhaps the best student of diplomacy of this cen-

tury, went even further and argued in "Peacemaking" that even when the great men are well and secure in office, the habit of personal diplomacy is dubious and maybe even dangerous.

"Diplomacy," he said, "is the art of negotiating documents in a ratifiable and therefore dependable form. It is by no means the art of conversation. . . . Nothing could be more fatal than the habit of personal contact between statesmen of the world. It is argued in defense of this pastime that the foreign secretaries of nations 'get to know each other.'

"This is an extremely dangerous cognizance. Personal contact breeds, inevitably, personal acquaintance and that, in its turn, leads in many cases to friendliness. There is nothing more damaging to precision in international relations than friendliness between contracting parties. . . . Diplomacy, if it is ever to be effective, should be a disagreeable business. And one recorded in hard print."

Washington Post
26 OCT 1975

SALT Pact May Slip to Early 1977

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States and the Soviet Union soon must decide if they are prepared to risk a freeze in the nuclear arms talks that can extend to 1977. American strategists acknowledge privately.

This is the most troublesome foreign policy issue inside the Ford administration, insiders agree. The problem is compounded by continuing differences between the State Department and the Department of Defense over the price that should be paid for U.S.-Soviet detente.

It is the Kremlin, however, rather than the White House, U.S. sources say, which now

means that if SALT negotiations are inconclusive in the next four months, they would go over to 1977.

With this limitation on negotiations, administration sources concede, the prospects diminish for any SALT accord in 1976 without major Soviet or American concessions soon.

As a political reality, the pressures will grow inside the administration even during this period to resist compromises that could expose President Ford to new attacks from the Republican right on his detente policy, U.S. planners anticipate.

Defense Department partisans initiated a flurry of attacks across the Potomac two weeks ago against Kissinger's SALT diplomacy, although Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger last week strongly disavowed any attempt to frustrate Kissinger's strategy.

Schlesinger personally shares some of Kissinger's concern about the need to "bind Brezhnev's successors" to agreed nuclear-force ceilings. But Kissinger and Schlesinger long have disagreed about the terms the United States should settle for in the projected 10-year SALT agreement.

A failure to reach a SALT agreement in 1976, many Defense Department strategists and other specialists contend, still would leave in force the five-year limit on American and Soviet strategic weapons that runs to October, 1977.

This would allow adequate time, these sources say, for resuming SALT negotiations after the presidential inauguration in January, 1977.

Kissinger's associates label this an invitation for "panic negotiations," in contrast to critics charge Kissinger with

conducting. Beyond that hazard, such a delay runs the risk of a "totally uncontrolled nuclear arms race." Kissinger associates caution.

By 1977, these sources say there is almost certain to be a new leader in the Kremlin, even if President Ford remains in the White House. A change in either leadership, it is argued, could provide justification for cancelling the Ford-Brezhnev agreement made at Vladivostok last November, which is the basis for the present SALT negotiations.

Kissinger, therefore, is described as being determined to continue his drive for a SALT accord until the last possible moment, in the hope of inducing the Soviet Union to reach even a partial nuclear compromise.

Time will run out, U.S. specialists now estimate, before the convening of the Soviet Communist Party's 25th congress, scheduled to open in Moscow Feb. 24.

This is where Brezhnev planned on displaying a completed SALT agreement, capped at a Washington summit conference, as the climax of his detente strategy—and, it was speculated, perhaps his political career.

The ailing Brezhnev, however, now may lack the power to produce any new concessions on SALT. In addition, the administration's political timetable for cutting off SALT negotiations may be construed as a deliberate pressure tactic, although U.S. officials have tried to eliminate that suspicion.

The two most intractable obstacles in the path of a SALT accord, however, it will be, offsetting demands for

dealing with two weapons not discussed at Vladivostok last year.

One is the latest Soviet bomber, known in the West as the Backfire B; the other is the American-initiated long-range cruise missile, yet to be test-fired, but already regarded as a major technological breakthrough to a new class of weapon.

Of the two weapons, American cruise missile is overwhelmingly the most significant.

The Defense Department is pressing the Soviet Union to count Backfire bombers in its force level of 2,400 strategic land, sea or air missiles or long-range bombers. The Soviet Union insists the plane is not an intercontinental bomber, but a medium-range bomber.

The Soviet Union, in turn, demands that the United States count long-range cruise missiles in its total of 2,400 strategic weapons. The United States refuses on grounds that the cruise missile is the equivalent of a low-flying pilotless plane, not a ballistic missile.

In the latest American counterproposal, submitted Sept. 21, which is now the critical offer in the negotiations, the United States proposed a trade-off formula for counting the Backfire and cruise missile in equal numbers, above the force levels set at Vladivostok.

There is little, if any, expectation on the U.S. side that this offer will be accepted as it stands. The question is whether it will be rejected, deadlocking the negotiations long before February, or as it hopes, it will stimulate an encouraging

holds the controlling decision on whether any accord will emerge from the strategic arms limitation talks in 1976.

The summit meeting between President Ford and Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev, which has been delayed repeatedly, is tied to a SALT accord. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's recurrently extended dates for producing a SALT agreement now have reached "early 1976."

This is the Ford administration's actual deadline for any accord, it was learned. The United States has informed the Soviet Union privately that it will be politically impractical to pursue SALT negotiations beyond early 1976, to avoid the contentious atmosphere of the American presidential election campaign.

If this cutoff is adhered to, it

counterproposal.

Kissinger is prepared to bargain. Schlesinger reportedly is too, but to a lesser extent. The Defense Department has no intention of abandoning what it sees as the technological lead it now can gain to offset what Pentagon

strategists regard as American advantages bargained away in earlier SALT agreements.

The ultimate test of whether there will be any SALT agreement in 1976, many U.S. experts believe, will turn less on the pursuit of detente than

on the level of Soviet concern that American technology will end up with an uncontrolled advantage in nuclear weapons.

This was the decisive factor in the first, disputed, SALT accord in 1972, which Kissinger justified primarily

on grounds that it checked a more dynamic Soviet missile-building program.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
9 October 1975

LIONEL BLOCH looks sadly at the Western nations' inadequacies in dealing with the Arabs

THE preparatory meeting for a world conference on energy and raw materials due to open in Paris on Monday, is a characteristic *tour de force* of that great illusionist President Giscard d'Estaing.

His ambitious project started in fact last April but promptly collapsed following the demand of the Third World's representatives to include the question of raw materials on the agenda—a thinly veiled way of claiming that anything OPEC could do with oil, they could do better with their own commodities. For once, the advanced industrial Powers decided to draw the line there and then but, having made their gesture, they are now back at the bargaining table after receiving a prolonged kiss of life from the Elysée. This is no mean tribute even to a man with the President's celebrated talents.

Since April, the plight of the poorer developing countries has grown more desperate, the budgets of the "older" consuming countries have become even more unbalanced and OPEC has resentfully settled for a "mere" 10 per cent. increase in oil prices.

Against this sombre background, the basic aim of the oil-consuming countries is to eliminate or limit attempts to wreck their economies by the ruthless manipulation of fuel supplies and to ensure that normal market mechanisms function free from cartel pressures. These objectives are common to both the developed and undeveloped consumer nations, but can they be attained by rational argument, diplomatic skill or appeals to the OPEC's enlightened self-interest? There are many reasons for doubt.

Firstly, the oil-consuming countries do not pursue a common policy. The Ford Administration is divided. An influential section of its economic establishment favours high prices which benefit America's own oil producers and stimulate the massive investments in alternative sources of energy. Not so long ago, at the time when Dr Kissinger uttered pious hopes that oil prices would come down a little, the Assistant Secretary in charge of energy problems, Thomas Enders, argued publicly in favour of a high floor price for oil. This conflict is not merely one of emphasis—it is similar to the current divergences between the Secretary of State and the Pentagon on supplying Israel with Pershing missiles and undermines

The mad hatter's oil party

America's credibility and standing in international negotiations.

When we turn to Britain's position, we note that her will to resist the crippling effects of high oil prices has been paralysed by three trends.

There is in the air a general feeling that financial expediency is all that matters. OPEC in general and its Arab members in particular must not be upset if we want to have their business and keep their sterling balances.

Beyond this crude and short-sighted opportunism, there are other forces at work. The rot has spread into the Conservative party, whose experts on energy can now only think of how best to recycle the excess oil profits of OPEC without even considering ways and means of reducing them. Given this sort of defeatism, who can blame the coal miners doing their own "recycling"? After all, they, too, could argue that any increases in wages paid to them are put back into our economy.

Even the *Economist* (Sept. 20) discerned something humiliating but "healthy" in seeing "the West so busy today appealing to OPEC, please not to put prices up too much" and shows sympathy for OPEC's use of oil power for denting "the arrogance of the West." With such friendly support, who needs enemies?

Of course, there remains the question of our vested interest in high oil prices for the sake of our North Sea bonanza. The most obvious criticism of this point of view is that this country's investment in the new oil fields should not have to depend on artificially high OPEC prices that, for a variety of reasons, could be brought down as arbitrarily as they were put up.

Pulling out

As to whether all our efforts to placate OPEC are useful, the answer is not reassuring. In 1974 OPEC invested £3,700 million in Britain. In the first six months of 1975, these investments dropped to £370 million. Having

shattered our precarious economic balance, OPEC is now letting us down because our economy no longer inspires confidence!

Is France faring differently? After all, with her well-established tradition of *renversement des alliances*, she has been leading Europe in cultivating OPEC's benevolence to the extent of turning some of her leading statesmen into commercial travellers. On the face of it, charm and servility have paid. In the first six months of this year French exports to the Middle East have increased by 76 per cent. But, for all this, France still pays for her oil as much as anybody else and her export records are a shade less gratifying when it is remembered that to a large extent they are paid for by her own money. To put it differently, the amount of oil that France could purchase in 1973 by exporting one tank to Libya could be bought a year later only by exporting five tanks. The price of French tanks and other exports were duly marked up, but not by 500 per cent., and the remaining gap still hurts: thus in her current Budget there are provisions for a "little deficit" of £4,500 million, and it is likely to be higher—as Germany is clamping down on Common Market agricultural subsidies.

Even when France's hell-bent export drive achieved records, its very success created new problems, as in the case of Algeria where—after a French trading surplus of \$650 million in the first six months of this year—a budding "special relationship" turned into acrimonious controversy culminating with the Algerian régime buying space in the French Press to berate the economic policy of Paris.

The weaknesses underlying all these strains and stresses among and inside the leading industrial countries do not escape OPEC's leaders, and inevitably they conclude that the consumer's goose can be made to lay many more golden eggs before the game is over.

The case of Patricia Hearst has prompted some general discussion on whether a kidnapping victim

can really make common cause with his tormentors. If one contemplates great Powers doing precisely that, why wonder when a helpless individual succumbs under pressure?

The true meaning of OPEC's frenzied overdevelopment is still only dimly perceived. It is a process generating its own uncontrollable momentum to such an extent that, against its better judgment, OPEC may be forced to press on and on for higher prices, even if this means growing interdependence with the West, stimulating the West's reserve stocks and its drive for alternative sources of energy, crushing the poorer nations and going against the

weight of market forces.

It is this last factor that worries the oil producers. To counter it, they encourage the notion of international economic egalitarianism which offers the richer countries of the world an opportunity to expiate the sins of past imperialism and present affluence. The *modus operandi* of this new ideology is the transfer of wealth to the underprivileged countries of the Third World by paying the earth for their produce and raw materials.

Possibly, this new egalitarian concept is an adaptation of the old Cargo Cult of the Pacific—a belief among some of its islanders that a large ship full with everything

they ever dreamt of and more would appear one day on the coral reef, wrecked and abandoned, its contents available to enable them to live forever after in blissful opulence. For all their weaknesses, contradictions and generosity, the time is nearing when the advanced industrial countries will have to inform OPEC and Co. that, although during the post-1973 storms some cargo had to be thrown into the sea—at least for the time being—they are neither shipwrecked nor willing to abandon their cargoes.

Alas, such candour is not the stuff of international conferences.

NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1975

With Fertilizer Shortage Past, Poor Countries Are Still Hungry

By ANN CRITTENDEN

The worldwide fertilizer shortage of last year is now past. But left in the wake is a decline in fertilizer usage—and therefore in potential food production—in the world's poorest countries. Furthermore, fertilizer manufacturers, who increased prices during the shortage far above production costs, are expecting huge profits.

These price increases — as much as 1,000 per cent between 1972 and 1974 for some of the most commonly used fertilizers — had a particularly severe impact on the less developed countries, which depend on expensive fertilizer imports for most of their needs. The impact of the shortage has been broad:

¶ In some of the poorest nations, such as India and the Philippines, fertilizer consumption has fallen as much as 30 or 40 per cent, according to the International Fertilizer Development Center, a private, non-profit organization that was recently established in Muscle Shoals, Ala.

¶ The world's major donor of fertilizer aid, the United States, reduced its aid from 631,000 tons in 1973-74 to 487,000 tons in 1974-75, and had to spend more than twice as much for the lower amount.

¶ As a result of these developments, some observers fear that food production has not been so high as it might have been in the hungriest areas. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations has calculated that the current shortfall of fertilizer in 43 of the world's poorest countries is equivalent to the loss of about 2.7 million tons of grain—enough to spell the difference between subsistence and starvation for millions of people.

¶ The steep price increases have also meant that poor countries have had to pay much scarce foreign exchange

to pay their escalating fertilizer bills that "they were forced to defer expenditures in other vital sectors, thereby slowing their already sluggish economic growth rates," according to Martin M. McLaughlin of the Overseas Development Council, a research organization in Washington.

Although there were many reasons for the sharp price increases of the last two years (primarily a real fertilizer shortage in the face of exploding demand) aggressive profit-maximizing on the part of the producers played a significant part, according to a number of industry analysts.

These analysts point out that although the jump in energy prices in 1973-74 did increase fertilizer-production costs, fertilizer price movements in most cases far exceeded cost increases. As a result, fertilizer-producing companies enjoyed unprecedented earnings last year.

"There was a big run-off last year," said Robert J. Eastman of Blith Eastman Dillon & Co., a brokerage firm. "The retail dealers and distributors took advantage of the shortage to run-off the farmers in this country, and the producers sold to countries like India and Brazil at inflated prices."

Buyers Show Resistance

This process ended a few months ago, as the inflated world prices ran into buyer resistance and as purchasers, many of whom panicked and overbought last year, pulled out of the market to work off their excess inventories.

For these and other reasons, the fertilizer shortage turned around to a glut, and the prices of many commonly used fertilizer products have tumbled to one-half to one-fourth of the peak levels of 1974—although they are still well above the lows of two years ago.

The major producers are holding large inventories, and according to World Bank officials many governments in developing countries have huge stockpiles, which they are unwilling to release without special subsidies.

Nevertheless, the poor nations will still need to import some 3 million tons of fertilizers in the 1975-76 growing season, by F.A.O. calculations. They will probably be unable to finance more than two-thirds of these requirements, leaving a shortfall equivalent to about 10 million tons of grain.

Of the three basic plant nutrients—nitrogen, phosphorus and potash—the most commonly used fertilizers in the third world are those based on nitrogen. The world's major food grains heavily depend on annual doses of artificial nitrogen fertilizer, which is largely based on ammonia, derived from natural gas, naphtha or coal.

Anhydrous ammonia can be applied directly to crops, but its derivatives are more significant in world trade, and urea, is the most widely used fertilizer in the developing world.

Next in importance are the phosphate fertilizers, such as triple superphosphate and the ammonium phosphates, based on phosphoric acid, and normal superphosphate, produced from phosphate rock.

When the fertilizer shortage emerged in late 1973, prices for all of these products, as well as potash, began to soar. From the depressed levels of 1971-72 to the peak earlier this year, urea went up 1,000 per cent, phosphate chemicals were up 800 to 1,000 per cent, and phosphate rock jumped 470 per cent.

In the process, producers and suppliers scrambled to renegotiate contracts signed at lower prices. According to Martin Roher, an industry analyst with Goldman Sachs & Co., "Companies would call their customers and say, 'Because of the shortage, we can't guarantee any more fertilizer. We don't want to break this contract, but if you want any of the product after this shipment, you'll have to pay more for it now.'"

One company, Baker Industries of Greenwich, Conn., broke the same contract with India twice, although the company says that after India threatened legal action, Baker agreed to sell at the original price.

"You might say we're gouging the poor," said Thomas Moorhead, a Baker executive,

"but we're also generating funds to build the additional capacity that will be needed in the next five or 10 years."

"The poor do a pretty good job of exploiting us when the shoe is on the other foot," he added. "Look at oil."

Or one might look at fertilizer, for now that prices are tumbling, it is the international customers turn to break contracts.

India has renegotiated several major contracts with American producers, and Indonesia has recently cancelled outright huge purchases of fertilizer made when the price was over \$300 a ton. It is now nearer half that.

"The sanctity of contracts doesn't exist in this business because of the wild price fluctuations," said Emil S. Finley, president of a fertilizer-exporting firm, the International Commodities Export Company of New York.

Part of the instability might also result from much of the export trades being handled by brokers, who frequently split their sizable sales commissions with key purchasing agents in less developed countries, according to widespread trade reports.

Referring to this practice, Mr. Finley said, "Our company could have made twice as much money last year if we had been greedy and willing to do the dirty business."

This chaotic situation in the fertilizer trade has worked far more to the advantage of the producers; however, than to the purchasing countries.

Last year the largest American companies that primarily produced fertilizer—the International Minerals and Chemical Corporation, Baker Industries, the First Mississippi Corporation and the Williams Companies—enjoyed an average return on equity of 31.6 per cent, in contrast to 14.6 per cent for the 425 companies listed in the Standard & Poor's index.

The fertilizer industry's pre-tax profit was 18.3 per cent, compared with 11.15 per cent for the 425, according to calculations made by Investors Management Sciences.

The leading producer, I.M.C., which sells one-third of its product internationally, had a 182 per cent increase in profits fiscal year ended June

30, following a 123 per cent jump in net income for the previous year.

Commenting on the prices that made such gains possible, I.M.C.'s president and chief executive officer, Richard A. Lennon, said, "We were meeting a market opportunity—that was what the buyers were willing to pay. It follows," he continued, "that to avoid a repetition of the shortage periods, prices will have to move forward. At current prices you could not build a plant from scratch today."

The most dramatic enrichment

was reflected in the income statement of Beker Industries. In the first six months of 1975, the company, which has \$157-million in sales, had a sales increase of 118 per cent and an increase in pretax income of 160 per cent, following a jump in income of 249 per cent last year. To a large extent the numbers reflect profits earned abroad, for foreign sales accounted for 55 per cent of Beker's total tonnage in 1974.

Ultimately, however, the farmers in the third world refused to pay the higher prices,

and the impact on consumption was clear.

Consumption Declines

In the Philippines, fertilizer usage dropped 40 per cent in the first six months of 1974. In Indonesia, normally a growth market of 10 to 12 per cent a year, consumption was stagnant last year, and in India it was down 25 to 30 per cent.

"It was pure and simply her inability to protect herself from world price increases," Dr. Paul J. Stergel of the International Fertilizer Development Center said of India.

Observers do point out, how-

ever, that factors other than price do partly explain lagging fertilizer usage in developing countries. These include low grain prices which discourage planting, and the lack of adequate marketing storage and credit facilities in many countries.

Moreover, India in particular would be completely self-sufficient in fertilizer if her own plants operated more efficiently, international experts say. But because of power failures and inadequate maintenance, Indian factories operate at only 60 or 70 per cent of capacity

NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1975

U.S. Arms-Sale Rise Stirs Capital Concern

Greater Control Is Sought by Congress As Nation Takes Lead in Munitions Sale

By RICHARD D. LYONS

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 18—The emergence of the United States as munitions king of the world and almost daily reports of new arms deals with foreign Governments are generating a fresh sense of uneasiness among policy makers and Congressmen over the impact of the weapons on global affairs.

Sales of American-made weapons have risen from about \$2-billion a year in 1967 to about \$11-billion in the last fiscal year, abetted by Federal policies of liberal credit, a benign attitude toward the shipping of arms overseas, the pre-eminent state of American military technology, the rapid obsolescence of weapons and an almost limitless world-wide demand for more guns.

Congress has become increasingly embroiled in the specifics of such arms deals as tanks for Turkey, missiles for Jordan, rockets for Israel and jet fighters for Egypt; at the same time Congress is considering the general idea that the Senate and the House of Representatives should have greater control over international shipments of munitions made in this country.

During the last decade there has been a complete reversal of United States arms policy from one of giving the weapons away to one of selling them, either for spot cash or on liberal credit supplied by the Federal Government.

The demand for American weapons has been spurred by arms races in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf because of the quadrupling of the price of oil and the desire of the petroleum producing nations to defend their enormously amplified wealth with steel.

In recent months, in these

two areas, which account for more than half of American arms sales overseas, there have been reports of Pershing missiles to Israel, radars to Egypt, fighters to Saudi Arabia, Hawk missiles to Jordan, destroyers to Iran, antitank missiles to Oman, bombers to Kuwait and tanks to Yemen.

While orders for American-made arms appeared to have peaked last year, the probable effect of Congressional approval of the Sinai accords, which would provide arms to both Egypt and Israel, would be to push still higher the sales of American arms, spare parts and training services.

Increasingly vocal critics of American arms policy, which some complain is a lack of policy, note that this country seems only too willing to sell to all sides.

Over the last generation a dozen nations in conflict have battled one another in Central American jungles, Middle Eastern deserts, East Indian islands and Asian plateaus in wars having one common denominator—they were fought with arms made in America.

Guerrilla Actions

In thousands of guerrilla actions spanning four continents from Northern Ireland to the Philippines, hordes of people have been killed and maimed by weapons whose production translated to salaries for American workmen and profits for American corporations.

In Asia, Africa and Latin America, military dictatorships have power and keep power with munitions sold, lent and given away with the endorsement—indeed even the enthusiastic approval—of the last six Presidents and 16 Congresses. Since the end of World War II the United States has shipped \$100-billion worth of weapons to 136 nations, making this country the munitions king of the globe with arms sales equal to those of all the rest of the

world.

In the last quarter-century the United States has transferred to foreign Governments 866 Phantom jets, 2,375 helicopters, 185 destroyers and destroyer escorts, 1,500 landing craft, 5,000 Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, 25,000 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, 28,000 antitank missiles, 16,000 armored personnel carriers, 25,000 pieces of artillery and 28,000 tanks, plus enormous stocks of other weapons, spare parts and services.

Virtually no public debate has accompanied the increasing flow of American-made armaments throughout the world, and only in the last year have members of Congress begun to express concern over the potential danger lurking in overseas arms sales, even to friendly nations.

'A Real Tragedy'

"I think it's a real tragedy for us to end up being the arms merchants of the world," Senator Edward M. Kennedy told a Congressional hearing on arms sales a few months ago.

Senator Hubert H. Humphrey has likened the American munitions industry to "a kind of arms supermarket into which any consumer can walk and pick up whatever he wants."

Defenders of overseas arms sales say, however, that they are necessary to counter Communist threats; that if the United States did not provide the weapons, other countries would, and that weapons production translates not only into national security but also profits and jobs.

In Congress, members of both houses are increasingly questioning what the arms sales policy of the Ford Administration is, if indeed there is one, and whether the nation should adopt a different course.

Among the questions they have raised about arms sales are these: Are they moral? Will the arms sold trigger wars? Could the arms eventually be used against the United States? Should the United States seek a treaty with the Soviet Union limiting the supply of conventional arms? Would other nations increase munitions sales if the United States chose to curtail shipments? What would be the impact on the American economy if the United States drastically reduced foreign arms sales?

"Merchant of Death"

In discussing such issues before a Congressional committee, Thomas Stern, deputy director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, said: "These are valid questions for Americans, who are troubled at seeing their country in the arms supply business. The image of 'Merchant of Death' dies hard."

Arms experts here are also expressing doubt that it would even be politically possible to curtail the production of weapons for sales overseas because of the increasing strength of the loosely allied arms lobby in the United States.

"The economy now is saddled with a self-perpetuating munitions industry that is bad for long-term economic policy," said one knowledgeable Senate staff aide.

In addition to the increase in sheer volume of arms being produced for other countries, the United States in recent years has radically changed its policy on the method of transfer. Until a decade ago most of the arms were given away. Now they are sold for cash, generating fat profits.

Financing Methods

Most arms transfers are financed in the following ways:

Direct give-aways of matériel and services to foreign Governments under the military assistance program. About \$500-million was earmarked in 1975.

Foreign military sales in which contracts for the arms are arranged by the Defense Department, with credit terms secured through the Treasury Department's Federal Financing Bank. Current rates of interest and terms of repayment, about 8.7 per cent over six years, are slightly below the going market rate for international loans. In the fiscal year 1975 about \$9.5-billion in orders were placed in this manner.

Commercial cash sales with the foreign Government dealing directly with the American manufacturer. Export licenses for the material, about \$1-billion of which was sold in the fiscal year 1975, must be issued by the State Department.

One of the very reasons used recently by White House lobbyists in imploring Congress to lift the ban on arms shipments to Turkey was that the Turks had already paid \$184-million

In cash for the undelivered weapons.

Boon to Grumman

The sale of 80 F-14 jet fighters to Iran has shored up the troubled Grumman Aerospace Corporation and helped to brake the unemployment rate on Long Island.

Throughout the world, American munitions agents are hustling for new contracts with the covert, if not total, approval of the Federal Government. Military assistance advisory groups, composed of 2,000 American military personnel, are stationed in more than 40 countries aiding in the purchase and maintenance of American-made weapons, as well as the training of those who man them.

"Munitions sales is the biggest floating crap game in the world," said one arms specialist in the State Department. "The amount of money involved is enormous and everyone is trying to get a piece of the action."

The United States and the Soviet Union are the world's biggest arms dealers, with the former outselling the latter by a margin of 2 to 1. But France, Britain, China, Italy, Sweden and Canada also make major overseas arms sales.

During a Senate subcommittee hearing in June, Senator Humphrey, a Minnesota Democrat, asked Lieut. Gen. H. M. Fish, director of the Defense Assistance Agency, if the Defense Department was "hustling" overseas sales.

'No Huckstering'

General Fish replied that there was "no hustling, no huckstering. Sales will be made only if it serves our national interests and meets a valid military requirement."

This prompted Senator Humphrey to ask, "What kind of security do you get out of giving something to Haiti, or to Paraguay?"

Yet former officers who have

served in the advisory groups overseas say that the units have and are working intimately with the sales representatives of American companies. One former Army colonel, who now is a staff aide on Capitol Hill, said the groups "do their best to convince foreign Governments to buy American weapons."

While serving in such a group in Europe, he said, the overseas agents of American arms companies "attended all the social events at the American Embassy." He added that even the air, naval and military attachés gave them aid by such things as setting up interviews with high-ranking officers of other Governments.

"I thought some of the relationships were clearly unethical," he added of the links between the agents for American arms and United States military officers stationed overseas.

Buyers 'Walk In'

In addition to pushing the sale of arms through the Defense Department, American weapons makers are also confronted by other Governments whose agents "walk in the front door demanding to be sold the stuff," as one State Department official put it.

He cited the almost unnoticed arms race now going on in South America in which the Peruvians bought tanks and jet fighters, prompting demands from Chile, Argentina and Brazil that they be sold similar equipment.

For over a decade the State Department had a tacit policy of forbidding the sale of sophisticated weapons to Latin American countries on the ground that they were not needed there since there was no outside threat to the security of the area.

"It's hard to say no to the requests," said Representative Lee H. Hamilton, Democrat of Indiana, who is chairman of a subcommittee of the House In-

ternational Relations Committee that is investigating overseas sales.

"I don't take the position that we ought not to have arms sales," he added, "but there has been a disproportionate attention paid to arms and not to the economic and political aspects of the sales. Can the countries afford them? Will the sales only spur new demands for more weapons?"

'Better Mousetrap'

One arms expert here said the military cliques "are always looking for a better mousetrap. If one country gets a new weapon its neighbor wants it too. In the Middle East it may be a question of national survival, but in Latin America it's more a matter of national pride. There's a macho attitude toward weapons too."

An American representative for a European munitions company, who is based here, said the best incentive to the sale of arms is the knowledge that a rival nation is also known to be buying new weapons.

"Is it really up to the United States to tell other sovereign nations what they may or may not be allowed to buy?" he asked. "This is the sort of patronizing that third world nations detest. They want to make their own decisions, and in a laissez-faire market how can we say, 'No'?"

'Have Never Asked'

But one attempt is being made to curtail overseas sales. In taking up the foreign assistance bill later this month, the Senate will have to consider an amendment put forth by Senator Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, and co-sponsored by eight other Senators, to suspend arms sales to the Middle East, which is the major American market.

Senator Kennedy originally had sought to goad the Ford Administration into approaching the Soviet Union in an

attempt to reach a joint moratorium on arms shipments to the area.

"We are told that if we do not sell arms other nations will do so, yet we have never tried to get common agreement," Mr. Kennedy said. "We have never asked the British, French, the Scandinavian countries, as well as the Soviet Union, whether they are interested in any kind of moratorium."

The Senator said he was particularly irked by the fact that shipments of American-made arms to the Middle East are being paid for in part by the higher prices Americans are paying for oil, so that "We are in effect funding the whole arms race in that part of the world."

The intent of the Kennedy amendment would be to force the Administration to explain what its arms sales policy is, not only in the Middle East but also elsewhere in the world. This is basically the aim of a bill introduced by Senator Gaylord Nelson, Democrat of Wisconsin, to force the Administration to disclose target figures on arms sales at the beginning of each year.

At present Congress may overrule the Administration and deny the right to export arms costing over \$25-million to a foreign country, but it has seldom done so.

But the arms lobby both in Congress and the rest of the nation is bound to attack both measures.

A warning about the power of this group was sounded 14 years ago by President Eisenhower during a farewell speech in which he offered parting words of advice to the nation. He spoke of the "grave implications" of weapons making that posed a threat to "the very structure of our society." Yet his warning of the dangers of the "military-industrial complex" has been all but forgotten in the intervening years.

NEW YORK TIMES
29 Oct. 1975

French Nuclear Spread

By deciding to sell South Korea equipment and technology to produce weapons-grade plutonium, the explosive material for atomic bombs, France has taken mankind a long step toward worldwide spread of nuclear weapons—and ultimate disaster.

For thirty years, the United States and other advanced nuclear countries have refused to sell such equipment. Then West Germany broke ranks in June by agreeing to sell Brazil a similar pilot reprocessing plant.

Apart from the threat to non-proliferation policy—and violation of the spirit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which both West Germany and France have pledged to honor—the Korean deal poses special dangers.

Divided Korea is the tinder box of Asia, with massive armies of the Communist North and the American-backed South facing each other across the 38th Parallel. North Korean ambitions to reunify the country by force, as was attempted in the 1950-53 war, have been reawakened by American withdrawal from Indochina. The South Korean nuclear move could provide a pretext for

a Northern attack—or lead to the even more dangerous nuclear arming of North Korea, stimulating dormant pressure for nuclear weapons in Japan.

The prolonged efforts of American officials to discourage France and West Germany from their nuclear deals undoubtedly would have had a far better chance of success if Secretary Kissinger and President Ford had not over-pessimistically refused to engage their own personal prestige, and the full influence of the United States, for fear of a profitless crisis with major allies.

After an overly cautious approach to the issue, Secretary of State Kissinger has belatedly underscored the awesome risks involved, when he told the United Nations General Assembly last month: "The greatest single danger of unrestrained nuclear proliferation resides in the spread under national control of reprocessing facilities for the atomic materials in nuclear power plants."

One urgent need is to step up American efforts to establish multi-national regional nuclear fuel centers. One urgent need is to step up American efforts to establish multi-national regional nuclear fuel centers.

securely stored for possible future use, if reprocessing ever becomes safe and commercially feasible.

More important would be a genuine effort to provide the world with an assured supply of enriched uranium, a far cheaper fuel than plutonium would be even if the breeder reactor proved safe and commercially feasible by the 1990's. Neither this country nor the world can afford further delays in expanding uranium enrichment capacity.

Finally, it is essential that the United States hold firm in its thirty-year policy of refusing to spread nuclear weapons capability around the world, whatever the French and Germans do now. The pressures undoubtedly will be intense. A \$7-billion reactor order from Iran is

hung up right now on Washington's insistence that the site and form of plutonium reprocessing, if ever economic, be subject to joint agreement. To hold firm on this position and the American refusal to sell power reactors to Egypt—unless there is a guarantee that the spent fuel rods will be processed abroad—will be difficult unless a more vigorous effort is made to reverse French and West German policy or, at the very least, to obtain assurances that no further such sales will be made.

The alternative is a world of a dozen or more states brandishing their nuclear arsenals within the next decade; in such a circumstance, the threat of nuclear holocaust would be immeasurable.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1975

U.S. Confirms '66 Diego Garcia Deal

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 16—The State Department said today that the United States had entered into a secret agreement in 1966 under which it reduced the cost of the Polaris missile to Britain in return for British establishment of a military base on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

In a report to the Senate, the State Department said the United States had agreed to share the cost of establishing the British Indian Ocean Territory on a group of islands with the understanding that the territory would be used to meet future defense needs of the two nations.

As its contribution, the United

States, according to the report, agreed to waive some \$14-million in research costs that had been charged to Britain in the purchase of the Polaris missile for her nuclear-powered submarines.

The agreement also specified that Britain would assume responsibility for removing some 1,000 residents of the Chagos Archipelago, of which Diego Garcia is a part.

There have been published reports in the past that the United States and Britain had made such an agreement. The report made public today by Senators John C. Culver, Democrat of Iowa, and Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, was the first official confirmation.

Senator Kennedy is the sponsor of an amendment to a

military construction bill calling for a complete report by the Administration on steps taken to establish a military base on Diego Garcia.

The report said that the population of the Chagos Archipelago was "essentially migratory, almost entirely comprised of contract laborers with ties in the Seychelles or Mauritius, and totally dependent on the coconut plantations for their livelihood."

"It appeared that most of the inhabitants would accept work elsewhere if given the opportunity," the report said.

"Thus, the removal of the workers and their families from the Chagos Archipelago—for reasons that were considered compelling—seemed at that time both reasonable and feasible, providing adequate resettle-

ment funds were made available."

The British Government in 1973 paid Mauritius \$1.4-million for relief and relocation of the persons removed from the Chagos Archipelago. The report acknowledged that thus far most of the resettlement funds had not been spent by the Mauritius Government.

In separate statements, the two Senators said the report made clear that Defense Department officials were dissembling when they told Congress earlier this year that Diego Garcia was an unpopulated island with no indigenous population. What Congress was not told, they said, was that the island was unpopulated because the United States had secretly colluded with Britain to remove the inhabitants.

"It is one more classic example of military objectives riding roughshod over basic humanitarian consideration," Senator Culver said.

NEW YORK TIMES

28 Oct. 1975

A U.S. Study Finds Mexico the Source For Most of Heroin

WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 (UPI)

—Mexico has replaced Europe as the major source of heroin that is smuggled into the United States, according to a Federal study released today.

During the first six months of this year, 90 per cent of the samples of confiscated heroin in 13 cities were Mexican-processed, according to an analysis of the Drug Enforcement Administration that was released today by Senator Charles H. Percy, Republican of Illinois.

In 1972, only 40 per cent of heroin sold on the street was the "Mexican brown" variety, so-called because of its impurities. For 1973 and 1974, the figures were 63 and 76 per cent.

Senator Percy said that the report, which he had requested from the agency "confirms the virtual severing of the 'French connection.'" Only 2 per cent of confiscated heroin that was analyzed between January and June came from Europe or the Middle East, compared with

44 per cent in 1972.

The film "French Connection" popularized the description of the movement of heroin from poppy fields overseas to American streets.

"In many ways the current situation is more difficult to control than in the days of the now-dormant 'French Connection,'" Senator Percy wrote in letters to Secretary of State Kissinger and Attorney General Edward H. Levi. The Senator urged them to take immediate diplomatic action "to dam up this international stream polluted with deadly granules of brown heroin."

Among the 13 cities in which illegal heroin was analyzed by narcotics agents, nine had a greater percentage that came from Mexico in the first six months of this year, three had slightly less and in Chicago all the heroin during both periods came from Mexico.

Boston Percentage Greatest

In Boston, 100 per cent of the confiscated samples came from Mexico—up from 50 per cent in 1974. In New York, 83 per cent of the samples were Mexican-processed and 10 per cent were European-processed in the first half of 1975. Last year, 21 per cent of the samples were Mexican and 67 per cent, European.

Western Europe

Sunday, October 26, 1973 THE WASHINGTON POST

French Ex-Spy Says Unit Plotted Murders

By Bernard Kaplan
Special to The Washington Post

PARIS, Oct. 22—During the 1960s the French government operated a high-level "assassination" committee whose task was to pinpoint enemies of the regime for elimination, according to a newly published book by a former senior French secret agent.

In his book "The Committee," ex-agent Philippe Thiraud De Vosjoli also claims that the De Gaulle government systematically opened foreign embassies' diplomatic mail, including that of the United States. On one occasion during an international conference in Cannes in 1961, according to De Vosjoli, a French agent entered the hotel room of U.S. Under Secretary of State George Ball in the middle of the night and rifled it for secret documents.

Although De Vosjoli's book contains many alleged revelations about the inner workings of France's intelligence U services, it is principally a defense of a former colleague, Marcel Leroy-Finville, who was cashiered and imprisoned for his supposed involvement in the kidnap-slitting here of a leftist Moroccan politician, Mehdi Ben Barka, in 1965. The Ben Barka affair erupted into a major scandal of the De Gaulle regime and led to a diplomatic crisis between France and Morocco.

De Vosjoli insists that Leroy-Finville, considered one of the top agents of the French intelligence agency, was actually framed by his own government. The real reason for his official disgrace, he says, was his refusal to obey orders—emanating from the "Committee"—to kill a number of French Algerian dissidents living in exile in Portugal and Spain just after the Algerian war.

Leroy-Finville, now in retirement in southern France, backed up De Vosjoli's allegations in a telephone conversation. "Nothing has escaped him," Leroy-Finville said. "He followed my personal tragedy closely."

According to the book, the committee consisted of senior intelligence officials and civil servants and was sometimes presided over by the then-prime minister, Georges Pompidou. De Vosjoli implicates Pompidou, later president of France, in the Leroy-Finville case, claiming that the orders to kill the French Algerian exiles came from a senior official in the prime minister's office.

The Committee kept no notes or records, De Vosjoli says. It had a "permanent" list of assassination "objectives," among them Presidents Sekou Toure of Guinea and Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, both at the time considered antagonists of Charles De Gaulle.

If De Vosjoli is to be believed, one successful target of the committee was the Italian state oil tycoon Enrico Mattei. French agents were responsible for sabotaging Mattei's airplane in 1963 because, according to him, France believed he was seeking to oust French oil interests in Algeria.

The book offers an explanation of why Leroy-Finville was abruptly released from prison after four months and never tried. According to De Vosjoli's account, a group of the accused man's former associates, including himself, sent a warning to De Gaulle and Pompidou that unless he was freed, they would reveal the existence of the special committee. He was released less than a week later.

Ironically, in view of the recent allegations of CIA involvement in foreign assassination plots, De Vosjoli in the mid-1950s was the French intelligence service's liaison man with the American agency. He was fired by De Gaulle for becoming too closely identified with the CIA. Some time afterward, he asserted that the French leader's entourage had been infiltrated by a Soviet agent—an allegation that served as the basis for the plot of the bestselling novel "Topaz" by Leon Uris. While De Gaulle was in power, the novel was banned in France.

In the more relaxed atmosphere under President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, a

French edition of "The Committee" is expected to be published here shortly. Meanwhile, a French-language version has appeared in Montreal.

De Vosjoli says that the diplomatic pouches of virtually all foreign embassies in Paris were regularly opened by French agents in the Gaullist era. Agents operated from a specially equipped van at Orly Airport, where the incoming and outgoing diplomatic mail was intercepted. They even had the chemistry equipment to reconstitute the fibers of paper that might be inadvertently torn in the process.

American diplomatic mail could not be intercepted in this way because it was invariably carried by State Department couriers. But, says De Vosjoli, French intelligence discovered that copies of most U.S. documents usually were sent to the American embassies in neighboring countries under less stringent security. So, according to De Vosjoli, Leroy-Finville set up an organization in Morocco to open U.S. diplomatic mail there.

The burglarizing of Ball's hotel room was ordered after a bugging device failed to pick up enough information, according to De Vosjoli. That operation was also conducted under Leroy-Finville. He stood poised as at the hotel's fuse box, ready to plunge it into darkness in case the agent was discovered. He was not, De Vosjoli says, but was able to photograph the contents of Ball's briefcase and replace them while the under secretary slept.

THE ECONOMIST OCTOBER 11, 1975

Spanish guide rouge

FROM OUR SPAIN CORRESPONDENT

Reading his censored newspaper and watching his government-operated box the average Spaniard is left with the impression that Spain's terrorist foes are a hydra-headed lot. In reality only two serious terrorist groups—Eta and Frap—are now active in Spain, and more than half of their active militants are either in prison or on the safe side of the French or Portuguese frontier.

Eta is the Basque separatist organisation which assassinated Admiral Carrero Blanco, General Franco's first prime minister, a little under two years ago. Its name is an acronym standing for Basque Country and Freedom. It began life in 1959 as a mainly Catholic

rejected the moderation of the traditional "bourgeois" Basque nationalist movement. In the 1960s Eta drifted to the left, though since its fifth assembly in December, 1968, its doctrinaire marxists have flaked away, in successive schisms, to join non-activist trotskyite groups such as the Revolutionary Communist League. Today its most able leaders are dead or in prison, and fewer than 100 experienced militants are still at liberty.

The Revolutionary Anti-Fascist Patriotic Front, or Frap, was founded in the spring of 1973. It is a mainly maoist group, though it is not thought to be backed by the Chinese embassy in Madrid, whose officials have been at pains to

authorities. Frap may, like Eta, have received a little Cuban advice and assistance. It operates mainly in Madrid. Its honorary president was the former Republican foreign minister, Sr Alvarez del Vayo, who died in Geneva last May aged 84. Most of its militants, like Eta's, are students and semi-skilled workers. In July a secret meeting of representatives of Eta, two anarchist groups and some IRA Provisional visitors criticised Frap's "half-hearted attitude to direct action". This may have goaded it into the operations that have recently enabled the police to capture some of its leading militants.

Frap has safe houses in Portugal that correspond to Eta's bases in France; but even in Madrid, Barcelona and Valencia, the cities its members know best, it lacks the widespread goodwill Eta can count on

in the Basque country, and will find it harder than the Basque group to reorganise and resume co-ordinated operations. But even scattered groups of determined terrorists can find sufficient targets to maintain political tension.

Other potential activist groups exist but, by comparison with Eta and Frap, their immediate significance is slight. Some belong more to folklore than to politics. In General Franco's native Galicia, whose language is similar to Portuguese, Eta has found an occasional ally in Uppga, the small but growing Portuguese and pro-marxist Union of the Gallego People. In Catalonia, whose nationalism is at the moment more cultural than political, Eta has some admirers but few imitators: the Front for the Liberation of Catalonia is alleged to have carried out a few dozen guerrilla-style actions, including the murder of a civil guard, in the early 1970s, but it now contents itself with issuing leaflets.

Spanish anarchists occasionally surge violently in groups such as Mil (Iberian Libertarian Movement), Gari (International Revolutionary Action Groups) and Olla (Organisation for the

Armed Struggle). Some of them have links with the big Spanish libertarian community in and around Toulouse—although, as anarchists dislike organisation, there is little serious co-ordination between them. One unpublicised attempt on General Franco's life, by means of radio-detonated explosives, was prepared and carefully rehearsed by an anarchist cell near Toulouse. Gari, said to consist of five "commando groups", was alleged last year to have tried to kidnap Don Juan de Borbón, the liberal father of General Franco's named successor, Prince Juan Carlos, but has not been heard of lately. Ten Catalans alleged to be members of Olla will soon go on trial in Barcelona: the prosecutor is asking for prison sentences totalling 500 years. The only guerrilla-minded trotskyite group appears to be the ineffective Revolutionary Communist party.

Most of these groups, and others, are well known to the police. The Spanish security police are the most experienced in western Europe in dealing with political subversion and their reports on opposition movements contain detailed accounts of the opinions and personal habits of

political militants and their families. Even Eta's internal discussions are reported, though with some delay, in detail. Some of this material is supplied by informers, some is obtained by the intimidation and torture of detainees. A source who was recently in contact with an imprisoned Eta militant who goes by the name of "Wilson" (Pedro Perez Beotegui), and was able to observe him during confrontations with other suspects, reports that he appeared crushed and said whatever the police required of him.

There are grounds for believing that pseudo-leftist grouplets have on occasion been sponsored by the police—for political reasons and in order to infiltrate a more important organisation—and that one such grouplet, having obtained advice from Eta and arms from a Mafia supplier, went into business on its own account and carried out an embarrassing operation. As any security man knows, in circumstances like those prevailing in Spain, subversive activities proliferate in direct proportion to the number of manhours devoted to keeping tabs on them.

NEW YORK TIMES

25 Oct. 1975

DISSIDENTS ACTIVE IN SPANISH FORCES

Clandestine Group Warns of
Civil War if Fascism
Survives Franco

By MALCOLM W. BROWNE
Special to The New York Times

MADRID, Oct. 25—A clandestine association of Spanish military officers believes that civil war could follow the Franco era "if it becomes apparent that the only alternative is 40 more years of fascism."

This view was expressed in a meeting arranged outside Madrid by two representatives of the underground group known as the Democratic Military Union. The interview, in Spanish, was understood to be the first the group had ever permitted in Spain proper with a representative of any foreign news organization. Extreme precautions were observed in its arrangements.

The two representatives, whose identity was not disclosed, are both captains in active command of troops. They said that the Democratic Military Union had 900 members or supporters in the armed forces and was counting on at least the sympathy of thousands of others.

"We personally know a number of colonels who will be

with us," one of the captains said.

Active Commands Involved

Although in numbers the group constitutes a small minority of the armed forces, the fact that many of its members are understood to hold active commands—some of them reportedly sensitive—lends it importance.

"We are all moderates in our goal," one captain said. "Our group does not believe the army should initiate political change in Spain, or in any way influence the future democratic political life of the country. Furthermore, we believe in peaceful change and seek no confrontations with anyone."

"But if, after Franco is gone, someone like Angel Campana, whom Franco appointed as commander of the civil guard a few weeks ago, then it would be different."

"In that case, armed confrontation between various army factions would be likely, if it becomes apparent that the only alternative is 40 more years of fascism."

He said that most of Spain's generals would probably oppose liberal change, adding that "they all owe their careers—in some cases very corrupt careers—to the present system."

But younger officers are rapidly spreading the doctrine of change in their contacts with fellow officers, he added.

Both of the officers spoke contemptuously of Generalissimo Francisco Franco and asserted that "our people will

be bathing in champagne" on hearing of his death.

Elections a Goal

The two captains interviewed said they were acting as spokesmen for the Democratic Military Union with the knowledge of the group's leaders.

They said the constitutional succession of Juan Carlos as Chief of State would be successful only if he quickly brought democracy to the country with the assistance of qualified civilian political figures.

The dissident group calls for the convocation of a constituent assembly to write a new national constitution, which would guarantee a referendum to determine the future form of government and subsequent free elections.

The group's manifesto has also demanded immediate release of all political prisoners, "redistribution of wealth," the right of workers to organize and strike, and other social changes.

"We are in contact with every political party in Spain," one of the officers said, "including the Communist party. But I can tell you that we are not Communists, and we neither advocate nor imagine possible the kind of situation that has developed in Portugal. We also insist that in the future, the army be controlled completely by a democratically elected civilian government."

He added: "Every possible political tendency from conservative to far left is represented among us, but we all agree on the basic aims."

The two army career men

said that in recent years younger men, "mainly from the new Spanish industrial bourgeoisie like ourselves, were coming out of the military academies, 400 of them a year."

"Most of us," he said, "fit into the age bracket of 30 to 45 years old. Instead of wasting all our spare time we have been studying, studying everything, not only military subjects."

"The effect was to open our doors to new ideas, and those ideas are antifascist in essence."

Arrests Last Year

The first of the dissident officers got into trouble and were arrested in September last year, they said. Since, others have been arrested, and many received such "nonjudicial" punishment as pay reductions.

One of the dissidents sharply criticized the United States for its friendly relations with the Franco regime.

He said the officers realized that Washington had a vested interest in Spain because of its need for military bases.

"But there were thousands of ways Washington could have brought pressure on Franco to liberalize the government, without actually breaking with him," he said. "Washington never seemed willing to capitalize on the fact that Franco needed American aid and friendship at least as much as Washington needed those bases."

"We hope America will change its policy in the critical time ahead, and choose the right side in Spain while there is still a choice open to Washington."

Near East

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1975

Egypt's Top Editor Attacks Sinai Pact And Says a War Is 'Highly Probable'

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 23—Egypt's best-known journalist has come to Washington to make clear his view that President Anwar el-Sadat's agreement with Israel were "a tragic mistake" and that a new Middle East war was highly probable.

Mohammed Hassanein Heykal, sitting in his room at the Madison Hotel this morning, was his usual provocative, garrulous self, seemingly unconcerned about the effect his jabs at Mr. Sadat's policies might have only three days before the Egyptian President arrives for a 10-day visit.

Once regarded as the spokesman for the Egyptian Government, Mr. Heykal in the last two years has become a sharp critic of Mr. Sadat's policies, although he has been permitted to travel widely and publish his views outside Egypt. Mr. Heykal has been in this country for 10 days. He said his visit was not connected with Mr. Sadat's trip.

Discussing the Sinai agreements, Mr. Heykal said they were "nothing, worse than nothing." He said they "divided the Arab world, which is a horrible thing" and made the Soviet Union more mischievous.

New Class Emerging

Even more damaging to Mr. Sadat's image on the eve of his visit here was Mr. Heykal's description of Egyptian society today. He said: "You have seen how many new cars there are in Cairo; a new class is emerging."

"Some people from the West and from here think this is a healthy sign," he said, gesturing with his expensive Corona. "This is not a middle class emerging, unfortunately. This is a para-

site class emerging."

These, he said, are "parasitical elements, who are living on parasitic activities, black-marketeering, illegal trade, commissions, bribery sometimes, and it is creating a very high pattern of consumption, vulgar consumption, and a very difficult strain economically and socially."

"Where is the ordinary man?" he asked. "What is he getting in all this he asked, 'in the form of services, production, wages?' The implied answer was very little."

Confidant of Nasser

The 52-year-old Mr. Heykal has been Egypt's best-known journalist for two decades. He was a close political confidant of the late Gamal Abdel Nasser, who made him head of Al Ahram, Cairo's leading morning paper and publishing house.

He wrote a weekly column, "Speaking Frankly," that was widely read throughout the Arab world and in foreign capitals as an authoritative insight into Mr. Nasser's thinking. Mr. Nasser also appointed him as Minister for National Guidance, in effect the official Government spokesman.

After Mr. Nasser's death on Sept. 23, 1970, Mr. Heykal remained at his journalistic posts under Mr. Sadat. But his criticism of Mr. Sadat's interim accord with Israel in January, 1974, led to his departure from Al Ahram, although he continued to draw his \$500-a-month salary until last week when, in another rift with Mr. Sadat, he was dismissed altogether.

Explaining the reasons for his break with Mr. Sadat in 1974, Mr. Heykal said this morning that he thought in the aftermath of the October, 1973, war, that "we had the

historical moment for a real agreement."

'A Moment in History'

"Why?" he asked himself aloud. "For one simple psychological reason. After October, I thought there is a moment in history when the psychology of all parties was ready. I thought simply that the Arabs to a certain extent were cured, not completely cured, cured from their inferiority complex and the Israelis were more or less cured from their superiority complex and the American element was there. The agreement of the super-powers was there for the first time and there was a certain sort of Arab unity. These elements are very necessary for an agreement."

But, he said, by going for a limited Israeli-Egyptian accord, "I think we destroyed most of the chances; instead of pushing to a real settlement, we left all the real issues aside."

"I expressed these views strongly and the President thought they were embarrassing to him," Mr. Heykal said.

As a result, he was forced to give up his editorship and column in Al Ahram.

Mr. Sadat, he said, "asked me to be his press adviser, and I apologized; he asked me to be his political adviser, and I apologized; and lately, he asked me to be deputy prime minister for information and then director of his office for political affairs. And I said 'No.' This is not my job."

"I told the President I want to be a friend and help as much as I can but I don't want to accept a governmental post and I prefer to keep my freedom as a writer," Mr. Heykal said.

Mr. Heykal said that Mr.

Sadat was coming here in part to seek a vast amount of arms from the United States, but he said he doubted that the United States would give the President anything substantial.

When asked for an alternative to the current step-by-step diplomatic approach on the Middle East, Mr. Heykal had no easy solution. At one point he said that such accords were a mistake, but then he said the Syrians and Palestinians had to get "something."

"We are moving, but substituting motion for progress," he said.

Asked whether this didn't mean the prospects were very grim, he said he saw "no other probability" but war. Not only was the chance of war great, he said, but the Arab world, including Egypt, was liable to a social, class explosion similar to what he Lebanon. The conflict there, he said, the result of differences between Christians and Moslems but but between the rich and the poor.

At the moment Mr. Heykal writes a column from Cairo that is syndicated in Beirut. But most of the money that allows him to wear expensive suits and smoke expensive cigars comes from royalties from his books and articles published in the West.

On the coffee table was his latest book, "Road to Ramadan," about the October war, being published in this country by Quadrangle Books.

Mr. Heykal said he had been invited to address the annual meeting of Arab graduates of American universities last week, in Chicago and was just passing through Washington, but while here he was seeing many important people.

Africa

NEW YORK TIMES
26 Oct. 1975

U.S. Turns Cheek and Checkbook To Zaire

By COLIN LEGUM

United States policy is once again focusing more sharply on Zaire, the former Belgian Congo, which became synonymous with chaos after its ill-prepared independence in 1960. Secretary of State Kissinger is urging on a reluctant Congress the importance of voting \$60-million of emergency aid to the regime of President Sese Seko Mobutu, who was helped to power by United States policy but who nevertheless expelled the United States Ambassador last June after alleging that the Central Intelligence Agency was behind an attempted military coup.

General Mobutu would appear to be an unthankful and unpredictable ally; why is Mr. Kissinger, who has shown so little interest in African affairs, trying to persuade Congress to enlarge the United States role in Zaire?

The answer is that more than 15 years after the United States first began to assert a major role in the Congo region of Equatorial Africa, Washington's evaluation of its interests in Africa has not changed very much.

In the late fifties and early sixties, Washington decided that the precipitate withdrawal of Belgian colonial rule from the Congo threatened to open the immensely rich heart of Africa to the Communist powers. The United States saw the first Prime Minister of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba, as a possible vehicle for the Russians. Washington intervened to help the President, Joseph Kasavubu, and, later, the young army leader, Colonel Mobutu, to oust Mr. Lumumba.

Recently, a former top scientist for the Central Intelligence Agency, Sidney Gottlieb, told a Senate committee that a dose of lethal poison was shipped to the Congo intended for the assassination of Mr. Lumumba, who was killed by his enemies before the agency's agents could put their plan into effect.

Mr. Mobutu's control over his army was finally established through the joint support of the Americans, the Belgians and the Israelis. Through his dynamic, and authoritarian, rule he brought the country back from economic ruin and anarchy. The country's enormous wealth, which had previously been monopolized by the Belgians, was thrown open to other foreign investors as well. By the end of 1973 United States private investment had reached \$100-million, with a further \$100-million in the pipeline. Bilateral aid totaled \$500-million between 1960 and 1973, second only to Belgian official aid.

However, as his power increased, Mr. Mobutu began to chafe at his reputation of being so closely tied to Washington. His natural xenophobic tendencies, assumed strong nationalistic overtones at home. In his foreign relations he decided to repair his broken bridges with Moscow and, especially, with Peking.

This realignment demanded that he should also

adopt a more critical attitude toward United States policies in Africa. When Mr. Kissinger earlier this year replaced Donald Easum as Assistant Secretary of State in the Africa Bureau with the former Chilean Ambassador, Nathaniel Davies, President Mobutu took the lead in criticizing the change.

Mr. Davies recently resigned the Africa post, largely because Mr. Mobutu refused to admit him into Zaire.

These developments occurred at a time when the emergence to independence of Zaire's neighbor, the Portuguese colony of Angola, again threatens the peace. Washington decision-makers see in Angola a close parallel to the earlier situation in the Congo at the end of Belgian rule.

In Angola, too, three rival movements were vying for power. One of the groups, the Movement for Popular Liberation of Angola, led by Agostinho Neto, has many similarities to the Lumumba movement. As was true of the Congo, Angola is a desirable and wealthy trading ally; and, strategically, its government can expect to wield considerable influence in the area.

The interests of the United States and Mr. Mobutu appear once again to coincide, since the Zaire leader is also bitterly opposed to the Neto organization, and to a possible Russian-influenced neighbor.

Mr. Mobutu has backed the rival Front for the National Liberation of Angola and, to a lesser degree, the Union for the Total National Independence of Angola. Zaire also hopes to get control over the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda, whose fields are worked mainly by United States multinationals.

The Threat of Civil War

However, the Neto movement has successfully entrenched itself in the capital of Luanda and the rival movements have promised to fight back. The prospects are that when independence comes on Nov. 11 there will be a civil war.

Zaire needs United States military aid to back up the national front, and the United States needs Zaire as a channel for its sub rosa support for the anti-Soviet movement.

However, the fall in the price of copper has plunged Mr. Mobutu's economy into deep trouble. To survive politically he needs Washington's help; thus Mr. Kissinger's request to Congress for emergency aid.

The American identification with Mr. Mobutu means the United States can expect to find itself in conflict with the Organization for African Unity and with many influential African leaders who back the pro-Soviet movement.

There are at least two lessons in this history of U.S.-Zaire relations:

- So long as Washington believes it has an interest in blocking what it sees as Russian-backed governments from coming to power in strategic areas like Angola or Zaire, the United States is bound to become a party to escalating foreign entanglements.

- While leaders of developing countries welcome the aid of the major foreign powers while such leaders are engaged in a struggle for power, they always end up deeply resentful of a too-heavy dependence on their supporters once the leaders have power.

A key, and unanswerable, question is whether the big powers serve their own best interests by deep involvement in such struggles. As long as any one of the super-powers elects to play a leading role in such situations, the others, under present conditions, are almost certain to react.

Colin Legum is associate editor of *The Observer* of London and editor of *The Africa Contemporary Record*.

East Asia

Monday, October 20, 1975 THE WASHINGTON POST

Tribesmen Still Fight Pathet Lao

By Lewis M. Simons
Washington Post Foreign Service

VIENTIANE, Oct. 19—Thousands of Laotian tribal guerrillas, many of whom fought for years as U.S. Central Intelligence Agency mercenaries, are staging an intensive armed struggle against the Communist Pathet Lao.

Confirmed by a ranking Pathet Lao government official here, the fighting is going on northeast of Vientiane in the Long Tieng Valley, until just six months ago the stronghold of Brig. Gen. Vang Pao, the CIA-backed Meo leader.

The struggle, described as a "sizable insurrection" by Western military sources and "scattered fighting" by a Foreign Ministry official, is the only known serious resistance to the gentle Pathet Lao revolution that has swept the Communists into power since last spring.

The guerrillas are members of the Meo tribe, a fiercely independent people spread across the mountainous regions of Laos, North Vietnam, Thailand and southern China.

Growers and heavy users of opium, the Meo are most easily recognized by the distinctive, colorfully embroidered black dresses and pendulous silver jewelry of their women. The name "Meo," applied to them by the Chinese centuries ago, is despised by the tribesmen, who refer to themselves as

Hmong. There are some 200,000 Meo among Laos' three million people.

Armed by the CIA, the Meo reportedly have salted away huge stocks of arms and ammunition. According to one informed Western source, "They've got enough to let them carry on the fight at this rate for a least a few years."

There have been no claims by the Pathet Lao that the CIA is continuing to support the Meo. However, Meo sources hint that they are receiving food and medical supplies from neighboring Thailand.

These sources suggest that Thai air force pilots, possibly acting on their own without the knowledge of their commanders in Bangkok, are making air drops to them.

Asked about this, a senior Pathet Lao government official said he knew nothing of such supply drops. If the Meo claims were substantiated, they could seriously aggravate the already strained relations between the new Pathet Lao leadership and the government of Thai Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj.

Kukrit, whose multi-faceted coalition government is none too steady, is striving to improve relations with his Communist neighbors in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. He admitted recently that he was limiting Meo refugees in Thailand to meager rations in an effort to drive them back to Laos.

The Meo, some 35,000 of whom have taken refuge in Thailand, openly express their hopes that Kukrit will be overthrown by a military coup. A Thai military government, the tribesmen believe, would come to their assistance against the Pathet Lao.

With travel by journalists and non-Communist

diplomatic observers sharply restricted, there is little firsthand information available on the extent of the Meo insurrection.

According to a top Pathet Lao official, the fighting is "small-scale." The official, respected by Western diplomats as one of the most powerful Pathet Lao figures in Vientiane, said a number of former followers of Vang Pao were "attempting to subvert" the Pathet Lao revolution by "stealing from villages" in scattered areas of the territory known as Military Region II.

"Villagers and soldiers of the Lao People's Liberation Army are collaborating to smash these small, scattered groups," the official said.

Western military sources claim that the insurrection is far more widespread and serious. "Not a night goes by without a major firefight between the Meo and the Pathet Lao," said one source, who based his information on reports from Meo tribesmen who recently traveled from Long Tieng to Vientiane.

This source claimed that some 5,000 Meo are engaged in the struggle. They are said to be armed with CIA-supplied M-16 rifles and M-79 grenade launchers as well as Chinese and Soviet-built AK-47 assault rifles captured over the years from Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops.

The Meo are reportedly operating in small raiding parties, striking at Pathet Lao units only at night, and claiming heavy casualties among the Communist troops.

A number of Western sources claim that the Pathet Lao are receiving armed support from elements of North Vietnamese army units that have remained in Laos since the end of the fighting in Indochina.

Pathet Lao officials deny the specific claim of North Vietnamese assistance against the Meo as well as the widely held general allegation that some 40,000 North Vietnamese army regulars are spread throughout Laos.

According to Western sources who had been in the Long Tieng Valley area when the Pathet Lao took control of the country away from the right-wing elements of the Laotian coalition government, the Pathet Lao are unable to guarantee security in the region.

The insurrection flared up soon after the Pathet Lao revolution took root throughout the country, these sources said.

According to one Westerner who lived among the Meo for several years, the trouble is directly traceable to Vang Pao. This source noted that the Meo have been split into pro- and anti-Communist elements since the French Indochina war in the 1940s and 1950s.

Following the Vientiane peace agreement of 1973, mixed teams of Pathet Lao and rightist government census takers began a survey of displaced persons throughout Laos. In most parts of the country, the census had the side effect of showing villagers that Pathet Lao and rightists could work together in peace.

"But Vang Pao sealed off the second military region from the census," the source said, "and the effect was that the rightist Meo continued to live in fear of the Pathet Lao and the pro-Communist Meo. Those who didn't follow Vang Pao to Thailand felt they had no choice but to fight for their lives."

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

The U. S. Embassy in Saigon chose to believe Communist assurances that a truce would be arranged last April, rather than its own intelligence reports that the North Vietnamese intended to capture the city, according to official sources.

This acceptance of what appears to have been a deliberate Communist deception was a major element in the embassy's failure to make adequate preparations for the evacuation. Thousands of Vietnamese who had been promised that they would be taken out, as well as dozens of Americans, were left behind.

which seemed to originate in Hanoi, said that the

Sunday, October 19, 1975

The Washington Star

Hanoi Misled U.S. on Pullout In Viet Truce

United States would be given a chance for an orderly withdrawal from Vietnam during a halt in fighting.

THE MESSAGE came through the Hungarian and Polish delegations to the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS), which was created by the ineffective 1973 Vietnam cease-fire agreement. Attempts to confirm it through the Soviet Union yielded ambiguous answers that were taken by many officials as confirmation.

Officials in Washington made final preparations for a helicopter evacuation of Saigon on the basis of the intelligence reports. But they also gave some credence to the assurances, if not so much as Ambassador Graham A. Martin in Saigon did.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger said when the evacuation ended that until 24 hours before it started, "We thought there was some considerable hope that the North Vietnamese would not seek a solution by purely military means... We thought a negotiated solution in the next few days was highly probable."

But then, "The North Vietnamese obviously changed signals," Kissinger said.

Intelligence reports showed, however, that there was no change of signals. The Communists never intended to make any kind of deal. Those reports were substantiated by independent means more than a week before the final attack on Saigon and have since been verified by Communist statements.

THE PICTURE which emerges from a lengthy investigation of the last days of an American presence in South Vietnam is one of confusion compounded by wishful thinking. Martin in Saigon as well as officials in Washington wanted to believe that the assurances of a dignified, arranged ending were true.

Martin was so convinced that right up to the final air raid and rocket attacks on Saigon, he was operating as if the war was about to halt.

Even after the 4 a.m. bombardment of Tan Son Nhut air base on the outskirts of Saigon which triggered the evacuation order from Washington, Martin told members of his staff that he could not understand what went wrong.

But all along, reports from intelligence agents of proven veracity had said the Communist high command intended to smash Saigon militarily. It planned to destroy any vestige of the Nguyen Van Thieu regime, rather than making any sort of deal with it or with the Americans whom the Communists linked with Thieu in undifferentiated hatred.

The confusion which surrounded the last American days was the kind of failure of intelligence evaluation —

not collection, because the raw material was there — which had occurred many times earlier in the Vietnam and Cambodian wars. This time it had the excuse of the Communist deception about intentions.

THE ROLE of the Hungarians and Poles is unclear. It is impossible to learn whether they were deceived themselves by the Vietnamese Communists into thinking a deal might be arranged, or were informed parties to a plan to throw U. S. officials off balance by putting out a false story.

Some Americans who were involved in the high-level exchanges during the last few weeks of April believe the two Communist delegations were in on the plan. They also believe that the Soviet Union was a party to deceit, although several senior officials refuse to accept this.

Despite the initial furor in this country after the Saigon evacuation left many persons behind, there has been little public discussion of what happened. This suits the Ford administration. There has been a strong official desire just to forget about the whole mess.

President Ford set the tone at a news conference May 6, a week after the evacuation of Saigon ended. He was asked if he would welcome "a congressional inquiry into how we got in and how we got out of Vietnam."

"It would be unfortunate for us to rehash" what happened, Ford replied. "I think a congressional inquiry at this time would only be divisive and not helpful... The lessons of the past in Vietnam have already been learned... and we should have our focus on the future."

THERE HAVE BEEN half-hearted congressional attempts to probe the last days. Up to now they have been fended off by the unavailability of Martin, who has been ill, but now he has recovered and is on leave while the administration tries to figure out what to do with him.

Other officials who were in Saigon at the end have been dispersed to other jobs. The State Department and the Agency for International Development say they wanted to get them settled in new jobs, but there is a strong suspicion among many officials that Kissinger wanted to separate them in order to prevent too much comparing of recollections and mutterings about the way things were handled.

The sequence of events which led to the American retreat from Saigon has no clear starting point. The 1968 Tet offensive might be

one point, since it caused the halt of continuing U.S. escalation of the war. But the final phase started last January in Phuoc Long Province along the Cambodian border north of Saigon.

What the Communists called "the People's Liberation Armed Forces" (PLAF), and were in fact North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units with some support from troops raised inside South Vietnam, launched an offensive in Phuoc Long about New Year's Day. They encountered little resistance.

Martin had been arguing that the reduction of U. S. military aid for South Vietnam had so weakened the southern army that it was unable to hold outlying areas. Ford asked Congress in January for a \$300 million supplement to the \$700 million already appropriated for military aid in the fiscal year ending last June 30.

WHATEVER THE reason for the loss of Phuoc Long — and some observers have argued that it was corruption and a lack of will, rather than a shortage of American aid, which caused the Vietnamese army to fight poorly — the Communists drew important conclusions.

They stepped up the flow of troops and supplies southward, adding to a fighting strength and logistical base that had been built up as part of both sides' violations of the 1973 Paris Agreement. Hanoi decided that it would strike at other provinces on the border of Cambodia, where adjacent regions were being used as NVA staging areas.

An offensive began March 5 in the Central Highlands, which run along the western side of central South Vietnam. Ban Me Thuot fell five days later. In a panicky decision made without considering all its ramifications or consulting the United States, President Thieu decided to shorten his logistical lines and reduce his battlefield by withdrawing troops from the highlands.

Inadequately prepared and incompletely executed, that withdrawal touched off a general collapse in the northern and central regions. On March 26 the psychologically important old imperial capital of Hue fell to the NVA almost without a fight, and on March 29 Communists took over South Vietnam's second-largest city, Da nang.

The Communists then decided to finish the war by

capturing Saigon, not by negotiating from their new position of strength.

Defense minister, Vo Nguyen Giap, and its army chief of staff, Van Tien Dung, published an article jointly in the four main Hanoi publications on June 30 recounting how the final victory was achieved. They made it clear that the Communists had never had any intention of making a deal.

After the collapse in the highlands and the Hue-Da nang area, they wrote, "the time was ripe for our armed forces and people... striking directly at the enemy's last lair in Saigon, completely annihilating the puppet army, totally overthrowing the puppet administration and achieving complete victory."

"By late March, when the Hue battle was going to end in victory, we had already officially taken the decision to launch a historic campaign of decisive significance... bearing the name of the great President Ho Chi Minh."

This article in effect confirmed that the leadership in Hanoi had always considered Vietnam as one entity, despite the 1954 division of the country, and was in command of both parts while using the PLAF as a fiction to obscure its control. Western analysts have generally felt that the Viet Cong's National Liberation Front (NLF) had a significant southern appeal but was ultimately a creation of the unified leadership of northerners and southerners in Hanoi.

The *Far Eastern Economic Review*, a weekly news magazine published in Hong Kong, carried on Aug. 8 an interview with the chairman of the NLF's central committee presidium, Nguyen Huu Tho. Although he was a figurehead whose insignificance has been emphasized by his invisibility since the fall of Saigon, Tho's account added details.

"BY ABOUT THE beginning of the last week of March, the determination to launch the historic campaign... was officially laid down," Tho said. He did not mention who laid it down, since that would have exposed Hanoi's control.

"At that time, we definitely reaffirmed that the total collapse of the puppet army and administration was unavoidable; the United States was completely incapable of rescuing their agents in Saigon," Tho said.

American analysts noted

that in early April the NLF's Liberation Radio stopped referring to the Paris Agreement's provision for the establishment of a three-part National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord of Thieu representatives, Communists and so-called neutralists as a transition away from the Thieu regime. The radio had been using Thieu's reluctance to agree to this as a propaganda weapon, but the significance of its being dropped was not appreciated at the time.

In fact, the Communists had decided to abandon a negotiated settlement as an unnecessary encumbrance now that total victory was in sight. The Paris Agreement, which was nibbled to death by both Hanoi and Saigon, had been ignored on one more section.

Within two weeks of the Communist decision, word on it had filtered through to the Central Intelligence Agency's offices on the sixth floor of the U. S. Embassy in Saigon.

THE INFORMATION came from what Americans called the Communists' Central Office for South Vietnam, or COSVN. This was the elusively mobile military and political headquarters for the war in the southern part of South Vietnam which U. S. troops had tried unsuccessfully to capture in the May 1970 invasion of Cambodia.

COSVN was directed by Pham Hung, a member of the politburo of the Lao Dong Party the Communist organization based in Hanoi that rules Vietnam—who outranked even Gen. Giap. Since the fall of Saigon, Pham Hung has emerged as the man in charge of South Vietnam, taking precedence in official lists over Tho and leaders of the apparently powerless Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG).

Contrary to recent congressional testimony about a lack of American intelligence agents inside the Viet Cong apparatus, the CIA received occasional reports from within COSVN. Over the years, these reports had repeatedly been proven accurate.

The first report on the late-March decision to smash over Saigon was brief. Coming at a time of rapid developments and numerous intelligence reports of varying degrees of reliability, it seems not to have gotten much attention in either the Saigon Embassy or in Washington.

A FACTOR contributing to this neglect was the message which the Hungarians and Poles were beginning to whisper in American ears.

When the ICCS was set up in 1973 supposedly to insure respect for the ceasefire agreement, it was generally assumed by Westerners that delegates from the two East European countries would be sympathetic to the Vietnamese Communists while the other two elements, Canadians and Indonesians, would be more neutral or even sympathetic to Saigon's problems. Canada quit the commission when it became impossible to overcome Communist obstruction and do a meaningful supervision job, being replaced by Iran.

With the ICCS moribund, the Hungarians and Poles took on a new role of intermediaries, passing messages between the Communists and Americans. The Hungarians in particular came to be briefed regularly on April's rapid developments by the CIA station chief, Thomas Polgar, who is of Hungarian origin.

This relationship seemed to have developed because of Washington's desire to get word through to the Vietnamese Communists that would avoid any misunderstanding of U. S. intentions. The *Far Eastern Economic Review* quoted an official in Hanoi in another Aug. 8 article as saying, "The question we had to deal with was whether the United States could dispatch troops for the second time."

WHATEVER THE reason, the Hungarians "were being told far more than they (U. S. officials in Saigon) were telling anyone else at that point," according to one source.

The message which the Hungarian and Polish ICCS delegations gave Polgar was that it would be possible to arrange a truce for the purpose of an orderly evacuation of Americans and some South Vietnamese. A safe corridor from Saigon to the South China Sea for the overland movement of refugees to Vung Tau or some other seaport was mentioned.

The message also contained or implied — it is not clear which one — that the Communists would negotiate an end of the war with some acceptable administration in Saigon. That meant someone other than Thieu, with the preference for Nguyen Van Thieu Minh, the general known

from his large stature for a Vietnamese as "Big Minh." He had been a weak and ineffectual South Vietnamese chief of state for 14 months after President Ngo Dinh Diem was overthrown and murdered in November 1963.

The French embassy in Saigon was active behind the scenes at the same time. Ambassador Jean-Marie Merillon was told by his contacts that the Communists were willing to compromise an end to the war with Minh, once Thieu was removed from power. This information supported the Hungarian and Polish message and seemed to confirm it.

The military situation was looking desperate as NVA troops closed in on the Saigon area. On April 10, Ford asked Congress for an emergency allocation of \$722 million in arms aid to Saigon, plus \$250 million as an "initial" amount of economic and humanitarian aid. This was presented as a possibility of saving South Vietnam, although Kissinger conceded later a lesser goal which he had only implied at the time.

THE COURSE then being pursued, Kissinger said April 29, "was designed to save the Americans still in Vietnam and the maximum number of Vietnamese lives, should the worst come to pass." The prospects for salvaging the military situation even with massive new aid were "somewhat less than 50-50," he added.

But there were hopes of negotiating an orderly ending.

Then on April 17 the CIA received a more detailed account of the late-March decision. A source in COSVN reported that there definitely would not be any truce or negotiations with any governmental entity in Saigon, whether headed by Minh or anyone else.

Instead, the report said, plans were being made to attack Saigon as soon as preparations were completed and to capture it, destroying any semblance of organized opposition to Communist rule. One detail offered to substantiate this was that radar units were being put on Black Virgin Mountain to direct captured American-made planes for an attack on Tan Son Nhut.

Black Virgin Mountain is a volcanic cone that rises 3,235 feet above the Mekong River plain 55 miles north-northwest of Saigon. A site for American communication war, it had been captured

by NVA troops on Jan. 9.

Within two days after the COSVN report was received, photo reconnaissance had confirmed that radar was being emplaced on the mountain. But despite this and the very high rating given the report's probable reliability, it got a mixed reception in Saigon and Washington.

THE MILITARY reaction was quick.

The U. S. Navy and civilian American vessels had been on alert in the South China Sea since Ford mobilized ships for the evacuation of Danang and other coastal towns at the end of March. A higher stage of alert for an emergency evacuation of Americans from Saigon by helicopter was put into effect April 18 as a result of the new intelligence.

The U. S. aircraft carrier Enterprise sailed into Manila harbor April 18 for an announced five-day visit. It abruptly left a few hours later. The carrier Hancock, which had arrived at Singapore April 16 for a scheduled seven-day visit, also sailed April 18. All over East Asian waters, Navy ships were marshalled for impending collapse in Saigon, with most of them arriving off the South Vietnamese coast between April 19 and 21.

The State Department sent a cable to Ambassador Martin which seems to have been triggered by the intelligence, although this connection cannot be confirmed. It asked him about evacuation plans.

EVERY U. S. embassy in a hazardous situation is supposed to have an up-to-date plan to evacuate embassy personnel and other Americans. But the Saigon plan was out of date and inadequate to the situation in mid-April. Martin had always taken the attitude that Thieu's regime would last indefinitely, and therefore his subordinates — most of them hand-picked for loyalty rather than competence — had not been pressed to follow State Department regulations on this.

Some administrative divisions of the huge embassy had been asked to turn in lists not only of Americans but also of Vietnamese whose lives might be in danger if the Communists took over and therefore should be evacuated. These were tossed into a box and when the situation finally fell apart they could not be

found in the panicky chaos of embassy administration.

Martin's answer to the State Department's query was that he had no plan to evacuate local Vietnamese employees because there were too many of them and besides an evacuation would induce panic in Saigon, possibly causing Thieu to fall. At the same time, Martin's deputy, Wolfgang J. Lehmann, was telling embassy division heads at staff meetings that plans were being made to take care of their high-risk employees, for whom many of the other diplomats felt great personal responsibility.

One officer in the embassy says flatly that Martin lied to some embassy personnel about evacuation plans, but others report only evasions.

U. S. Air Force planes were evacuating some persons from Saigon at the time. They were mostly employees of the U. S. Army, while others were waiting

for further word from the embassy.

KISSINGER CABLED back after getting Martin's answer, saying it was inadequate. Under pressure from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and other congressional units, the secretary of state asked Martin to speed up the reduction of airplane evacuations so the number of persons who might need to be lifted out by helicopter would be manageable.

But Martin felt no great urgency. On the basis of the Hungarian and Polish message, he did not think a helicopter lift would be necessary.

The evaluation in Washington was complex. Every morning a number of groups met around town to review the latest developments, and late every afternoon a meeting was convened at the State Department. Chaired by Philip C. Habib, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, it

was attended most of the time by Kissinger's No. 2 man, Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll.

Representatives of State, the National Security Council, the Pentagon, the CIA and other branches of government met with Habib to try to make plans. But they were almost overwhelmed by the mass of sometimes conflicting and often confusion reports, according to one participant in the meetings.

Commenting on the April 17 report from COSVN, this source said that the CIA usually failed to indicate clearly which reports out of a mass of intelligence deserved more credence than others. A desire to protect CIA agents obscured the fact that this particular report came directly from COSVN, the source added.

APPARENTLY reflecting the intelligence, Ford said in an interview April 21 that he had the impression in the previous few days that Hanoi was seeking a

quick military takeover, but there was "no way to tell what the North Vietnamese will do." He noted that a lull in fighting had set in around Saigon earlier that day.

This turned out to be a five-day lull, beginning as Martin, Polgar and the French ambassador, Merillon, finally convinced Thieu that he should resign for the good of South Vietnam. The lull seemed to substantiate the Hungarian and Polish message of an evacuation truce, but evacuation went ahead only fairly slowly while high-risk Vietnamese remained in their jobs.

Officials here decided that, because of the conflict between intelligence and diplomatic reports, the possibility of an arranged end needed to be checked with North Vietnam. The Soviet Union was asked to inquire in Hanoi.

Tomorrow: The denouement.

The Washington Star

Monday, October 20, 1975

Moscow a Party to Deceit On Last Days of Saigon?

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

(Second of two articles).

With the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) massing troops around Saigon late last April, the United States did not know whether to expect the city to be overrun militarily — forcing an emergency helicopter evacuation of remaining Americans — or an imposed but peaceful ending that would establish Communist predominance while permitting an orderly U.S. withdrawal.

The situation was confused, the evidence conflicting.

On April 21, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger said that the Ford administration was seeking a "controlled situation" which permit a negotiated end to the long war and an orderly transition from the regime of President Nguyen Van Thieu, who resigned that day, to Communist control.

"Various negotiating efforts are going on," Kissinger added, "but it would be inappropriate for me to discuss them at this moment."

ONE CHANNEL was through the French ambassador in Saigon, Jean-Marie Merillon. He played a key role in convincing Thieu to resign because of Merillon's understanding from Communist contacts that with Thieu removed it might or would be possible to reach a compromise peace arrangement.

But more important was the word from Hungarian and Polish delegates on the International Commission of Control and Supervision

(ICCS), established by the moribund Paris cease-fire agreement of January 1973. They were telling the U.S. Embassy in Saigon that a deal was possible. It would include a truce and a corridor to the sea for the evacuation of Americans and some Vietnamese.

On the other hand, the Saigon station of the CIA had received reports from agents of proven reliability in the Communists' Central Office for South Vietnam, or COSVN, which were contradictory. A report of April 17 in particular said that in late March the Communists had decided not to compromise — that, instead, they would overrun Saigon and smash any semblance of organized resistance.

A detail of that report added that radar was being put on Black Virgin Mountain 55 miles north-northwest of Saigon to guide warplanes for an air raid as part of the attack on the city. U.S. aerial reconnaissance confirmed the radar installation.

This report triggered the abrupt diversion of U.S. Navy ships to evacuation duty off the South Vietnamese coast. But it did not convince Ambassador

Graham A. Martin in Saigon or senior officials in Washington that the Hungarian-Polish hope of an orderly end were false.

THE NEGOTIATING possibility was closely held in Washington by President Ford and a handful of officials around Kissinger. The secretary of state was, as usual, playing an almost lone hand in the tightest secrecy in apparent hope of pulling off a diplomatic miracle out of a hopeless-looking situation.

He decided to ask the Soviet Union — in the spirit of detente — to see if it could learn from Hanoi what Vietnamese Communist intentions were. This might resolve the conflict in available information.

According to several senior officials, the Soviet reply was ambiguous.

Asked if it were true that a truce and orderly evacuation were possible, Moscow came back — ostensibly after contacting Hanoi — with a reply to the effect that the United States could proceed on that assumption. One official called it "ambiguous," and another said it was "vague and uncertain."

Kissinger said in an

interview May '5, "The Soviet Union played, in the last two weeks, a moderately constructive role in enabling us to understand the possibilities there were for evacuation, both of Americans and South Vietnamese, and for the possibilities that might exist for a political evolution."

SOME LOWER officials feel that Moscow was a party to the deceit of getting the United States to believe it could get out of Vietnam smoothly and respectably. But other officials refuse to accept this, suggesting that the Soviets were kept in the dark by the Vietnamese Communist leadership and put off with a deliberately uninformative answer when they tried to act as intermediaries for Washington.

Apparently referring to the Soviet channel and messages coming from the Hungarian and Polish ICCS delegations in Saigon, and maybe the French as well, Kissinger said April 29 as the evacuation ended that "we did deal with Hanoi and with the PRG (Provisional Revolutionary Government) through different intermediaries and we were in a position to put our

views and receive responses."

The secretary of state added that until Sunday night, April 27, Washington time, which was Monday morning, April 28, in Saigon, "we thought there was some considerable hope that the North Vietnamese would not seek a solution by purely military means. . . . Duong Van Minh had then become president, and "we thought a negotiated solution in the next few days was highly probable."

"Sometime Sunday night the North Vietnamese obviously changed signals. Why that is, we do not yet know. . . . What produced this sudden shift to a military option or what would seem to us to be a sudden shift to a military option, I have not had sufficient opportunity to analyze."

Until Sunday, Kissinger said, "the battlefield situation suggested that there was a standdown of significant military activity and the public pronouncements were substantially in the direction that a negotiation would start with General Minh. There were also other reasons which led us to believe that the possibility of a negotiation remained open."

SOME INFORMED observers think the five-day lull or standdown was mainly a preparatory period for the NVA, although it began when Thieu resigned April 21. But it fit with the whisperings of a truce and orderly American withdrawal, and also with the analysis of U.S. Hanoi-watchers in Saigon.

Ignoring the absence of further references in Communist propaganda to carrying out the Paris agreement's provisions, which had significantly disappeared by early April, these analysts felt that it was in North Vietnam's interests to bring the war to a negotiated end.

The analysts reasoned that by making a deal with Minh which left some semblance of a continuing Saigon administration, although it would be subordinated in a Communist-controlled superstructure, the Communists would be able to claim the legitimacy of the agreement which had been endorsed by world powers. They also would have some claim to American aid for reconstruction.

There were other elements contributing to hopes for a truce — or creation of a deception.

A press report from Moscow April 18 said Soviets in contact with North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong did not expect them to try to achieve all-out victory by conquest. And on April 19 the PRG's representative stationed at Tan Son Nhut air base on the outskirts of Saigon under Paris agreement arrangements, Col. Vo Dong Giang, hinted at a peaceful arrangement rather than an attack.

ALL OF THESE reinforced the Hungarian-Polish message, creating a conviction by Martin and some others in the Saigon embassy that a deal was being struck. Apparently after some further detail from the ICCS Communists, and with receipt of a Soviet reply, the word went around in top embassy circles that "the fix is in."

On Thursday, April 24, Martin's deputy ambassador, Wolfgang J. Lehmann, telephoned his wife Odette in Bangkok, where she had been evacuated with other embassy dependents. Lehmann told her to come back and bring a long list of personal supplies, because a deal had been made and they would be in Saigon for some time to come.

This was at a time when, the White House said, Ford had ordered American personnel reduced "to levels that could be quickly evacuated during an emergency." Martin's embassy was operating on its own interpretations, with what looked in retrospect like wishful thinking strongly affecting analysis of the situation.

Another embassy official who had just made arrangements to pack up and ship out his valuable antiques and oriental objects had halted the arrangements. He had been told he was on the short list of persons who would stay.

The word in the embassy was that an agreement for a truce and orderly evacuation also included the Vietnamese Communist acceptance of a small continuing U.S. Embassy in Saigon. The fact that this was in flat disagreement with Liberation Radio and Hanoi media denunciations of any American presence was overlooked in the coincidence of this idea with the analytical assumption that Hanoi would want an American mission in Saigon to handle reconstruction aid.

KISSINGER'S BELIEF that the situation changed

time showed a "lag" in American perceptions.

The Giap-Dung article said that the final offensive began at 5 p.m. Saturday, April 26 — early Saturday morning in Washington. By early the next morning in Vietnam, rockets were being dropped into Saigon and attacks had started on QL15, the road from Saigon to Vung Tau. The hope of an agreed evacuation had included the Communists' leaving open that corridor to the sea.

The big American-built military logistical complex at Bien Hoa, 15 miles northeast of Saigon, was also under attack. On Sunday a team led by Erich F. von Marbod, a principal deputy assistant secretary of defense in charge of military aid to Indochina, recovered some valuable aid equipment from Bien Hoa while under artillery fire.

Von Marbod had gone secretly to Vietnam to try to get back as much U.S. aid supplies as possible before the Communists captured it. The Pentagon was worried about congressional criticism of losing more than the approximately \$800 million worth of military equipment which had already been abandoned in northern South Vietnam.

After being shot out of Bien Hoa on Sunday, Von Marbod went to see Martin on Monday morning. Martin advised him that it was unnecessary to take chances because there would shortly be a halt in fighting during which supplies as well as personnel could be evacuated by arrangement with the Communists.

VON MARBOD WENT back to Bien Hoa anyway. Again under fire, he "supervised activities for the distribution and recovery of critical high-value support equipment," according to the wording of the citation when Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger gave him the Pentagon's highest civilian award.

That afternoon, Monday, April 28, the radar on Black Virgin Mountain went into action.

On April 8, a South Vietnamese pilot named Nguyen Thanh Trung had defected and bombed Thieu's Independence Palace before flying north. He was later revealed to have been a longtime Communist agent.

According to the Far Eastern Economic Review

North Vietnamese pilots to fly American-made warplanes which had been captured in Da Nang. Four A37 Dragonfly light bombers hit Tan Son Nhut late Monday, causing surprise and a rising sense of panic.

Panic peaked at 4 a.m. Tuesday when a rocket and artillery barrage hit the air base. It was the beginning of the final Communist offensive. But Martin found that hard to believe.

AFTER DAWN HE went out to see for himself where the shells had landed, killing two U.S. Marine guards and others. Back at his embassy, Martin told staffers that he could not understand it. He still refused to believe that the Communists would persist in a military takeover, but instead thought there could or would be a political settlement.

Washington never seemed to understand, much less accept, the degree of certainty which had gripped Martin and some others in his embassy. The barrage at Tan Son Nhut led to Ford's ordering the final helicopter evacuation. Martin strung it out as long as possible, getting the maximum possible number of Vietnamese removed at the last minute after having failed to provide for them earlier.

Martin had been a controversial figure in Saigon since Nixon sent him there in 1973. He had sought to distort reports to Congress and in the press so as to put the best possible face on the situation. In the final month, he seemed unresponsive to the realities as viewed from Washington.

It was not just Congress which was exasperated with him during the delay in reducing the embassy staff to easily evacuated limits. Persons who attended the crisis meetings chaired by Habib reported very critical comments about Martin by Habib and others, at least in part reflecting the distress of embassy personnel in Saigon about the lag in arranging for the safety of Vietnamese for whom they felt responsible.

But the degree to which Martin was being led astray by the Hungarians and Poles as well as his own wishful thinking was never properly appreciated here. While Kissinger and others allowed their hopes for a peaceful settlement to rise about April 21, officials here kept in sight the need for a final col-

lapse. Martin apparently did not.

THE ULTIMATE result of the Communist decision in late March to smash all resistance came on Wednesday, April 30, in Saigon — late Tuesday here. After the last American helicopter had gone, leaving behind panicky thousands who felt abandoned, NVA troops marched into the capital with little resistance. The Giap-Dung article said that "at exactly 11:30 on 30 April our army planted the flag of the PRGRSV (PRG Republic of South Vietnam) atop the puppet presidential palace and the Ho Chi Minh campaign achieved complete victory."

At 10:24 a.m., Minh had broadcast an order for

southern soldiers to stop fighting. He said he was waiting at the palace to meet PRG representatives "to discuss the ceremony to hand over power. . . ."

But that meant Minh claimed to head a still-functioning regime which could deal with the Communists. They would have none of that. His offer was ignored.

At 3:22 p.m., some hours after he had been captured, Minh came on the air again. "The president of the Saigon administration calls on the Army of the Republic of (South) Vietnam to lay down their arms and to surrender unconditionally to the South Vietnam Liberation Army," Minh said. "I declare that the Saigon administration from the central to the local

echelons must be completely dissolved and turned over to the PRGRSV."

A Communist voice then came on and said the unconditional surrender was accepted. Nothing was left of the Thieu regime's structure or the Paris agreement concept of a three-part shared transitional arrangement.

TWO CONGRESSIONAL subcommittees have submitted letters to the State Department asking that Martin testify about those last days. They are the legislation and national security subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee and the House International Relations Committee's special subcommittee on investigations.

Martin had been in the United States for medical treatment late last winter and has been sick again since he was taken by helicopter off his embassy's roof. The subcommittees have been told orally that he could not appear because of illness.

He was discharged from a hospital almost two weeks ago and now, while on leave, is haunting the State Department asking when he will be given a new ambassadorial posting.

The White House has not decided what to do with him. Senior officials want to avoid any reopening of the Saigon sore and therefore doubt that Martin's name will ever be put before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for another appointment to ambassador.

WASHINGTON STAR
October 1975

OLIPHANT

©1975 WASHINGTON STAR



'Get him to tell you the one about the big oil and wheat deal with Russia!'

Latin America

Friday, October 24, 1975

The Washington Star

Cuba, Panama Issue Shelved

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

The Ford administration will slow down on treaty negotiations with Panama and the movement toward resumption of normal relations with Cuba until after the 1976 U.S. elections.

The "freeze" on progress toward eventual restoration of political and commercial relations with Cuba is geared to the March 9 primaries in Florida, where there are many Cuban-American voters, as well as the November elections. The negotiations with Panama for a new treaty on the canal and the Canal Zone will drag until after Americans vote next year.

Officials say the Panama decision must be regarded as practical as well as political. The administration and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger are firm in their desire for a new treaty with Panama that will result in eventual relinquishment of control of the strategic waterway and the 10-mile-wide Canal Zone to the Republic of Panama.

WHAT THEY have in mind is a treaty that would leave the United States in control of the canal until the early 21st century but with gradual sharing of functions with Panama and an end to the Canal Zone as an

American enclave from the outset.

But the administration realizes that any attempt to obtain congressional approval for a new treaty poses risks in an election-year atmosphere. If the Senate rejects the treaty, or if the House exercises its prerogative to bar transfer of any property acquired with government funds, the forecasts of experts are that there will be violence on a heavy scale by the Panamanians against the zone and the canal.

Administration analysts do not wish to thrust a treaty on Congress in a national election year when senators and representatives are most susceptible to both lobbying and voter reaction. There are congressmen who might vote for the treaty in 1977 who would not in 1976. And rejection of the treaty in either House will be enough to thrust the United States into a potential emergency that might require military intervention.

Since the last thing Washington wants is any repeat of the 1964 riots, in which the U.S. Army faced Panamanian mobs in pitched battle, Ambassador Ells worth Bunker and his negotiating team will go into low gear until the election period is past.

INFORMED sources here believe that Panama's strongman, Brig. Gen. Omar Torrijos, well understands the U.S. domestic problem. While Torrijos has tight control in Panama through his well-trained Guardia Nacional force of more than 7,000 military and police units, even he could not restrain a violent surge of nationalistic reaction should the treaty reach Capitol Hill and be defeated there.

Torrijos cannot afford to publicly acknowledge acquiescence with a slowdown in treaty negotiations, since he has made far too many flaming speeches on the subject of the Canal Zone and Panamanian sovereignty there. But privately, it is believed Torrijos and his foreign minister, Juan Tack, will go along.

In general, the United States has acknowledged that the 1903 treaty needs revision so that Panama's sovereignty and control of the zone is realized; that many U.S. functions in the zone must be transferred to Panama; that Panama should share in control, operation and defense of the isthmian waterway for a period of years and then obtain full control.

The main differences remaining to be settled lie in the time span for the handing over of the zone and the canal to Panama.

BUNKER WILL continue to travel periodically to Panama for negotiating sessions, but the administration no longer contemplates completion of the treaty or signing of the document by President Ford for at least 13 months.

The Cuban issue poses problems for any candidate in the Florida primaries where many anti-Castro Cubans are now American citizens and registered voters. The administration has made clear that it is prepared for a return to normal relations with Cuba if Premier Fidel Castro wishes this. But it also recognizes the explosiveness of the Cuban issue in Florida.

Cuba actually made it easy for the State Department to reduce the pace of restoration of ties. When the Cubans made a big show at the United Nations General Assembly recently of attacking U.S. "colonialism" in Puerto Rico and supporting independence for the island commonwealth, the United States was handed an excuse.

Only a minority of Puerto Ricans favor independence. The major issue in Puerto Rico is whether the island should opt for statehood or continue as a commonwealth.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Tuesday, October 21, 1975

U.S. and Cuba inch toward ties

By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

The United States and Cuba are, in a sense, shadow boxing as they inch toward rapprochement.

Both have in recent days set up conditions that on the surface might seem to preclude an early movement toward some sort of new U.S.-Cuba relationship.

But these conditions are, in the view of long-time observers, merely bargaining points.

Cuba last week reiterated its demand that Puerto Rico be granted independence and warned Washington that it would not give up its position for the sake of rapprochement. Earlier State Department officials had said that the Cuban position on Puerto Rico was a stumbling block in the path of normalizing relations.

The United States, for its part, has on several recent occasions

impediment to lifting the embargo on Cuba and smoothing the way to relations was the estimated \$1.6 billion in claims against the Cuban government by U.S. citizens and companies whose interests were expropriated in the early 1960s. Cuba has rejected these claims.

As far as Puerto Rico is concerned, Cuba knows that the majority of the Puerto Rican people have rejected independence, although many would like some changes in the present commonwealth status. Cuba will continue its support for independence, however, in spite of Washington's objections.

And as far as the claims of U.S. citizens and companies are concerned, Washington is aware that there is little likelihood of any compensation being paid, although some token payments might well be forthcoming in a few cases. Yet the U.S. will continue to emphasize this issue.

achieve its goal on these points and its position therefore is not implacable.

Meanwhile, Washington has acknowledged that the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba has become less and less effective. The Commerce Department in a report last week said that higher sugar prices have given Cuba more money to spend.

"Unilateral continuation of the Cuba embargo becomes a bit more costly to the United States, though that economic cost is still relatively small," the report said.

The U.S. in August eased the embargo by allowing foreign subsidiaries and affiliates of U.S. companies to do business with Cuba. The value of this business is relatively small, but it is seen as a sign of the time.

There are other signs: Cuba recently returned \$2 million to Southern Airways from a 1972 skyjacking and it granted a permit for the parents of Boston Red Sox pitcher Luis Tiant to visit their son during the conclusion of